MACEDONIA/GREECE NAME ISSUE: HOPING FOR A MIRACLE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000179

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA/GREECE NAME ISSUE: HOPING FOR A MIRACLE,
SHOWING SOME FLEXIBILITY

REF: SKOPJE 173 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) In separate meetings March 6, Macedonia's name
negotiator Ambassador Dimitrov and UN mediator Ambassador
Nimetz briefed the Charge on the latest round of high level
discussions earlier the same day. Still disappointed over
the latest Nimetz proposal, Macedonian leaders are not yet
prepared to start making concessions, but signaled that they
may accept a permanent replacement for the temporary name
"FYROM." Dimitrov hoped for a new Nimetz proposal that moved
closer to Macedonia's position, or to find a way to get past
the Bucharest summit with a NATO invite. If that outcome
materialized, Macedonia would be more receptive to a
compromise. Dimitrov recommended the U.S. convey to the
Macedonian leadership that the USG does not have a "magic
formula" for an eleventh-hour resolution, absent steps toward
a compromise between Macedonia and Greece. End summary.

SOME FLEXIBILITY IN GOM'S OFFICIAL POSITION


2. (C) UN mediator Ambassador Nimetz briefed the Charge March
6 on his talks with the top Macedonian leadership earlier the
same day. Nimetz said the GOM's official position remained
the dual-name approach (i.e. use "Democratic Macedonia" or
"Independent Macedonia" with Athens, and use the
constitutional name for all others and in international
organizations). The Macedonian leaders signaled, however,
that if/if there was an agreement on a specific name,
excluding any geographic adjective or the modifier "New,"
Macedonia could use the new name "wherever FYROM currently is
used." In a subsequent meeting, Ambassador Dimitrov
confirmed Nimetz's readout and indicated that PM Gruevski
remained the stumbling block to putting a more flexible
proposal forward.

DOMESTIC POLITICS IMPEDING FLEXIBILITY


3. (C) According to Dimitrov, the latest Nimetz proposal,
which the Macedonians see as heavily biased in Greece's
favor, shocked even the "rational elements" of the GOM
leadership. A new proposal, which was "at least somewhat
acceptable" to the Macedonian side, could reinvigorate the
process, Dimitrov said. He was worried, however, that
domestic political rivalries between the ruling VMRO and
opposition SDSM were impeding GOM flexibility.

HOW TO AVOID A DEAD END?..


4. (C) Clearly frustrated, Dimitrov assessed that "we are
gradually heading towards a dead end," and neither the U.S.,
nor any other NATO ally, was giving Macedonia supportive
signals about the viability of the negotiations process. He
outlined a number of options Macedonia might pursue to try to
resolve the issue: 1.) Stick to its current dual-name
position; 2.) Accept a provisional name to replace FYROM for
7 years, pending a final agreement (see paragraph 5); 3.) Ask
for a "conditional invitation" that would allow the two sides
to resolve the issue before ratification of Macedonia's
membership; 4.) Take the matter to the International Court of
Justice. Dimitrov said that the GOM team was "genuinely
worried about the possibility of a Greek veto of Macedonia's
NATO membership." The Charge suggested that Dimitrov put
down on paper a draft position that Macedonia could
potentially accept and circulate among all major political
leaders. Once they concurred, Dimitrov could present the
document to the Prime Minister as a united national position,
which Gruevski could then decide whether to propose to
Greece, knowing he was protected domestically. Dimitrov said
he would consider doing that.

NEW "TEMPORARY NAME" FOR 7 YEARS?


5. (C) Dimitrov suggested that a provisional NATO invitation
to Macedonia, with a requirement for resolution of the name
issue prior to full membership might be acceptable here, but
he was skeptical that the Greeks would accept it. His
approach echoed Nimetz's newly-floated idea of a "temporary

name" to be used for 7 years, during which negotiations would
continue in parallel with joint history and CBM commissions
between the two countries. If no agreement was reached by
the end of the period, the matter would be referred back to
the UNSC. Dimitrov said that the idea was "acceptable in
principle," but rejected the names that Nimetz had floated
again ("Republic of Makedonija-Skopje" and "Northern Republic
of Macedonia"). Nimetz said he planned to ask Athens whether
it could accept a halfway solution in order to get past the
Bucharest summit with a NATO invite for Skopje. The names he
mentioned he would test again with the Greeks were
"Independent Republic of Macedonia," "Democratic Republic of
Macedonia" and "Republika Makedonija."

HOPING FOR A U.S. DEUS EX MACHINA...


6. (C) Both Nimetz and Dimitrov felt the GOM's "strategy" now
boiled down to waiting for "the Americans to help us resolve
this." Convinced of the futility of such an approach,
Dimitrov suggested that the most useful message the U.S.
could convey to Macedonia at this time was that "the U.S. has
no magic wand to make this problem disappear, and that we
will have to reach an agreement with the Greeks." He
suggested that a letter, or a phone call from "the highest
levels in Washington" to the top leaders in Macedonia might
provide the needed wake up call for the Macedonian leadership.

COMMENT


7. (C) Our conversations yesterday showed that the
Macedonians are down, but not yet out. Disappointed and
convinced that the latest Nimetz proposal was unfairly
slanted towards Greece, Macedonia's top leaders are concerned
about the impact on Macedonia's future of a Greek veto. They
are hesitant to start making compromises in the absence of
any sense that Greece would reciprocate, and out of concern
over increasing attacks by their domestic political rivals.
A reliable voice of reason, Ambassador Dimitrov is
pessimistic and feels that the only way the process could
progress is for Nimetz to make an urgent new proposal that
tilts at least a bit towards the Macedonian side. The
Macedonians are hoping that NATO allies, out of concern for
regional stability, will prevent Greece from vetoing. We
will continue to encourage the Macedonians towards greater
flexibility and away from simply hoping for a U.S.-delivered
solution.
NAVRATIL