MACEDONIA: FM MILOSOSKI ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION &

C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO KV MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: FM MILOSOSKI ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION &
NAME NEGOTIATIONS

REF: SKOPJE 143 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) IN A FEBRUARY 29 MEETING WITH THE CHARGE, FM MILOSOSKI
REITERATED THE GOM'S STANCE THAT DEMARCATION OF THE
KOSOVO-MACEDONIA BORDER SHOULD BEGIN BEFORE MACEDONIA
RECOGNIZES KOSOVO. SKOPJE ALSO WANTS TO AVOID ANY
DISCUSSIONS WITH PRISTINA OF THE 2001 SKOPJE-BELGRADE
AGREEMENT ON THE BORDER THAT MIGHT SUGGEST KOSOVO IS
INTERESTED IN CHANGING THE ACTUAL DELINEATION OF THE BORDER.
MILOSOSKI WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CHANCES FOR AN AGREEMENT
UNDER THE NIMETZ PROCESS ON THE NAME DISPUTE, AND THE GOM
EXPECTS A GREEK VETO OF ITS NATO CANDIDACY AS A RESULT. THE
CHARGE URGED THE GOM TO ENGAGE FLEXIBLY AND ACTIVELY IN THE
NIMETZ PROCESS. HE NOTED THAT THE USG IS WORKING IN BRUSSELS
AND ALLIED CAPITALS TO PERSUADE GREECE NOT TO VETO, BUT
UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS IN FINDING A MUTUALLY
AGREED RESOLUTION OF THE NAME ISSUE IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE
PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. END SUMMARY.

KOSOVO RECOGNITION AFTER DEMARCATION PROCESS BEGINS


2. (C) DURING A FEBRUARY 29 MEETING WITH THE CHARGE, FM
MILOSOSKI CONVEYED GOM CONCERNS REGARDING KOSOVO DEPUTY PM
KUQI'S FEBRUARY 28 PUBLIC STATEMENT INDICATING THAT MACEDONIA
SHOULD RECOGNIZE KOSOVO BEFORE DEMARCATION OF THE
KOSOVO-MACEDONIA BORDER COMMENCES. THE GOM FOUND THAT
STATEMENT "UNHELPFUL" AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEMARCATION
PROVISIONS OF THE AHTISAARI PLAN. THE GOVERNMENT HAD
RESPONDED POLITELY BUT FIRMLY TO PM THACI'S LETTER ON KOSOVO
RECOGNITION, NOTING THE AHTISAARI PLAN'S PROVISIONS FOR
FORMING A JOINT TECHNICAL COMMISSION (JTC) TO BEGIN PLANNING
FOR DEMARCATION.


3. (C) MILOSOSKI ASKED THAT THE USG SHARE WITH PRISTINA THE
GOM'S CONCERNS THAT KUQI'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL,
ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN MACEDONIAN CITIZENS FELT BESIEGED
BY GREEK THREATS TO VETO MACEDONIA'S NATO CANDIDACY AND WERE
WARY OF THE THREAT OF A SERB EMBARGO IN THE EVENT SKOPJE
RECOGNIZED KOSOVO. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, HE CONTINUED, IF PM
THACI REITERATED HIS EARLIER ASSURANCES TO PM GRUEVSKI THAT
KOSOVO WAS WILLING TO BEGIN FORMING THE JTC, EVEN IF
RECOGNITION WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY FORTHCOMING. MOVING AHEAD ON
DEMARCATION WOULD REINFORCE PRISTINA'S "POSITIVE IMAGE" AND
WOULD GIVE SKOPJE A USEFUL, CONCRETE ARGUMENT TO USE WITH ITS
PUBLIC IN FAVOR OF RECOGNITION.


4. (C) IF THE DEMARCATION PROCESS DID NOT BEGIN SOON,
MILOSOSKI SAID, THEN RECOGNITION PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT
UNTIL AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IN APRIL. WITH A NATO INVITATION
IN HAND, MACEDONIA WOULD BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO WEATHER
NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTIONS TO PRISTINA'S INSISTENCE ON
RECOGNITION BEFORE DEMARCATION. LEFT UNSAID WAS WHAT
MACEDONIA'S POSITION WOULD BE IF IT DID NOT/NOT RECEIVE AN
INVITATION AS A RESULT OF A GREEK VETO (SEE BELOW). THE
GOVERNMENT WANTED TO AVOID "LONG DISCUSSIONS" BETWEEN SKOPJE
AND PRISTINA ON THE BORDER DELINEATION CONTAINED IN THE 2001
SKOPJE-BELGRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH COULD RAISE PUBLIC CONCERNS
ABOUT HAVING TO "CHANGE THE BORDER." IN RESPONSE TO THE
CHARGE'S QUESTION REGARDING THE TIMING OF RECOGNITION,
MILOSOSKI SAID THE GOM WOULD EXPECT THE JTC TO BE FORMED
FIRST, AFTER WHICH RECOGNITION COULD FOLLOW.

NATO AND THE NAME -- "WE NEED A HELPING HAND, NOT ARM
TWISTING"


5. (C) MILOSOSKI REITERATED EARLIER GOM DESCRIPTIONS OF THE
RECENT NIMETZ PROPOSAL (REFTEL) FOR RESOLVING THE NAME
DISPUTE AS "COMPLETELY UNWORKABLE." THE GOVERNMENT HAD BARELY
AGREED TO STAY ENGAGED IN THE NIMETZ PROCESS AFTER ITS
INITIAL DISMAY AT THE CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSAL. WHAT
MACEDONIA NEEDED, HE SAID, WAS "A HELPING HAND, NOT ARM
TWISTING." NATO'S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES, MILOSOSKI CONTINUED,
"SHOULD NOT BE CORRUPTED BY ONE OF ITS MEMBERS." MACEDONIA
DID NOT WANT TO BE PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO SAVE PM KARAMANLIS'S
GOVERNMENT FROM FALLING. THE US, HE SAID, COULD USE ITS
LEVERAGE WITH GREECE BY THREATENING, FOR EXAMPLE, TO JOIN
TURKEY'S FOOTNOTE ON NATO DOCUMENTS IF ATHENS WIELDED ITS
VETO.



6. (C) THE CHARGE REITERATED THAT THE USG'S GOAL OF A NATO
ENLARGEMENT THAT INCLUDED MACEDONIA REMAINED UNCHANGED, AND
NOTED THAT WE WERE WORKING IN BRUSSELS AND IN OTHER ALLIED
CAPITALS TO PREVENT A GREEK VETO. ALTHOUGH GREECE HAS THE
OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE 1995 INTERIM ACCORD, THE THREAT OF
A VETO IS REAL. WE WANTED TO EXTEND A HELPING HAND TO
SKOPJE, NOT TWIST ARMS, IN ORDER TO REACH A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE NAME ISSUE. BUT MACEDONIA HAD TO
BE FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATING, AND HAD TO STAY ENGAGED IN THE
PROCESS, IN ORDER FOR US TO BEST BE ABLE TO PERSUADE ALL NATO
ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY GREECE, TO SUPPORT AN INVITATION.

NEXT STEPS -- EXPECTING A GREEK VETO


7. (C) MILOSOSKI SAID THE GOM WOULD WAIT FOR NAME NEGOTIATOR
AMBASSADOR DIMITROV TO REPORT BACK FROM THE TALKS ON THE
NIMETZ PROPOSAL THAT WERE TAKING PLACE ON FEBRUARY 29 IN NEW
YORK. THE PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENT, AND MAIN POLITICAL
PARTY LEADERS WOULD THEN MEET TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS. THE
OPPOSITION, HE CLAIMED, ALREADY HAD ACCUSED PM GRUEVSKI OF
HAVING "COMMITTED TREASON" FOR HAVING AGREED TO A COMPOSITE
NAME FOR INTERNATIONAL USE. (COMMENT: AN OPPOSITION LEADER
DID/DID LEVEL A TREASON ACCUSATION AGAINST GRUEVSKI'S
MINISTER OF INTERIOR, BUT NOT AGAINST GRUEVSKI, AND THE
CHARGE WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MINISTER'S ALLEGED
MISHANDLING OF A PRO-NAME PROTEST IN SKOPJE. END COMMENT.)


8. (C) MILOSOSKI SAID THE GOM EXPECTED PM KARAMANLIS TO VETO,
FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, EVEN IF THE TWO SIDES REACHED
AN AGREEMENT IN THE NAME TALKS. THAT WOULD ALLOW KARAMANLIS
TO PAINT FM BAKOYANNIS'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE AS A
FAILURE, STRENGTHENING THE GREEK PM'S POLITICAL HAND. HE
SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD
EITHER REACH AN AGREEMENT, OR AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE, BEFORE
THE APRIL NATO SUMMIT. THE CHARGE URGED CONTINUED MACEDONIAN
ENGAGEMENT IN THE NIMETZ PROCESS, AND SUGGESTED SKOPJE WORK
TO SHAPE THE DIRECTION OF THE TALKS BY PUTTING FORWARD WHAT
IT COULD ACCEPT IN THE NIMETZ PROPOSAL AND NEGOTIATING ON THE
POINTS IT FINDS PROBLEMATIC. EVEN IF A FINAL AGREEMENT
CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BEFORE BUCHAREST, REAL PROGRESS OR AN
"AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE" COULD POSSIBLY PERSUADE GREECE TO
LIFT ITS VETO THREAT. MILOSOSKI REPLIED THAT THE MACEDONIANS
WERE "OPTIMISTS," BUT WOULD NOT "ALLOW OUR PRAGMATISM TO BE
USED TO PAY FOR THE POLITICAL MISTAKES OF OUR GREEK
NEIGHBORS."

COMMENT


9. (C) FROM MILOSOSKI'S DESCRIPTION, THE GOM APPEARS RESIGNED
TO A GREEK VETO. HOWEVER, PRIME MINISTER GRUEVSKI REMAINS
THE PRIMARY DECISION MAKER. THE LACK OF ANY APPRECIABLE
PROGRESS IN THE NIMETZ TALKS IN NEW YORK OVER THE MARCH 1-2
WEEKEND LIKELY HAS FURTHER REINFORCED MACEDONIAN FATALISM
ABOUT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS, AND THUS THE
COUNTRY'S NATO PROSPECTS. WE WILL CONTINUE PRESSING FOR
MACEDONIAN FLEXIBILITY AND ENGAGEMENT, BUT THE GREEK
GOVERNMENT'S FIRM, PUBLIC VETO THREATS ARE HAVING THE EFFECT
HERE OF HARDENING RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA OF MAKING
COMPROMISES THAT MIGHT PERSUADE GREECE TO LIFT ITS VETO
THREAT.
NAVRATIL