Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHANGHAI276
2008-07-23 08:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

Tags:  PREL PARM MCAP CH JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1976
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1302
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1300
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1273
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1443
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1111
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0328
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0016
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7556
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000276 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM
NSC FOR WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MCAP CH JA
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

REF: A) SHANGHAI 273; B) SHANGHAI 804

CLASSIFIED BY: Veomayoury Baccam, Acting Political/Economic
Section Chief, U.S. Consulate , Shanghai .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000276

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM
NSC FOR WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MCAP CH JA
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

REF: A) SHANGHAI 273; B) SHANGHAI 804

CLASSIFIED BY: Veomayoury Baccam, Acting Political/Economic
Section Chief, U.S. Consulate , Shanghai .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: China's leading academic experts on Japan are
cautiously optimistic that the relationship will continue to
build on recent positive developments. High-level visits by
leaders on both sides, Japan's relief effort in the aftermath of
the Sichuan earthquake, the port call to China by Japan's
military vessel, and the bilateral agreement to jointly develop
gas fields in the East China Sea have all contributed to a
significant warming of relations and positive portrayal of Japan
in the Chinese media. However, this optimism is tempered by
still-unresolved historical issues, distrust and lack of mutual
understanding between the general public of both countries.
Regarding abductees, the academics argued that the issue should
not be an integral part of the Six Party Talks and should be
"separated" from the central issue of resolving North Korea's
nuclear ambitions. End summary.

High-Level Push to Warm Ties
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met with Shanghai's leading academics on Japan in
mid-July to discuss the current state and future outlook for
China-Japan relations. The academics all characterized the
relationship as moving in the right direction, largely propelled
by a series of high level visits on both sides over the past
year. Wang Shaopu, Director of the Center of Japan Studies,
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS),opined that China
wanted to resolve outstanding bilateral issues in the past but
was prevented from doing so politically because of then Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. According
to Wang, Koizumi's successor, Shinzo Abe, and current Prime
Minister Fukuda's more "cooperative, softer approach" have
helped build a greater degree of mutual trust. However, Wang
echoed a concern among some Chinese of the future relationship
after Fukuda leaves office. He rhetorically asked "What will
happen if someone like Taro Aso becomes prime minister?"



3. (C) Wu Jinan, Senior Fellow, Department of Japanese Studies,
Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS),believes
there are still a "small number" of politicians in both
countries that view the other side with suspicion, but there is
a "general consensus" in both governments to develop a more
positive relationship. He observed how 2007 was the first time
leaders from both countries visited each other in the same year,
and said there will be more opportunities for high level
meetings in the second half of 2008.

Mutual Trust Not Permeating to Grass Roots
--------------


4. (C) Despite greater mutual trust at the higher levels, Wu
thinks there are still underlying currents of distrust and
suspicion among the general public on both sides. He stated
that many Japanese are psychologically averse to accepting
China's rise as an economic great power, while many Chinese
cannot accept "Xiao Riben" (a derogatory term literally
translated "Small Japan") as an equal partner, mostly for
historical reasons. He pointed to three particular issues
hindering greater interaction between the Japanese and Chinese
public: 1) visa restrictions for Chinese who want to visit
Japan; 2) expensive flights between Tokyo and Chinese cities (Wu
mentioned that flights from Shanghai to Los Angeles are cheaper
than Shanghai to Tokyo, calling this a "conspiracy" by airline
companies); 3) social discrimination in Japan towards
foreigners. He called for more exchanges, particularly
involving students, on both sides.


5. (C) Gao Lan, Associate Professor of the Institute of
Asian-Pacific Studies, SASS, argued there is a generational and
regional gap in Chinese perceptions of Japan. She believes
youth in their teens and 20s, particularly those in urban areas,
know much about Japan through the media and harbor mixed
feelings because of their admiration for Japan's economic might
and pop culture on the one hand weighed against negative
impressions from history. Having grown up during a period of

SHANGHAI 00000276 002 OF 003


China's rapid economic growth, they exhibit stronger nationalism
and pride in their country than older generations that
experienced the Cultural Revolution, and this confidence colors
much of their views on China's relations with Japan and the
world. However, Gao thinks this sentiment may not be as
widespread in rural areas, where economic conditions have lagged
and people are more concerned about their daily lives rather
than China's role on the international stage or relations with
its neighbors.

Sichuan Aftermath: Japan's Public Relations Success
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Several recent events have helped improve Japan's image
in the eyes of the Chinese public. Wu mentioned the extensive
Chinese media coverage of Japan's relief efforts after the
Sichuan earthquake in May. Chinese television showed Japanese
rescue workers in action and ordinary Japanese citizens
collecting money and supplies to help victims. Wu said these
images had a "very positive impact" on Chinese perceptions and
even brought him to tears. Xia Liping, Deputy Dean of the
School of Law and Political Science, Tongji University, called
Japan's Sichuan earthquake response a "public diplomacy success"
and noted an increase in positive Chinese media coverage of
Japan recently. He attributed this to China's willingness to
"separate history from current issues", although he qualified
this by stating that many ordinary Chinese are still concerned
about Japan's interpretation of its history.

Military Port Call and Gas Agreement
--------------


7. (C) Gao called the first ever port call by a Japanese
warship to Guangdong, China at the end of June a
"ground-breaking" moment that would hopefully lay the
foundations for more military exchanges in the future. However,
she cautioned that future visits, though welcome, must take into
consideration the feelings of the Chinese people. Wang agreed
that these visits are closely tied to people's emotions but that
the Chinese public will eventually "get used to" such visits.
Wu mentioned that the Japanese sailors wore their military
uniforms when touring the Chinese city and, to his surprise (and
relief),were greeted warmly by locals in department stores and
restaurants. However, he acknowledged that much of this was
likely orchestrated by the Chinese government.


8. (C) Regarding the joint development of gas fields in the
East China Sea, Wu thinks that despite some domestic opposition
to the agreement, the majority of Chinese was pleased with the
result. He sees the agreement in the context of Chinese
President Hu Jintao's vision for regional stability, namely,
China's desire to access Japan's advanced energy technology and
China's desire to be viewed as a responsible international
player. Wang stated that the basic outline for the agreement
had been formulated several months beforehand but that its
announcement was delayed for various "unclear" reasons. This
issue was difficult to resolve because it touched upon
nationalistic sentiment on both sides; in the end, it required a
push at the higher levels to get completed.

Concerns about the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance
-------------- --


9. (C) The academics expressed concerns about the U.S.-Japan
security alliance. Wang argued that the alliance made sense in
the 1980s during the Cold War but that its current purpose and
necessity are unclear to China. Gao echoed Wang's concerns,
stating that China is nervous about Japan's military spending
and transfer of advanced technology from the United States.
However, they concurred that the alliance does serve the useful
purpose of preventing Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Abductees Issue Separate from North Korean Nuclear Issue
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Wu and Wang argued in separate discussions that the
issue of Japanese abductees should not be linked with the issue
of resolving North Korea's nuclear development. They both
expressed China's sympathy with the Japanese victims but
explicitly stated that this issue should not be included in the
Six Party Talks. Wu believes China can possibly serve as

SHANGHAI 00000276 003 OF 003


mediator in bilateral talks between Japan and North Korea on
this issue. It could also help identify the abductees' remains
as a "neutral" third party. (See Reftel A).

Comments
--------------


11. (C) The academics were generally more optimistic about the
current and future state of China-Japan relations than the
academics and students Poloff met in Nanjing in December 2007
(see Reftel B). This may be due to the current positive
atmosphere fanned by the Chinese media, especially coming on the
heels of high level visits and Japan's earthquake relief effort.
However, the academics stressed that although the relationship
is good now, certain factors in Japan, such as another visit to
Yasukuni Shrine by Japan's prime minister, could quickly enflame
anti-Japanese sentiment in China.
JARRETT