Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHANGHAI386
2008-09-11 08:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:
GEORGIA CRISIS TESTS SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO)
how-toVZCZCXRO0404 RR RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHGH #0386/01 2550849 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 110849Z SEP 08 FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7142 INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0004 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0007 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2100 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0016 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1387 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0016 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1358 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1539 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0004 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0031 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1381 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1194 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0005 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0009 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0026 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7726
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000386
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WINTER, LOI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/11/2018
TAGS: CH ENRG GG IR PREL RS XD XE
SUBJECT: GEORGIA CRISIS TESTS SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO)
COHESION
REF: A. A: SHANGHAI 375
B. B: SHANGHAI 53
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1 (C) Summary: Several Shanghai scholars regard the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) annual summit's greatest success
as maintaining solidarity among member states in the face of the
Georgia crisis. Still, while SCO leaders are able to reach paper
agreements on anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, and
infrastructure building activities, implementation of these
agreements languishes at the lower levels. The SCO has deferred
the question of new members by allowing interested non-member
states to apply for "dialogue partner" status. The SCO wants to
raise its international profile and may make a concerted pitch
for UN observership in the short term. One scholar argues that
China would welcome the opportunity to work with the United
States in Central Asia, and believes Afghanistan offers the best
way forward. END SUMMARY.
(SBU) Poloff met with several local experts on the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO),Central Asia, and international
security in early September, to discuss the August 28 SCO summit
meeting. The scholars included: Shen Dingli, Director, Center
for American Studies, Fudan University; Zhao Huasheng, Director
of the Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies,
Fudan University; Shao Yuqun, Deputy Director of the Department
of South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute for International
Studies (SIIS); and Pan Guang, Director of the Center of
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies (COSCOS),Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences (SASS).
--------------
CRISIS IN GEORGIA
--------------
3. (C) The scholars confirm the crisis in Georgia occupied a
large part of the SCO summit agenda. Pan Guang alleges that SCO
heads of state held a two-hour, closed door meeting -- as often
takes place at the summit -- during which Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev briefed his counterparts on the situation on the
ground and solicited support for Moscow's position. While the
SCO planned to address several regional issues, Zhao Huasheng
claims that Russia actively tried to steer the group toward the
Georgia conflict. Zhao agrees that it is natural for Russia to
seek assistance from states that might be sympathetic to its
situation. Moreover, Zhao continues, the crisis in Georgia
undoubtedly has regional significance, given its proximity to
Central Asia and Moscow's role in the matter. Still, the SCO
should limit its involvement to the affairs of member states,
and Georgia is not a member. Shao Yuqun concurs, arguing that
U.S. and European Union (EU) backing of Georgia was an
additional deterrent to SCO action.
4. (C) The summit's greatest success, Zhao concludes, was to
maintain solidarity among member states and the organization's
overall political direction. The final SCO joint statement, Shen
Dingli points out, recognized Russia's legitimate interest in
events on its periphery, but reiterated SCO member states'
long-held principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other
states. That the SCO avoided an overt break with Moscow over the
Georgia crisis, and that moderate language backing this stance
was incorporated into the joint statement, is a big victory,
Zhao believes. Pan concurs, noting that "at least Russia got
something" out of the document. Moscow obviously wanted more
support for its stance but accepts the reality that member
states cannot support what it has done, Pan observes (see reftel
A). While acknowledging that other member states did their part
as well, Zhao asserts that Beijing played a key role in drafting
the final language for the joint declaration.
SHANGHAI 00000386 002 OF 003
5. (C) Pan argues that the SCO's partial repudiation of Russian
actions in Georgia proves his earlier point (see reftel B) about
the nature of the SCO, namely, that the organization will not
allow a single member state to dictate its political direction.
However, this is not an unadulterated victory, Pan admits, for
the SCO cannot effectively operate in the absence of strong
Sino-Russian bilateral relations. Russia still regards Central
Asia as its backyard, Pan opines, but the crisis in Georgia has
meant that even Uzbekistan no longer supports Russia.
--------------
TROUBLESOME CENTRAL ASIA?
--------------
6. (C) Shao laments that while SCO heads of state continue to
reach "paper agreements" on anti-terrorism, drug interdiction,
and infrastructure building activities, implementation of these
agreements languishes at the lower levels. Shao places the blame
squarely on the bureaucracies of Central Asian member states,
which she termed variously as corrupt, unable to effectively
implement SCO programs, or engaged in foot-dragging due to
unspoken fears of China's expanding regional influence.
7. (C) Shao further notes there was some discussion among SCO
watchers prior to the summit regarding Uzbek President Islam
Karimov's attendance. Some reports had circulated that Karimov
was ill and would be unable to attend, while other observers
considered this a ruse intended to draw regional attention to
Uzbekistan's occasional dissatisfaction with the SCO. Shao
claims that Uzbekistan is a "problematic partner" that often
likes to go its own way within the SCO.
--------------
DIALOGUE PARTNERS
--------------
8. (C) Pan believes the SCO successfully avoided the difficult
question of responding to new states seeking SCO membership by
introducing the concept of "dialogue partners." The SCO will
allow non-member states to apply to become dialogue partners,
apparently a step above observer status, beginning next year.
Pan admits the SCO has merely deferred the membership problem,
which will surely surface again during next year's summit in
Russia. According to Pan, by that time, the issue may be even
harder to resolve, especially if Moscow changes its position on
Iranian membership.
9. (C) Elaborating on the idea behind dialogue partners, Zhao
describes the designation simply as a way for non-member states
to get closer to the SCO. He agrees the new category allows the
organization to preserve its cohesion, and sidestep admitting
new members with unwieldy political baggage. Shao maintains that
although the SCO is "not a Central Asian NATO," the group has
consciously taken NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a
template for creating the dialogue partner designation. Zhao
admits he does not know what, in practice, a dialogue partner
will be permitted to do, but notes that since observer states
presently "just get a seat and observe," the presumption is that
dialogue partners will have some say in SCO proceedings. Shao,
on the other hand, is less confident that aspiring SCO members
will be satisfied with dialogue partner status, but believes
that those states accepted as dialogue partners will at least
wait to see whether it represents a meaningful instrument for
SCO engagement or is merely a holding pattern.
10. (C) Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Turkmenistan --
which is not an SCO member state -- prior to the SCO summit, was
merely intended to strengthen bilateral relations, Zhao claims.
Turkmenistan is not an SCO member, Zhao observes, because it
fashions itself as a "Central Asian Switzerland," and interprets
its neutrality as being prohibitive of its entry into regional
collective groups, even those that are not military alliances.
The SCO takes the view that Turkmenistan may become a member
SHANGHAI 00000386 003 OF 003
state if it later chooses. However, the issue is not a priority
from the Chinese perspective, Zhao notes, since Beijing already
maintains strong bilateral relations with Ashgabat.
--------------
UN OBSERVERSHIP?
--------------
11. (C) The SCO is interested in raising its international
profile and may make a concerted pitch for UN observership in
the short term. In Shao's experience -- as an SCO expert who
occasionally travels outside China to attend international
conferences -- even many well-informed observers have not heard
of the SCO, and the SCO recognizes this. Shao cautions pursuit
of UN observership should not be construed as the SCO seeking a
global role. Rather, it would give the nascent organization more
exposure to multilateral diplomacy, experience particularly
useful to Central Asian diplomats, whose landlocked countries
are "rather insular" in their global outlook. Pan, meanwhile,
reports that SCO Secretary General Bolat Nurgaliev may give a
short speech at the upcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA). It is
unlikely he will mention Georgia, but will probably discuss
Afghanistan and resource management issues.
--------------
ENERGY CARTEL PROPOSAL
--------------
12. (C) According to Pan, Russia continues to seek to establish
a price-making entity within the SCO that would set member and
non-member state prices for natural gas and oil, a move that Pan
claims is at least backed by Uzbekistan. Shao, however, doubts
the proposal can come to fruition in the short term, if at all.
Central Asian states are generally reluctant to treat energy
resources as a diplomatic weapon, as Russia does, observes Shao,
while the volatility of energy markets counsels against such a
move. According to Pan, the cartel proposal was not raised at
this year's summit but is sure to surface again, perhaps at a
future SCO Prime Ministers' meeting.
--------------
POTENTIAL U.S. COOPERATION
--------------
13. (C) Shao argues that China would welcome the opportunity to
work with the United States in the region, and that Afghanistan
offers the best way forward. U.S. efforts to counter the drug
trade and build infrastructure dovetail with Beijing's and the
SCO's desire to do the same. Pan, on the other hand, continues
to advocate a Track Two approach for potential U.S. engagement
with the region. Shen believes the summit's results certainly
show that the SCO is not intended to act as a counterweight to
NATO. The SCO, Shen asserts, "only makes enemies of non-state
entities," that is, the SCO aims to take on those transnational
problems, such as terrorism and drug smuggling, that member
states face.
CAMP
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WINTER, LOI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/11/2018
TAGS: CH ENRG GG IR PREL RS XD XE
SUBJECT: GEORGIA CRISIS TESTS SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO)
COHESION
REF: A. A: SHANGHAI 375
B. B: SHANGHAI 53
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1 (C) Summary: Several Shanghai scholars regard the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) annual summit's greatest success
as maintaining solidarity among member states in the face of the
Georgia crisis. Still, while SCO leaders are able to reach paper
agreements on anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, and
infrastructure building activities, implementation of these
agreements languishes at the lower levels. The SCO has deferred
the question of new members by allowing interested non-member
states to apply for "dialogue partner" status. The SCO wants to
raise its international profile and may make a concerted pitch
for UN observership in the short term. One scholar argues that
China would welcome the opportunity to work with the United
States in Central Asia, and believes Afghanistan offers the best
way forward. END SUMMARY.
(SBU) Poloff met with several local experts on the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO),Central Asia, and international
security in early September, to discuss the August 28 SCO summit
meeting. The scholars included: Shen Dingli, Director, Center
for American Studies, Fudan University; Zhao Huasheng, Director
of the Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies,
Fudan University; Shao Yuqun, Deputy Director of the Department
of South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute for International
Studies (SIIS); and Pan Guang, Director of the Center of
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies (COSCOS),Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences (SASS).
--------------
CRISIS IN GEORGIA
--------------
3. (C) The scholars confirm the crisis in Georgia occupied a
large part of the SCO summit agenda. Pan Guang alleges that SCO
heads of state held a two-hour, closed door meeting -- as often
takes place at the summit -- during which Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev briefed his counterparts on the situation on the
ground and solicited support for Moscow's position. While the
SCO planned to address several regional issues, Zhao Huasheng
claims that Russia actively tried to steer the group toward the
Georgia conflict. Zhao agrees that it is natural for Russia to
seek assistance from states that might be sympathetic to its
situation. Moreover, Zhao continues, the crisis in Georgia
undoubtedly has regional significance, given its proximity to
Central Asia and Moscow's role in the matter. Still, the SCO
should limit its involvement to the affairs of member states,
and Georgia is not a member. Shao Yuqun concurs, arguing that
U.S. and European Union (EU) backing of Georgia was an
additional deterrent to SCO action.
4. (C) The summit's greatest success, Zhao concludes, was to
maintain solidarity among member states and the organization's
overall political direction. The final SCO joint statement, Shen
Dingli points out, recognized Russia's legitimate interest in
events on its periphery, but reiterated SCO member states'
long-held principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other
states. That the SCO avoided an overt break with Moscow over the
Georgia crisis, and that moderate language backing this stance
was incorporated into the joint statement, is a big victory,
Zhao believes. Pan concurs, noting that "at least Russia got
something" out of the document. Moscow obviously wanted more
support for its stance but accepts the reality that member
states cannot support what it has done, Pan observes (see reftel
A). While acknowledging that other member states did their part
as well, Zhao asserts that Beijing played a key role in drafting
the final language for the joint declaration.
SHANGHAI 00000386 002 OF 003
5. (C) Pan argues that the SCO's partial repudiation of Russian
actions in Georgia proves his earlier point (see reftel B) about
the nature of the SCO, namely, that the organization will not
allow a single member state to dictate its political direction.
However, this is not an unadulterated victory, Pan admits, for
the SCO cannot effectively operate in the absence of strong
Sino-Russian bilateral relations. Russia still regards Central
Asia as its backyard, Pan opines, but the crisis in Georgia has
meant that even Uzbekistan no longer supports Russia.
--------------
TROUBLESOME CENTRAL ASIA?
--------------
6. (C) Shao laments that while SCO heads of state continue to
reach "paper agreements" on anti-terrorism, drug interdiction,
and infrastructure building activities, implementation of these
agreements languishes at the lower levels. Shao places the blame
squarely on the bureaucracies of Central Asian member states,
which she termed variously as corrupt, unable to effectively
implement SCO programs, or engaged in foot-dragging due to
unspoken fears of China's expanding regional influence.
7. (C) Shao further notes there was some discussion among SCO
watchers prior to the summit regarding Uzbek President Islam
Karimov's attendance. Some reports had circulated that Karimov
was ill and would be unable to attend, while other observers
considered this a ruse intended to draw regional attention to
Uzbekistan's occasional dissatisfaction with the SCO. Shao
claims that Uzbekistan is a "problematic partner" that often
likes to go its own way within the SCO.
--------------
DIALOGUE PARTNERS
--------------
8. (C) Pan believes the SCO successfully avoided the difficult
question of responding to new states seeking SCO membership by
introducing the concept of "dialogue partners." The SCO will
allow non-member states to apply to become dialogue partners,
apparently a step above observer status, beginning next year.
Pan admits the SCO has merely deferred the membership problem,
which will surely surface again during next year's summit in
Russia. According to Pan, by that time, the issue may be even
harder to resolve, especially if Moscow changes its position on
Iranian membership.
9. (C) Elaborating on the idea behind dialogue partners, Zhao
describes the designation simply as a way for non-member states
to get closer to the SCO. He agrees the new category allows the
organization to preserve its cohesion, and sidestep admitting
new members with unwieldy political baggage. Shao maintains that
although the SCO is "not a Central Asian NATO," the group has
consciously taken NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a
template for creating the dialogue partner designation. Zhao
admits he does not know what, in practice, a dialogue partner
will be permitted to do, but notes that since observer states
presently "just get a seat and observe," the presumption is that
dialogue partners will have some say in SCO proceedings. Shao,
on the other hand, is less confident that aspiring SCO members
will be satisfied with dialogue partner status, but believes
that those states accepted as dialogue partners will at least
wait to see whether it represents a meaningful instrument for
SCO engagement or is merely a holding pattern.
10. (C) Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Turkmenistan --
which is not an SCO member state -- prior to the SCO summit, was
merely intended to strengthen bilateral relations, Zhao claims.
Turkmenistan is not an SCO member, Zhao observes, because it
fashions itself as a "Central Asian Switzerland," and interprets
its neutrality as being prohibitive of its entry into regional
collective groups, even those that are not military alliances.
The SCO takes the view that Turkmenistan may become a member
SHANGHAI 00000386 003 OF 003
state if it later chooses. However, the issue is not a priority
from the Chinese perspective, Zhao notes, since Beijing already
maintains strong bilateral relations with Ashgabat.
--------------
UN OBSERVERSHIP?
--------------
11. (C) The SCO is interested in raising its international
profile and may make a concerted pitch for UN observership in
the short term. In Shao's experience -- as an SCO expert who
occasionally travels outside China to attend international
conferences -- even many well-informed observers have not heard
of the SCO, and the SCO recognizes this. Shao cautions pursuit
of UN observership should not be construed as the SCO seeking a
global role. Rather, it would give the nascent organization more
exposure to multilateral diplomacy, experience particularly
useful to Central Asian diplomats, whose landlocked countries
are "rather insular" in their global outlook. Pan, meanwhile,
reports that SCO Secretary General Bolat Nurgaliev may give a
short speech at the upcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA). It is
unlikely he will mention Georgia, but will probably discuss
Afghanistan and resource management issues.
--------------
ENERGY CARTEL PROPOSAL
--------------
12. (C) According to Pan, Russia continues to seek to establish
a price-making entity within the SCO that would set member and
non-member state prices for natural gas and oil, a move that Pan
claims is at least backed by Uzbekistan. Shao, however, doubts
the proposal can come to fruition in the short term, if at all.
Central Asian states are generally reluctant to treat energy
resources as a diplomatic weapon, as Russia does, observes Shao,
while the volatility of energy markets counsels against such a
move. According to Pan, the cartel proposal was not raised at
this year's summit but is sure to surface again, perhaps at a
future SCO Prime Ministers' meeting.
--------------
POTENTIAL U.S. COOPERATION
--------------
13. (C) Shao argues that China would welcome the opportunity to
work with the United States in the region, and that Afghanistan
offers the best way forward. U.S. efforts to counter the drug
trade and build infrastructure dovetail with Beijing's and the
SCO's desire to do the same. Pan, on the other hand, continues
to advocate a Track Two approach for potential U.S. engagement
with the region. Shen believes the summit's results certainly
show that the SCO is not intended to act as a counterweight to
NATO. The SCO, Shen asserts, "only makes enemies of non-state
entities," that is, the SCO aims to take on those transnational
problems, such as terrorism and drug smuggling, that member
states face.
CAMP