MACEDONIA'S PRESIDENT ON LATEST NAME PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000140

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S PRESIDENT ON LATEST NAME PROPOSAL

REF: SKOPJE 64 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) President Crvenkovski briefed the Ambassador February
19 on the state leadership's reaction to the latest Nimetz
proposal, which had been provided to the Greek and Macedonian
sides the night before. In a dispassionate, moderate
analysis, Crvenkovski said the proposal was unexpected and
contained elements and formulations the GOM side could not
accept. It listed "New Macedonia" as a possible name
(despite PM Gruevski having identified that option as a
redline for the Macedonian side). Of far greater concern,
however, were changes to the overall approach -- including
that the name for international organizations be used in
official Macedonian documents and that the UN would encourage
nations to use the international organization name in
bilateral relations. Seeing the proposal as heavily weighted
against Macedonia, Crvenkovski nevertheless assured the
Ambassador he would discuss with the Prime Minister ways to
keep the process moving forward. End summary.

REQUIRES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
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2. (C) President Crvenkovski met with the Ambassador February
19 to brief her on UN Special Envoy Nimetz's latest proposal
on the name issue, which had been provided to the Greek and
Macedonian sides on February 18. Analyzing the framework of
the new proposal, Crvenkovski said the stipulation that the
international name (IN) be used beyond international
organizations, to include in multilateral treaties, on
passports, etc., was impossible to accept. That requirement
was a major departure from earlier Nimetz formulations, he
added, since it not only required others/others to refer to
Macedonia by the IN, but would compel Macedonians to do so as
well. Furthermore, the proposal would require Macedonia to
amend its constitution (there is even a specific paragraph on
this) to allow Macedonia to refer to itself by the IN on
passports and when signing multilateral treaties, while
Macedonian citizens would continue to refer to themselves by
their constitutional name. That requirement also was a
non-starter.


3. (C) COMMENT: The proposal to issue passports using the IN
surprised and angered the Macedonians. The concept of
issuing official documents with anything other than the
constitutional name essentially negates the provision that
the constitutional name remains unchanged. We are unfamiliar
with any precedent of a nation issuing national documents
(e.g. passports, driver's licenses) under a name other than
its own. It is not entirely clear whether a constitutional
amendment or just a regular law would be required, but in any
case we would not expect any serious consideration of
changing the name used in passports. END COMMENT

BILATERAL USAGE PRINCIPLE UNDERMINED
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4. (C) Crvenkovski also objected to the suggestion that the
IN would be considered for use in other official
international usage and for bilateral usage, a position he
said had never been contemplated in earlier proposals. He
drew a distinction between (acceptably) leaving it open and
(unstated) to every sovereign nation to decide by what name
to recognize and refer to Macedonia, and the (unacceptable)
formulation in the proposal that would have the UN encourage
use of the international name for bilateral recognition.

NAME OPTIONS UNACCEPTABLE
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5. (C) The President noted the five name proposals in the
text (Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, Democratic
Republic of Macedonia, Independent Republic of Macedonia, New
Republic of Macedonia, and Republic of Upper Macedonia)
included two (New and Upper) that were completely
unacceptable to the GOM. He suspected Nimetz would ask both

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sides to each delete two names, and expected the fifth name
remaining to be Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, which
Skopje likewise could not accept. He noted the linkage
between that suggestion and Bulgaria's earlier rejection of
the existence of the Macedonian language and Sofia's 1999
references to "the Macedonian language, in accordance with
the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia." The
Ambassador noted that the five names were only suggested
options, and that others could be put on the table as part of
a revised package proposed by either side.

HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF THIS "BAD PROPOSAL"?
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6. (C) Overall, Crvenkovski said, he had been willing to
consider a "good proposal" from Nimetz, along the lines of
Nimetz's 2005 proposal and in keeping with the framework
Nimetz proposed a few months ago, but this was a "bad
proposal," the "worst Nimetz had ever tabled." He had been
planning how to get the political leadership together to
unite behind an acceptable name and finish things, while now
he could not even be sure he could convince the PM not to
reject the entire proposal. According to him, Gruevski
believed it would be easier to justify to the public
rejecting the deeply flawed (from Skopje,s perspective)
package now, and then hoping for another Nimetz proposal in a
week or two.


7. (C) The President said that, instead of rejecting the
proposal, he would propose to Gruevski that the GOM take the
following steps:

- Highlight what was acceptable in the proposal, and what was
not, including the GOM,s acceptance of the modifiers
"Independent" or "Democratic" for the IN if they were used
only in international organizations, and provided the
constitutional name remained in use for bilateral relations;

- Agree that Nimetz could address international use only/only
in further discussions, but not bilateral use. That would
include deleting provisions on the use of the IN for
Macedonian passports ("he cannot tell us how to refer to
ourselves.")


8. (C) Crvenkovski cautioned it was possible Gruevski would
reject the proposed way forward, but if he did so, the GOM
would need to know what next steps they would have to take.
If Nimetz invited both the Greek and Macedonian negotiators
to New York to hear their positions, and then produced a
compromise solution out of both sides' proposals, would the
GOM be bound to accept it?

DON'T SAY NO, KEEP TALKING!
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9. (C) Emphasizing that she was not talking on instructions
from Washington, the Ambassador stressed the Greeks likewise
were not likely to find the proposal acceptable. Both sides
would need to compromise. It was important for Skopje not to
say NO or walk away from the process. The proposal contained
a "menu" of options for which the GOM could offer a
counterproposal, as long as it kept the process alive. She
did not believe the proposal was a "take it or leave it"
offer. The Macedonian could side could say YES, even if
conditionally, with comments on what was acceptable in the
package. As the process continued, there would be an
increased international desire to see it succeed, which would
help build momentum toward compromise.

WHAT IF THE WORST HAPPENS?
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10. (C) Clearly frustrated, Crvenkovski asked what we thought
would happen if Greece blocked Macedonia's NATO invitation.
What would happen to Macedonian troop deployments in
Afghanistan and Iraq? To inter-ethnic relations and Framework
Agreement implementation? To the country's EU perspective? A
"bad atmosphere" would prevail domestically, which would
affect the region. The Ambassador said we understood well
the consequences of a veto. That was what was driving our
efforts to keep the Nimetz process going, with a resolution

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of the name issue either before the Summit or agreement in
sight. We did not believe that a Macedonian "Plan B" to
"change the name at the UN" had much chance of succeeding,
given the need for the UNSC to agree to such a move. And
even if successful, it would not remove the roadblock of
Greece refusal to permit Macedonia to enter NATO and the EU.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The latest proposal came as a shock to the GOM as it
differs substantially and negatively (from Skopje,s
viewpoint) from past proposals, including the framework
recently proposed by Nimetz. The introduction of elements
that appear in practical terms to negate the paragraph saying
the constitutional name remains unchanged, and the contrast
between the nature of the proposal, and the hope that had
started to build that with a "good" proposal Macedonia might
be able to accept something, all combine to make prospects
very difficult.


12. (C) It was clear that even the President, who is far more
experienced and professional than the Prime Minister, felt
that there was a grave risk in negotiating from a position of
weakness, e.g., from the new Nimetz draft, since their
proposed revisions would be based on a far less evenhanded
proposal than many in the past. The Ambassador countered
that there is only benefit from negotiating. She underscored
that it was important to give Nimetz space to continue
discussions and offer some positive ideas. Crvenkovski is
well disposed, and we are actively supportive of getting to
yes or at least not announcing no. But the proposal has
dashed hopes and given PM Gruevski a lot of ammunition and
incentive to act swiftly and negatively.
MILOVANOVIC