Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHANGHAI253
2008-07-01 01:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI SCHOLARS' VIEWS ON THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION

Tags:  PREL ENRG CH RS XD XE IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000253 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILDER, TONG
DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/1/2033
TAGS: PREL ENRG CH RS XD XE IR
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS' VIEWS ON THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION (SCO)

REF: 07 SHANGHAI 790

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political and Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000253

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILDER, TONG
DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/1/2033
TAGS: PREL ENRG CH RS XD XE IR
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS' VIEWS ON THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION (SCO)

REF: 07 SHANGHAI 790

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political and Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Shanghai scholars described Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states as committed to
cooperation on issues of common interest, but divided over any
larger role the organization should play over the long term.
The August 2008 summit will not break new ground but will focus
on implementation of existing agreements. Full SCO membership
for interested observer states, including Iran, is unlikely to
materialize in the short term, due to the SCO's consensus
decision-making, disagreement over the merits of admitting new
members, and lack of a fixed mechanism for doing so. The
Shanghai scholars detect a divergence in views between Beijing
and Moscow regarding the SCO's long-term trajectory, but differ
on its significance. They are similarly positive on the idea of
greater U.S. involvement in Central Asia but divided on
potential U.S. engagement strategies. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In advance of the 2008 Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) summit, Poloff conducted separate meetings June 25-27 with
local experts on the SCO and Central Asian affairs. The experts
included: Shao Yuqun, Deputy Director of the Department of South
Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies
(SIIS); Pan Guang, Director of the Center of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences (SASS); and Zhao Huasheng, Director of the Center for
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies, Fudan University.
The summit, to be held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, is tentatively
scheduled for mid-August, though the dates have not been made
public.

--------------
AUGUST SUMMIT
--------------


3. (C) The scholars concur that the August summit will focus on
the implementation of existing agreements but break little new
ground. Zhao Huasheng remarked that there are 127 outstanding
SCO agreements, covering a range of joint economic, cultural,

and energy activities, on which member states are agreed in
principle but have yet to take any concrete action. Pointing
out that decisions are traditionally made by consensus, Pan
Guang argued that even implementation might be difficult, and
predicted there will be "lots of discussion but little
accomplished." Still, China does have its priorities among
these agreements, noted Shao Yuqun. Beijing would most like to
see its SCO counterparts focus on regional infrastructure
projects and fighting Central Asian government corruption, both
of which would benefit Chinese business. For their part,
Central Asian member states will seek to deepen their economic
cooperation with Beijing, a result of their growing knowledge of
the Chinese market. In the past, ethnic Uighur contacts in
Xinjiang would act as middlemen for Central Asian traders
seeking to obtain Chinese goods. However, traders are
increasingly traveling east to such places as Yiwu in Zhejiang
Province, cognizant of better deals and a wider selection of
products.


4. (C) The scholars noted that Russia is likely to raise energy
issues at the summit, but expressed mixed views on how China is
likely to react. Shao argued that Beijing is uncomfortable with
using the SCO as a vehicle for energy diplomacy because Moscow
takes a more confrontational approach to energy. Russia has
vague ambitions for turning the SCO into a natural gas cartel,
Shao asserted, and has demonstrated its unreliability by
dragging its feet in implementing its bilateral energy

SHANGHAI 00000253 002 OF 004


agreements with China. In contrast, the Central Asian states
are simply more pragmatic, concentrating on securing energy
buyers and diversifying their portfolio of consumers. China
prefers bilateral engagement on energy issues, or at least
venues where Russia cannot interfere, said Shao. While Pan
confirmed that China indeed prefers to conduct its energy
diplomacy on a bilateral basis because "it's just easier that
way," he believes Beijing is more open to the possibility of
cooperating with Moscow on energy. China would happily import
natural gas from Russia through an existing pipeline running
from China to Kazakhstan, Pan stated, a money-saving move that,
in fact, Russia has already agreed to.

--------------
NEW MEMBERS UNLIKELY
--------------


5. (C) The scholars generally agree that full SCO membership
for interested observer states is unlikely to materialize in the
short term. All decisions regarding new members would require
consensus among SCO states, noted Pan, which would be difficult
to achieve. Both Shao and Zhao pointed out that China fears
enlargement will dilute the SCO's regional focus and cohesion,
and possibly render the organization's activities less
effective. Moreover, since there is no established mechanism
for offering SCO membership to interested states, it is not
exactly clear how candidates would be evaluated and approved.


6. (C) Beyond general concerns about the process of admitting
new SCO members, member states also disagree on the merits of
specific candidacies. Shao was particularly skeptical about
Iran's bid, announced in March 2008, claiming that Beijing and
others have serious questions about Tehran's foreign policy.
Pan similarly asserted that "everyone knows Iran just wants to
use the SCO" to enhance its prestige and further an aggressive
policy agenda. Shao commented that some Chinese academics have
expressed the view that only states bordering current SCO member
states should be considered for full membership. Noting that,
among interested states, only Iran does not border a current SCO
member state, Poloff pressed Shao as to whether Beijing was
preparing this argument to defuse Tehran's membership bid. Shao
demurred, stating that this is simply one view in circulation.


7. (C) On South Asia, the SCO faces another conundrum, Shao
argued. Pakistan has expressed its desire to be considered for
full membership, but if Pakistan is admitted, then India cannot
very well be denied. However, Beijing is concerned about the
U.S. response should New Delhi join, and is reluctant to bring
Pakistan and India, with all of their bilateral baggage, into
the SCO fold. Were any state to quickly gain SCO membership,
Shao guessed, it would be Mongolia, the least controversial of
observer states that can still make a good case for joining a
Central Asian forum. Pan disagreed, arguing that, for the time
being, Mongolia is satisfied with its observer status, and in
fact no new members should be expected soon.

--------------
AGAINST THE WEST, OR JUST UNREST?
--------------


8. (C) The scholars detect a divergence in views between Moscow
and Beijing regarding the SCO's long-term trajectory, but differ
on its significance. Besides its energy agenda, Shao believes
Russia would like to push the SCO in the direction of becoming a
NATO counterweight, whereas Beijing sees the forum as a neutral
grouping that reinforces regional stability. Russia is already
more willing to view the SCO in its present state as balancing
the West. However, China is uncomfortable with this approach,
as are some Central Asian states, notably Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, who are speaking out on their position. Shao
commented that in some previous SCO meetings, Tajikistan
responded to anti-NATO statements made by the Russian side with

SHANGHAI 00000253 003 OF 004


praise for NATO's role in securing the Afghan border and help
with building Tajik infrastructure, especially its
communications network and electrical power grid.


9. (C) While acknowledging these differences, Pan and Zhao hold
that the cooperative aspect of the Beijing-Moscow relationship
is the more remarkable development. Moreover, Pan observed that
the United States and NATO are already cooperating with SCO
member states. In 2002, the United States worked with a
provisional grouping of Afghanistan's six neighbor states to
discuss reconstruction efforts and regional stability.
Additionally, Russia and Uzbekistan recently reached agreement
with NATO to permit supplies intended for Afghanistan to be
shipped across their borders, an issue that may receive mention
at the SCO summit. Of course, Pan noted, Russian acquiescence
to this latter scheme was probably designed to give Moscow a
trump card for preventing NATO from extending membership to
former Soviet states such as Georgia. Nevertheless, these
examples disprove the theory that SCO states somehow cannot work
with NATO, Pan stated.


10. (C) The scholars strongly disagree with the view, espoused
by some Western observers, that the SCO is largely a vehicle for
Russian and Chinese geostrategic ambitions. Recalling the 2005
SCO summit declaration, which called on the United States to
establish a timeline for closing its military bases in member
states, Shao accused Russia of being its primary instigator.
China tried to put the brakes on this initiative, Shao claimed,
but ultimately signed on to preserve consensus and prevent the
SCO from appearing weak and divided. Pan offered a similar
interpretation of the 2005 events, and, more generally, warned
the United States against regarding Russian or Uzbek comments on
the SCO as representative of all SCO member states. "Russia
always has big plans for the SCO," Pan laughed, for which, if
pursued, Russia would not really be able to obtain consensus.

--------------
POTENTIAL FOR U.S. COOPERATION
--------------


11. (C) Asked whether the SCO would ever consider working on
some level with the United States, the scholars were positive on
the idea of greater U.S. involvement in Central Asia but divided
on potential U.S. engagement strategies. Zhao suggested that
the United States and SCO member states have many common
interests in the region, specifically fighting terrorist groups
like Al Qaeda and the Taliban, putting an end to
drug-trafficking, and ensuring that Afghanistan -- presently
"the most unstable factor in the region" -- is put on a more
stable footing. Washington needs to play a more active role in
Afghanistan but avoid fueling increased terror in the region;
coordination with the SCO would be one way to maximize the
former and mitigate the latter, Zhao asserted.


12. (C) Were the United States to formally seek SCO observer
status, Shao speculated, Russia and probably Uzbekistan would
prevent a favorable outcome. Still, some Central Asian states,
and possibly even China, would welcome SCO cooperation with
Washington on at least

some level. It would be important that U.S. engagement with the
SCO emerge organically from discussion with member states, Shao
stressed, so the best strategy might start with informal Track
II discussions with member states, ideally without direct
reference to their SCO affiliation. Pan, meanwhile, argued that
regional cooperation with the United States, EU, and even NATO
might be more acceptable -- and thus more easily achievable --
using the "six Afghan neighbors" grouping rather than the SCO.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

SHANGHAI 00000253 004 OF 004




13. (C) While Chinese suspicions of the West may not approach
those harbored by Moscow in degree, Pan and Shao's assertions
that Beijing does not view the SCO as a bulwark against U.S.
influence in Central Asia are not entirely credible. Zhao, for
instance, peppered an otherwise upbeat presentation on the SCO
with pointed remarks about the color revolutions and the U.S.
military presence in Kyrgyzstan. Though not insurmountable,
Chinese and Russian differences over energy and the SCO's
future, if unresolved, may prove a drag on future cooperation
and hamper the organization's evolution.
JARRETT