Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHENYANG48
2008-04-10 01:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shenyang
Cable title:  

MORE INTERNAL PRC RESEARCH ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS:

Tags:  PREF PINR PGOV PREL PHUM KN KS CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8080
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHSH #0048/01 1010112
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100112Z APR 08
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8388
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0515
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0107
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0075
RHHJJAA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI 0039
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0048
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0097
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0541
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000048 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREF PINR PGOV PREL PHUM KN KS CH
SUBJECT: MORE INTERNAL PRC RESEARCH ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS:
POLICY AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 12

B. (B) 07 SHENYANG 229

C. (C) 07 SHENYANG 196

D. (D) SHENYANG 38

E. (E) 07 SHENYANG 31

F. (F) 07 SHENYANG 78

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN.
REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREF PINR PGOV PREL PHUM KN KS CH
SUBJECT: MORE INTERNAL PRC RESEARCH ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS:
POLICY AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 12

B. (B) 07 SHENYANG 229

C. (C) 07 SHENYANG 196

D. (D) SHENYANG 38

E. (E) 07 SHENYANG 31

F. (F) 07 SHENYANG 78

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN.
REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Northeast China is home to 10,000-20,000
North Koreans, according to the internal research of
another one of the few Chinese specialists studying North
Korean border-crosser issues for the PRC Government. PRC
policy toward North Korean border-crossers shifted in 2002
in part because of growing evidence of the involvement of
some crossers in criminal activity, said the specialist,
who noted that Chinese border officials remain frustrated
by the laxity of the DPRK's border control. A small cohort
of scholars has explored certain policy alternatives to
arresting and repatriating North Koreans. A major push for
policy change, however, remains unlikely, not only because
of political considerations, but also because of the
professional reluctance of scholars to advocate radical
policy alternatives that are likely to be perceived
negatively by superiors. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Poloff met privately February 21 with WU Jianhua
(STRICTLY PROTECT),a North Korea expert at the Liaoning
Academy of Social Sciences (LASS) and part of a small,
informal cohort of northeastern Chinese scholars
researching North Korean border-crosser issues on behalf of
the PRC government. This is the fourth in an irregular
series of reports exploring internal PRC thinking on North
Korean border-crosser issues and the researchers sanctioned
by the Chinese government to study them (see refs A-C for
previous).

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY
--------------

3. (C) A government scholar also active on PRC-DPRK border
security and cross-border trade issues, Wu conducts

classified, internal ("neibu") research on North Korean
border-crossers. Much of his research is field/survey-
based, like that of the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences'
ZHOU Weiping (refs C, A) and LASS' LU Chao (refs B, D),two
other northeastern Chinese government specialists with whom
Wu has collaborated in the past. In the field, Wu--who
studied in Pyongyang in the late 1980s, again in the early
2000s and returns each year--has interviewed North Korean
border-crossers living in Dandong, Yanbian and other parts
of northeast China's borderlands. He has also been
permitted to interview PRC border authorities and detained
North Korean border-crossers in situ at Dandong's detention
center for apprehended North Koreans.

ESTIMATES OF NORTH KOREAN BORDER-CROSSERS IN CHINA
-------------- --------------

4. (C) Wu's estimates of North Korean border-crossers in
China are lower than those of other researchers in his
cohort. Though well-known methodological problems make
reliable statistics difficult, Wu believes northeast China
is home to roughly 10,000-20,000 North Korean border-
crossers, primarily situated in Jilin and Liaoning
provinces and, to a lesser extent, in Heilongjiang
Province. (Ref C and the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences'
Zhou Weiping puts the number closer to 50,000, largely
concentrated in Jilin Province's Yanbian Korean Autonomous
Prefecture.)


5. (C) Queried on his interviews of border-crossers
detained in Dandong, Wu--echoing comments made by another
scholar (ref C)--reported that PRC border police continue
to (re)apprehend North Koreans that they have arrested and
repatriated to the DPRK. In interviews, certain detainees
said they did not fear repatriation and, in some cases,
rather defiantly declared that they would again return to
China, according to Wu. The ability of North Koreans like
these to make multiple forays into China after repatriation
underscores, in part, the corruption of North Korean

SHENYANG 00000048 002 OF 002


soldiers and other security personnel on the DPRK side of
the border, Wu said. It also suggests, in select cases,
ties of some border-crossers to resilient criminal networks
in North Korea, Wu asserted without offering further
elaboration. He repeatedly emphasized local Chinese border
officials' frustration at the laxity of the PRC-DPRK
border, putting the bulk of the blame squarely onhe DPRK.
(NOTE: Corruption on the Chinese side of the border remains
a problem on this front as well; see, for instance, refs E-

F. END NOTE.)

PRC POLICY EVOLVES: 2002 AS TURNING POINT
--------------

6. (C) Turning to PRC policy toward North Korean border-
crossers, Wu explained that until 2002, Beijing and local
northeastern Chinese government officials benignly
neglected North Koreans "living peacefully" in northeast
China. But in 2002, PRC policy toward North Korean border-
crossers officially shifted, requiring the arrest and
repatriation of "illegal migrants" to the DPRK. The well-
known, high-profile incursions into diplomatic facilities
in 2002 was only one catalyst, according to Wu. The other
catalyst was the gradual accretion in China of evidence
indicating the involvement of some North Korean border-
crossers in criminal activities that Chinese officials
adjudged to undermine border stability, Wu said.


7. (C) In the years following, PRC policy has practically
evolved to involve deterrence, principally by delaying exit
permission to North Koreans who have successfully accessed
diplomatic compounds in China. While the PRC "allows" some
to find refuge at foreign embassies or consulates within
China, Beijing aims to "punish" (and hence deter) South
Korea and other countries by imposing long delays for exit
permission, Wu said.

WHITHER PRC POLICY ALTERNATIVES ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS?
-------------- --------------

8. (C) Asked about internal debates among government
scholars on possible policy alternatives to repatriating
North Korean border-crossers, Wu sounded somewhat
conflicted. On the one hand, he asserted that North Korean
border-crossers today are not analogous to the 1970s-era
Vietnamese, whom the PRC regarded as bona fide refugees
and, consequently, accorded commensurate treatment. On the
other hand, even despite the fear of a "flood" of North
Korean refugees into China, Wu acknowledges that the PRC's
repatriation policy "undermines" China's "humanitarian
image in the world." Wu reported that he and a small group
of other scholars have investigated some policy
alternatives. One proposal, for instance, would be to
quietly establish certain "paths" (shuidao) to
normalization for North Koreans who have lived in China for
many years without incident. (NOTE: Wu, who appeared quite
nervous discussing the topic in general, would not
elaborate further. Ref C points to some specific paths to
normalization being explored by other scholars. END NOTE.)


9. (C) However, a radical shift in policy remains unlikely,
and not just because of political calculations, Wu said.
In the "Chinese system," Wu averred, scholars cannot
professionally sustain advocating granting North Koreans
refugee status as a possible policy alternative. Such a
move, he claimed, would be received as a condemnation of
current policy and its makers. He concluded that the
"Chinese system," in this respect, is beset structurally by
a reluctance of inferiors, like himself, to "fan shang," or
go against one's superiors.
WICKMAN