SHANGHAI ACADEMICS COMMENT ON GEORGIA: IMPLICATIONS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000375

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/2033
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SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMICS COMMENT ON GEORGIA: IMPLICATIONS AND
ROLE FOR CHINA

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Leading Shanghai academics on Russia and
international security fault both Russia and Georgia for
escalating the conflict, and state that China will not support
independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia because of concerns
over setting a precedent for Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. They
place some of the blame on the United States for provoking
Russian anger with its push for NATO expansion and missile
defense, and say the United States should not push Russia
further into a corner. They see similarities between the
breakaway provinces and Kosovo and believe South Ossetia and
Abkhazia are likely to remain in "quasi-independent" status or
apply to become part of Russia in the next few years. Any
proposal on Georgia at this month's United Nations General
Assembly would be dead on arrival since Russia and the United
States both wield veto power, but China is unlikely to raise the
issue. China may benefit in the end from the conflict, the
Shanghai academics argue, as both the United States, constrained
by its international commitments, and an increasingly isolated
Russia will look to compromise more with China on international
issues. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly will
convoke leading Chinese international security scholars on
September 12 to discuss the Georgia conflict. End summary.

Both Sides at Fault
--------------

2. (C) Poloff met with leading Shanghai scholars on Russia and
international security issues in a series of separate meetings
in early September to discuss China's view of the situation in
Georgia. Both Zhao Huasheng, Director of the Center for Russia
and Central Asia Studies at Fudan University, and Shen Dingli,
Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University,
expressed their appreciation of the complexity of the situation,
Zhao stating that it is not "black and white" who caused the
crisis. However, he insisted that Russia merely "reacted" to
Georgia's actions. Shen opined that both Russia and Georgia
could justify their actions. Georgia has a right to defend its
territorial integrity even with the use of force; however, it
was wrong to attack Russian peacekeepers in the breakaway
enclaves, and Georgia should have been "more sophisticated" in
its response. Russia also has a right to protect its own
troops, but it should not have used "excessive force".
(Comment: Although Shen runs the Center for American Studies, he
is widely recognized and often quoted in local press as an
expert on a wide range of international security issues. End
comment.)

That "Crazy Man" Started It
--------------

3. (C) Pan Guang, Director of the Institute of European and
Asian Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, was less
nuanced in his view of the crisis. He thinks it was instigated
by "that crazy man," Georgian President Saakashvili who, he
claims, preplanned the attack on South Ossetia to coincide with
the Olympics. He did not respond clearly when asked whether
Russia played a role in instigating the war. Zhao and Shen did
not have any particularly strong opinion or insights into
Saakashvili but opined that he probably miscalculated Russia's
response.

But The United States Also at Fault
--------------

4. (C) Shen argued that Russian peacekeepers should not have
been in the area to begin with since they clearly are not
neutral parties. Why did the United Nations (UN) Security
Council not deploy a more neutral peacekeeping force to the
region? He insinuated that the United States was as much at
fault in fomenting tension since it did "too much" to anger
Russia with its push for NATO expansion and missile defense

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deployment in Eastern Europe. The United States pushed the
envelope, and Georgia provided Russia with an opportune excuse
to display its strength. Zhao also thinks Russia had sent many
signals to the West expressing its discontent with NATO
expansion and missile defense but that these signals were not
taken seriously enough.

Medvedev Had "No Choice"
--------------

5. (C) Regarding Russia's leaders, the scholars acknowledged
Russian Prime Minister Putin's "great influence" and his likely
key role in the Georgia conflict. But Zhao believes Russian
President Medvedev is "stronger than people think". Georgia was
Medvedev's first real test as president, and he had "no choice"
but to react strongly; otherwise, his position would have been
in jeopardy. The decision to attack Georgia was a "collective
decision" made by Medvedev, Putin, and top figures in Russia's
defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence establishments,
according to Zhao.

China Will Not Recognize Independence
--------------

6. (C) The scholars were all surprised, not by the fact that
Russia recognized South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence,
but at the quickness of the recognition. They do not believe
China will support their independence. Shen commented that the
Georgia crisis presents an awkward situation for China given its
predicament in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. China does not want
to set a precedent for these areas by recognizing the
independence of the breakaway provinces. But Pan thinks some
countries like Venezuela, North Korea, Belarus, and "some
countries in the Middle East" might follow Russia's lead.

Similar to Kosovo
--------------

7. (C) Pan drew parallels between South Ossetia and Kosovo,
asserting that the situation is essentially "the same" since
Saakashvili "killed many South Ossetians, just like Milosevic
(did in Kosovo)." Shen, who is most concerned about U.S.-China
relations, presented a more balanced view, citing similarities
such as the presence of large ethnic minority groups and the
central governments' use of force in both areas, though there
are plenty of differences in the degree of integration of the
minorities and the extent of the central governments' use of
force. Shen said the U.S. rationale to intervene in Kosovo
could be used by the Russians.

Russia Not Asking For Too Much From Its Friends
-------------- --

8. (C) Russia understands that China and other members of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are prevented from
expressing more support for Russia's actions by various domestic
and foreign policy concerns, according to the scholars.
Although the Russian media is divided in its reaction to the
SCO's joint statement, Pan and Zhao think Russia was "not very
disappointed" and relatively satisfied with the outcome since
the statement acknowledged Russia's interests and role in the
region. However, Shen believes Russia probably miscalculated
when it recognized South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence,
erroneously thinking the SCO would support this move. (Note:
More on the SCO to be reported SEPTEL. End note.)

Don't Back Russia Into A Corner
--------------

9. (C) Zhao thinks the West has very few tools to persuade
Russia to back down. Threats to block accession to the World
Trade Organization or to drop it from the G8 may not be enough
to push Russia towards a compromise. The West should try to
persuade Saakashvili not to complicate the situation further.
Georgia's recent announcement that it was cutting off diplomatic
ties with Russia will not help matters and will only end up
hurting Georgia, which is dependent on Russia for trade and
energy. Shen argues for a policy of moderation by the United
States and Russia: both sides need to back off a little. Russia
is currently "not acting rationally", and Shen cautions against

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making them lose face; a cornered Russia would be very
dangerous. The international community should deploy a neutral
international peacekeeping force into the region. Zhao predicts
that South Ossetia and Abkhazia will eventually apply to become
part of Russia, and the Russians will acquiesce. Shen predicts
both enclaves will continue to have "quasi-independent" status
the next several years. If they eventually move to formally
join Russia, there will be war between Georgia and Russia, Shen
predicts.

China Does Not Want To Be Active Player
--------------

10. (C) These academics all stated that China does not want to
play an active role in defusing the conflict. According to Pan
and Zhao, the Caucasus is still "far away" from China, so China
does not want to act in a way that could jeopardize its
relations with either Russia or the West. Shen said China
cannot publicly express too much support for Russia given the
importance of relations with the United States, but it should
tell Russia in private that it sympathizes with Russia's
situation since China needs Russia's help on certain issues,
such as energy supplies and preventing Japan from becoming a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. At the
same time, China should be wary of Russia because if Russia
gains power, it will "not be a responsible hegemon" in the
region.

Dead on Arrival At UNGA
--------------

11. (C) The Georgia issue will not be raised by Russia and is
unlikely to be raised by China for discussion at the upcoming UN
General Assembly. Pan argued the UN Security Council cannot do
anything since both Russia and the United States have veto
power. Shen thinks Georgia may raise the issue, but Russia
would veto any idea of deploying an international peacekeeping
force.

China Looks to Benefit
--------------

12. (C) China may end up benefiting from this conflict, Zhao
elaborated. Since the United States will be preoccupied with
Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea, it will seek more
compromise with China on international matters. Russia will
find itself increasingly isolated, elevating China's importance
in the region. Zhao also thinks there will be "less chance for
disputes" between China and Russia, since an increasingly
isolated Russia will have little choice but to look to China for
support on international issues.

Competition in Central Asia?
--------------

13. (C) China and Russia are competitors and cooperative
partners in Central Asia. Russia still views this region as its
"traditional backyard"; recognizing Russia's concerns, China has
tried to advance its energy interests (i.e. signing energy deals
with Central Asian states) while maintaining good relations with
Russia. Pan stated that Russia would be "unhappy" with any
pipeline deal involving Central Asia that leaves Russia out of
the loop. The SCO has served as a useful forum for coordinating
energy deals; for example, the oil pipeline from Russia through
Kazakhstan to China was coordinated through the SCO. However,
China and Russia also compete in certain areas, like
Turkmenistan, where both countries have signed gas deals.


14. (C) The Central Asian states have largely been successful
in maintaining good relations with Russia, China, the European
Union, and the United States, according to the academics. Pan
asserted that Saakashvili "should learn" from these countries
and recognize the need for a well-balanced relationship with all
major powers.


15. (C) The academics downplayed China's dependence on Russia
for oil and arms. China's military imports from Russia have
significantly declined in recent years, according to Shen,
though he has heard rumors recently of China's plans to import

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100 armored vehicles from Russia. Pan estimates that only 10
percent of China's oil imports are from Russia; the majority
comes from other countries like Saudi Arabia, Angola, Sudan, and
Oman. Although China highly values its relationship with Russia
for political reasons, the academics agree that the most
important international relationship for China now is with the
United States due to their economic ties.

Comment
--------------

16. (C) Zhao and Pan enjoy close ties with Russian scholars and
government figures, perhaps leading to some bias in their views
on the conflict. Pan was especially vehement in denouncing
Saakashvili's actions. He mentioned a possible roundtable
discussion in the future with Russian and Georgian government
officials in Shanghai, saying he knows the Russian Consul
General well, but then realized "Georgia has no Consulate in
Shanghai." Zhao stated he had been to Georgia once a few years
ago and did not have many positive impressions of the place. He
has been to Russia numerous times and even lived there for some
time. Shen was less biased in his views but critical of the
United States for raising tensions "unnecessarily". He
mentioned that he has been invited by the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to attend a conference (likely in Beijing) on
September 12, in which the Ministry will elicit ideas from
leading Chinese scholars on the Georgia conflict.
CAMP