Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHANGHAI352
2008-08-22 05:48:00
SECRET
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

NANJING SCHOLARS UPBEAT ON CHANCES FOR CONTINUED

Tags:  CH ECON PGOV PREL TW 
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FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7096
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2056
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1355
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1326
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1502
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1351
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1164
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7673
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000352 

SIPDIS

AIT TAIPEI PLEASE PASS TO AIT KAOHSIUNG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2033
TAGS: CH ECON PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: NANJING SCHOLARS UPBEAT ON CHANCES FOR CONTINUED
CROSS-STRAIGHT PROGRESS

CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000352

SIPDIS

AIT TAIPEI PLEASE PASS TO AIT KAOHSIUNG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2033
TAGS: CH ECON PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: NANJING SCHOLARS UPBEAT ON CHANCES FOR CONTINUED
CROSS-STRAIGHT PROGRESS

CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S) Summary: Nanjing scholars express optimism that
cross-Strait relations can continue to develop at a brisk pace,
though cautious on the possibility of short-term steps toward
political integration or a "diplomatic truce." Chinese
President Hu Jintao's flexibility on Taiwan nomenclature and
cross-Strait interaction has been a key factor in warming
bilateral ties. One contact alleges that Hu has established a
de facto hotline to Taiwan Kuomintang (KMT) Party Chairman Wu
Po-hsiung, and perhaps also honorary Chairman Lien Chan, and
speak on a weekly basis. Taiwan leader Ma Ying-jeou has been
unimpressive on the Taiwan domestic political stage, but is
conducting a relatively sophisticated foreign policy. Meanwhile,
new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen
may be making some headway in rebuilding the minority party.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) During an August 14-15 visit to Nanjing, Poloffs met
several local experts on Taiwan affairs and other academics for
an update on the island's domestic politics, the current state
of cross-Strait relations, and prospects for continued dialogue.
Our interlocutors included: Cui Zhiqing and Liu Xiangping,
Center for Taiwan Research, Nanjing University; Wu Shu, Shao
Jianguang, and Deng Wei, Nanjing Party Institute of the
Communist Party of China; and Gu Su, Professor of Philosophy and
Law, Nanjing University.

CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
--------------


3. (C) The scholars express optimism that cross-Strait relations
can continue to develop at a brisk pace, notably on the economic
front, while admitting political integration is a longer-term
prospect. Deng Wei regards Chinese exchange with Taiwan as a
natural phenomenon, noting that Mainland youth are already quite
familiar with Taiwan products and popular culture. At the same
time, China continues to attract substantial Taiwan investment
and members of the island's business community, a powerful sign

of China's economic importance to Taiwan. Wu Shu views economic
development and exchange across the Strait as a precursor to
meaningful political progress. Because China and Taiwan stand
to gain so much from each other economically, the latter can be
deferred.


4. (C) Meanwhile, quick progress on cross-Strait flights seems
likely in the short-term. Gu Su goes so far as to predict that
existing cross-Strait routes will be made permanent within two
months, while direct flights (i.e., those not required to pass
through Hong Kong airspace) will follow very quickly thereafter.
Cui Zhiqing claims that Beijing has sought direct flights "for
nearly thirty years," and that support from the international
business community, in addition to Taiwan leader Ma Ying-jeou's
flagging domestic approval, will compel Beijing and Taipei to
reach agreement. Regarding the small number of Chinese tourists
that have traveled to Taiwan thus far, Deng believes difficult
application procedures on the Mainland side, as well as the
Olympic Games, are largely to blame. Still, the former will
improve with time and the latter will end shortly, so neither
factor is likely an enduring problem.

DIPLOMATIC TRUCE
--------------


5. (C) The scholars are more circumspect on the possibility of a
"diplomatic truce." Cui, for instance, finds it difficult to
understand how China might respond to a country, such as
Nicaragua or Paraguay, which sought to establish relations with
Beijing on its own initiative, without China appearing to break
the truce. Liu Xiangping asserts that the Chinese leadership is
split on this issue, with Chinese President Hu Jintao inclined
towards a truce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) taking
a harder line. At the same time, the MFA is reluctant to push
Taiwan too hard; if Ma were voted out of office in 2012, after
four years of cross-Strait ceasefire, China would be faced with
a calamity. Liu believes the Ministry will follow Hu's lead
unless Taiwan suddenly establishes a new foreign relationship.


6. (C) Liu said that although "dollar diplomacy" originated with
Taiwan, the island can no longer realistically compete with

SHANGHAI 00000352 002 OF 003


China given the Mainland's economic clout and monetary
advantage. At present, 168 countries recognize the People's
Republic of China (PRC) while only 23 recognize Taiwan. This
margin is due in no small part to the fact that, even today,
Beijing devotes 80 percent of its diplomatic resources to
Taiwan-related issues and concerns, Liu claims. Ma's calls for
a truce are understandable because his is the weaker position,
concludes Liu. Adopting a confrontational cross-Strait posture
would only undermine Ma's position further.


7. (C) Wu asserts that even if the two sides agree to abandon
dollar diplomacy, Beijing will continue to insist on its
one-China policy, which international society has increasingly
come to recognize. China is willing to discuss anything with
Taiwan on the basis of this principle, but certainly cannot
allow for Taiwan independence. For this reason, former Taiwan
leader Chen Shui-bian was a "political hooligan," Wu contends,
for trying to remove Taiwan from the one-China context, against
the advice of other island leaders and the United States.

CHINA'S NEW FLEXIBILITY
--------------


8. (S) Gu argues that Hu Jintao's flexibility on cross-Strait
interaction and Taiwan nomenclature has been a key factor in
warming bilateral ties. During negotiations on cross-Strait
flights, for example, the Taiwan side demanded that Nanjing --
the former Republican capital with strong KMT ties -- be added
to the list of participating Mainland cities at the last minute.
Despite this eleventh-hour tactic, Beijing quickly accepted to
ensure the deal went through. Gu also alleges that Hu has
established a de facto hotline to Taiwan Kuomintang (KMT) Party
Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, and perhaps also honorary Chairman Lien
Chan, and they speak on a weekly basis.


9. (C) Gu recalls another disagreement that surfaced in July,
when some Mainland entities began referring to Taiwan's Olympic
team as "Zhongguo Taipei" (a choice of words that implies PRC
sovereignty over Taiwan) rather than the previously-accepted
"Zhonghua Taipei" (which merely suggests a shared national
heritage). Gu traces China's decision to quickly concede the
point, after Taiwan protested, to Hu's personal intervention.
Remarking on how quickly the Chinese public seemed to accept
this shift, Gu notes that many Chinese now routinely refer to
the Taiwan Olympic team as "Team Zhonghua." Shao Jianguang
agrees Beijing acted pragmatically on the Olympic nomenclature
dispute, and believes such concessions are indicative of the
hopes China attaches to improved ties with Taiwan.

MIXED PERFORMANCE BY MA
--------------


10. (C) The scholars assert that Ma's first months as Taiwan
president have been unimpressive at home, but they regard his
foreign policy as fairly sophisticated. Cui considers Ma a
knowledgeable, Harvard University graduate who was able to
quickly climb the KMT ladder. Still, Ma faced few challenges in
his ascent, resulting in a leader who may be "proud but not
tough." His eight-year record as Taipei mayor is unremarkable,
and his popularity never approached the level of Chen Shui-bian
when he was mayor of Taipei, or Frank Hsieh when mayor of
Kaohsiung. As a result, these Nanjing scholars say they
themselves and many in Taiwan question Ma's abilities, and that
Ma's election was achieved less on his own merits than it was
the product of widespread dissatisfaction with the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP).


11. (C) Gu concedes that Ma's domestic performance has led many
in his own party to turn against him. Still, Ma has adopted an
appropriately cautious stance in his international conduct and
overseas travel plans, taking pains to avoid any comments or
gestures that could jeopardize cross-Strait ties. Liu similarly
regards Ma's low-key trip to South America and U.S. transits as
a "wise decision" which may help Ma achieve better results in
the international sphere than Chen was able to.

RETURN OF THE DPP?
--------------


12. (C) Liu notes that new DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen appears
to be making some headway in rebuilding the minority party.
While Tsai seems to have made little progress toward eliminating
factions within the DPP, her attempts to woo former DPP members
back to the party may fare better, especially given Chen

SHANGHAI 00000352 003 OF 003


Shui-bian's recent legal troubles. Liu describes that scandal
as a symbol that the Chen era in Taiwan politics is over, one
that could help Tsai in her efforts redirect the DPP. Cui
agrees that Chen has provided Tsai with a unique opportunity to
consolidate her role as head of the party. With Taiwan local
elections next year, the sooner the DPP cuts its ties with Chen,
the better. Liu also said that Tsai had visited the Mainland
once--October 14-18, 1998--to participate in unofficial talks
with the PRC in Shanghai as an advisor to Koo Chen-fu, then
Taiwan's lead cross-Strait negotiator.


13. (C) Relations between the DPP and the KMT, however, remain
combative. Cui likens the recent change in administration to a
"Cultural Revolution" for Taiwan, and questions what the future
holds should the DPP regain power. Cui points out that the DPP
remains unwilling to accept the 1992 Consensus (i.e. the tacit
understanding between Beijing and Taipei deferring the issue of
Taiwan's political status, and the basis for the current
cross-Strait rapprochement). Moreover, Cui and Liu question
whether the DPP would even honor any decisions made by the
Taiwan authorities under a KMT administration.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Despite Nanjing's fair distance from Shanghai and its
suburbs -- perhaps a more central location for cross-Strait
investment and economic exchange -- the former capital seems to
maintain substantial connections to Taiwan, particularly to the
KMT and the Taiwan business community in China. Cui and Liu
claim the Center for Taiwan Research receives numerous Taiwan
visitors every year. These include DPP party officials, most
recently Frank Hsieh's and Yeh Chu-lan's secretaries. KMT
members, including Legislative Yuan members, are more numerous
and more frequent visitors to Nanjing, Cui and Liu said, and the
Center often meets these visitors and arranges visits for them
to Republican China sites and the tomb of Sun Yat-sen. Given
the scholars' close ties to Chinese and Taiwan contacts, their
views provide a peek at what may be possible on cross-Strait
affairs, even if the scope and timing of their predictions prove
inexact.
JARRETT