Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SKOPJE173
2008-03-04 16:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:
MACEDONIA: PREPARING FOR NIMETZ NAME TALKS, ROUND
how-toVZCZCXYZ4268 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSQ #0173/01 0641624 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041624Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7140 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0236 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2216 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000173
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PREPARING FOR NIMETZ NAME TALKS, ROUND
II
REF: SKOPJE 87 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
(C)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000173
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PREPARING FOR NIMETZ NAME TALKS, ROUND
II
REF: SKOPJE 87 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
(C) 1. In separate meetings March 4, the closest advisors to
PM Gruevski and President Crvenkovski gave us the latest
Macedonian thinking on the eve of the arrival of UN mediator
Ambassador Nimetz. Even though the PM's and the President's
offices suggested different red lines in the name
negotiations, the overall feeling here is that the
Macedonians are on the verge of resigning themselves to a
veto, while faintly hoping for an eleventh-hour miracle by
the U.S. The Charge stressed that only active engagement in
the Nimetz process could lead to a positive outcome. End
summary.
NIMETZ'S NEW IDEAS ARE WELCOME, BUT OUR POSITION IS FIRM...
(C) 2. With the PM's Chief of Staff Martin Protoger, the
Charge stressed the importance of flexibility and continuous
positive engagement in the Nimetz process. Protoger said the
PM would "look at any new ideas Nimetz might have," but noted
that the PM's position remained that a name for bilateral use
with Greece only was the only viable compromise. The Charge
encouraged Protoger to look for a way for Macedonia to take
full advantage of the Nimetz process and defend Macedonia's
interests while showing a willingness for compromise.
Putting a positive proposal forward would give Nimetz and the
rest of NATO something to work with, the Charge emphasized.
He urged that Macedonia give Nimetz a proposal that included
acceptable elements of Nimetz's latest proposal. For
example, one or more acceptable names from the Nimetz list
for use at the UN, NATO, etc.; a statement in the agreement
that says other countries can decide whether to use the
constitutional name or the international name; a line in an
inside page of the passport that states the fact that
Macedonia uses the international name at the UN, NATO, etc.
and in some cases bilaterally.
DON'T QUIT
(C) 3. The Charge assured Protoger that the U.S. strongly
supports the UN process and urged that Macedonia not quit. A
frustrated Protoger responded that the citizens wanted "NATO,
but not with broken dignity and honor." He pointedly asked
if the U.S. had a Plan B in case of a veto. Without
speculation on "day after" scenarios, the Charge predicted
that Macedonia's engagement, or lack of engagement, in the
Nimetz process would largely determine the perceptions of all
NATO allies. If Macedonia took a step forward by advancing a
constructive proposal that addressed Greece's concerns,
Macedonia would gain international sympathy and would be in a
much better position in the event of a veto.
SCOPE OF USE -- A REPLACEMENT FOR FYROM
(C) 4. In a separate meeting the same day with P/E Chief,
President Crvenkovski's Chief of Staff Natasha Savova
reported that President Crvenkovski had instructed Ambassador
Dimitrov the day before to tell interlocutors in Washington
that Macedonia would be willing to use "Democratic Republic
of Macedonia" everywhere the provisional name FYROM was used,
including at the UN and in other international organizations,
but not bilaterally or on passports. She said the President
preferred that such a proposal for the scope of use come from
Nimetz. Savova said she did not know whether PM Gruevski
would accept that formulation, but added that Crvenkovski was
prepared to "go public" with the proposal if Gruevski
rejected it. (Note: Crvenkovski's threat to go public with
this broader proposal (compared to the PM's "only with
Greece" position) is at odds with his desire to have Nimetz
make such a proposal. End note.)
COMMENT
(C) 5. Our meetings today and Charge's conversation with the
Foreign Minister on Friday suggest that the Macedonian side
feels heavily inclined to resign itself to a veto, while
harboring waning hopes that the U.S. will somehow save the
day. The best hope for resolving this is to convince them
not to give up, and instead take a proactive stance with
Nimetz.
NAVRATIL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PREPARING FOR NIMETZ NAME TALKS, ROUND
II
REF: SKOPJE 87 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
(C) 1. In separate meetings March 4, the closest advisors to
PM Gruevski and President Crvenkovski gave us the latest
Macedonian thinking on the eve of the arrival of UN mediator
Ambassador Nimetz. Even though the PM's and the President's
offices suggested different red lines in the name
negotiations, the overall feeling here is that the
Macedonians are on the verge of resigning themselves to a
veto, while faintly hoping for an eleventh-hour miracle by
the U.S. The Charge stressed that only active engagement in
the Nimetz process could lead to a positive outcome. End
summary.
NIMETZ'S NEW IDEAS ARE WELCOME, BUT OUR POSITION IS FIRM...
(C) 2. With the PM's Chief of Staff Martin Protoger, the
Charge stressed the importance of flexibility and continuous
positive engagement in the Nimetz process. Protoger said the
PM would "look at any new ideas Nimetz might have," but noted
that the PM's position remained that a name for bilateral use
with Greece only was the only viable compromise. The Charge
encouraged Protoger to look for a way for Macedonia to take
full advantage of the Nimetz process and defend Macedonia's
interests while showing a willingness for compromise.
Putting a positive proposal forward would give Nimetz and the
rest of NATO something to work with, the Charge emphasized.
He urged that Macedonia give Nimetz a proposal that included
acceptable elements of Nimetz's latest proposal. For
example, one or more acceptable names from the Nimetz list
for use at the UN, NATO, etc.; a statement in the agreement
that says other countries can decide whether to use the
constitutional name or the international name; a line in an
inside page of the passport that states the fact that
Macedonia uses the international name at the UN, NATO, etc.
and in some cases bilaterally.
DON'T QUIT
(C) 3. The Charge assured Protoger that the U.S. strongly
supports the UN process and urged that Macedonia not quit. A
frustrated Protoger responded that the citizens wanted "NATO,
but not with broken dignity and honor." He pointedly asked
if the U.S. had a Plan B in case of a veto. Without
speculation on "day after" scenarios, the Charge predicted
that Macedonia's engagement, or lack of engagement, in the
Nimetz process would largely determine the perceptions of all
NATO allies. If Macedonia took a step forward by advancing a
constructive proposal that addressed Greece's concerns,
Macedonia would gain international sympathy and would be in a
much better position in the event of a veto.
SCOPE OF USE -- A REPLACEMENT FOR FYROM
(C) 4. In a separate meeting the same day with P/E Chief,
President Crvenkovski's Chief of Staff Natasha Savova
reported that President Crvenkovski had instructed Ambassador
Dimitrov the day before to tell interlocutors in Washington
that Macedonia would be willing to use "Democratic Republic
of Macedonia" everywhere the provisional name FYROM was used,
including at the UN and in other international organizations,
but not bilaterally or on passports. She said the President
preferred that such a proposal for the scope of use come from
Nimetz. Savova said she did not know whether PM Gruevski
would accept that formulation, but added that Crvenkovski was
prepared to "go public" with the proposal if Gruevski
rejected it. (Note: Crvenkovski's threat to go public with
this broader proposal (compared to the PM's "only with
Greece" position) is at odds with his desire to have Nimetz
make such a proposal. End note.)
COMMENT
(C) 5. Our meetings today and Charge's conversation with the
Foreign Minister on Friday suggest that the Macedonian side
feels heavily inclined to resign itself to a veto, while
harboring waning hopes that the U.S. will somehow save the
day. The best hope for resolving this is to convince them
not to give up, and instead take a proactive stance with
Nimetz.
NAVRATIL