Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SKOPJE186
2008-03-11 06:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA BEFORE MIDNIGHT: ACTING U/S FRIED

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO KV MK 
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VZCZCXRO1062
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0186/01 0710654
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110654Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7156
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0243
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2221
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000186 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO KV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA BEFORE MIDNIGHT: ACTING U/S FRIED
PRESSES FOR NAME COMPROMISE

REF: SKOPJE 179

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000186

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO KV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA BEFORE MIDNIGHT: ACTING U/S FRIED
PRESSES FOR NAME COMPROMISE

REF: SKOPJE 179

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During March 7 meetings with President Crvenkovski and
PM Gruevski, Acting U/S Fried urged both leaders to redouble
efforts to close a deal on the name dispute with Greece to
avoid a Greek veto of Macedonia's chances for a NATO
invitation at the Bucharest summit. He warned that the USG
could not force Athens to back down from its veto threat, but
offered USG assistance in the name negotiations -- in
addition to the Nimetz process -- if the GOM thought that
would be useful. Crvenkovski said there was little room for
maneuver left in the negotiations, but agreed USG assistance
would be helpful. He offered as a compromise position
acceptance of an international name (without geographic or
temporal modifiers) to replace the provisional FYROM in
international organizations and in other venues where FYROM
is used. Gruevski was less flexible, arguing that popular
sentiment has turned against a compromise solution. Gruevski
said the GOM is preparing for a Greek veto and would work to
ensure public anger over such an outcome would be directed at
Greece, and not against NATO or the U.S. Fried told Gruevski
to focus on a potential success instead, and to use his
strong political position to make the tough choices that
would secure a NATO invitation. End summary.

STRIKE A DEAL NOW
--------------


2. (C) During late-night back-to-back meetings with President
Crvenkovski and PM Gruevski March 7, Acting U/S Fried told
both leaders there was increasing support among NATO allies
for membership for Macedonia. The unresolved name dispute
with Greece was the single remaining barrier to that goal;
now was the time to strike a deal. NATO ministers wanted a
"fair and balanced" deal that the Greeks would have to
accept. A solution would give Macedonia the "keys to NATO
and EU membership," a major step forward for Macedonia's
future and regional stability. Amb. Fried also underscored

that the USG could not force the Greeks to withdraw their
threat to veto Macedonia's membership. Time was of the
essence, and there had to be faster progress in order for
Macedonia to hope to receive an invitation at Bucharest.

RESTRICTED ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION, NEED USG INVOLVEMENT
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Crvenkovski said three factors limited Macedonia's
room for maneuver -- the short time remaining until the April
NATO summit, Greece's intent to veto absent a deal on its
terms, and a low threshold of tolerance among Macedonian
political leaders and the public for a compromise that could
undermine Macedonians' national identity. The biggest
concession Macedonia could offer would be to use a different
name in international organizations permanently. No
Macedonian government in the past had been ready to tread
that path, even in the face of a three-year Greek embargo, or
at a time when only a handful of other governments had
recognized the constitutional name. Greece had sought to
turn its right to veto Macedonia's NATO membership into a
right to veto any name Skopje proposed. That was
unacceptable.

PRESIDENT: REPLACE FYROM WITH INTERNATIONAL NAME
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Crvenkovski suggested Macedonia could accept a
solution in which a name "different from the constitutional
name" could be use to replace the provisional reference FYROM
at the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and in other international
organizations in which Greece was a member. Countries would
be free to choose which name to use in bilateral relations
with Macedonia. A compound name could include such
variations as "Independent Republic of Macedonia, Sovereign
Republic of Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Macedonia,
State Republic of Macedonia (or: State of Macedonia),or
Republika Makedonija."

SKOPJE 00000186 002 OF 002




5. (C) If Greece could accept that proposal as a basis for
negotiations, then Macedonia would have room for adjusting
its position. Skopje could not, however, accept "upper,
north, modern, or new" as name modifiers. Crvenkovski noted
that the name negotiations had never before included
reference to how Macedonians would refer to themselves; the
Greeks could not expect to include such conditions in a
compromise solution. Amb. Fried said he appreciated
Crvenkovski's suggestions, while again underlining the
importance of reaching a deal with Athens that would allow
Greece to lift its membership veto threat.

PM: PUBLIC NOT READY FOR COMPROMISE
--------------


6. (C) PM Gruevski said the Macedonian public was not ready
for a compromise on the name, despite earlier public support
for an international name to be used to replace FYROM in
international institutions. The latest Nimetz proposal had
driven public support for a compromise down, Gruevski said,
"destroying the atmosphere" and sparking anti-compromise
demonstrations organized by local youth groups. As a result,
there was no public will for a compromise and no political
room left for maneuver in the negotiations, nor would there
be for at least a few months, he added.

PREPARING FOR FAILURE
--------------


7. (C) Admitting that failure to reach a deal would result in
a Greek veto, Gruevski said the GOM wanted to prepare the
public for that outcome. The government wanted to avoid an
anti-NATO, anti-U.S. backlash and would try to direct popular
anger toward Greece. The GOM still hoped Greece could be
pressured at the last minute to respect the terms of the 1995
Interim Agreement and allow Macedonia to enter NATO as FYROM.
If Greece vetoed, however, it would "set a negative
precedent, violate NATO principles, and "embarrass" the
Alliance.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) We disagree with Gruevski's assessment of the public
mood for a compromise on the name issue. The demonstrations
Gruevski mentioned were relatively small (about 2,500
participants combined) and there has been significant press
commentary on the need to reach a solution to the name issue
in order to secure a NATO invitation. We believe that a
compromise that protects Macedonia's constitutional name,
while replacing FYROM in international organizations with
something non-offensive to Macedonian sensibilities, would
receive widespread understanding among the public as a
necessary measure, if accurately explained. However, if the
compromise tilted too far toward the Greek demand that the
international name be used for almost everything else,
including bilaterally, that would be far less likely to win
acceptance here. We will urge formation of a broad coalition
of parties -- from government and the opposition -- who would
back a compromise solution as the best way to avert a Greek
veto. We will then work with Gruevski to see if he will buy
the argument that, with broad backing from government and
opposition parties, he can afford to gamble and lose (if
Greek vetoes),or claim a joint victory (if Athens accepts a
compromise and supports Macedonia's membership).
NAVRATIL