Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHANGHAI122
2008-03-27 05:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI AMERICAN STUDIES SCHOLAR ON TAIWAN ELECTION, TIBET

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON CH TW 
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P 270520Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1793
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 1169
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 1171
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 1142
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 1301
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0981
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0194
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RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0131
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7323
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000122 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EAP DAS CHRISTENSEN, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER, KURT TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/27/2033
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH TW
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI AMERICAN STUDIES SCHOLAR ON TAIWAN ELECTION, TIBET
UNREST AND DEMOCRATIZATION


CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Shanghai, China, Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000122

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EAP DAS CHRISTENSEN, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER, KURT TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/27/2033
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH TW
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI AMERICAN STUDIES SCHOLAR ON TAIWAN ELECTION, TIBET
UNREST AND DEMOCRATIZATION


CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Shanghai, China, Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 26, 2008 DPO and Conoff met with Fudan
University Professor Wu Xinbo, Deputy Director of the Shanghai
Institute for American Studies to discuss the Taiwan
presidential election. Wu speculated that under certain
conditions Beijing could tolerate a U.S. visit by Ma Ying-jeou
prior to his inauguration. Wu expects Ma Ying-Jeou's victory to
improve cross-strait ties. Before the election China had made
economic gestures in order to achieve a political result (Ma's
victory),and now the PRC will need to make political gestures,
including movement on Taiwan's "international space" and
possibly some reduction in its visible military presence on the
mainland side of the strait, in order to obtain economic
benefits, such as direct transportation links, more mainland
tourism to Taiwan, and greater market access in Taiwan for
mainland products. He also commented on the recent disturbances
in Tibetan areas of China. Wu will travel to Washington during
the week of March 31, where he expects to see EAP DAS
Christensen, NSC Wilder, Congressional staffers, and think-tank
scholars such as the Brookings Institution's Richard Bush. END
SUMMARY.

Ma Ying-jeou to the U.S.?
--------------


2. (C) Wu Xinbo commented on recent press reports that Ma
Ying-jeou has asked to visit the United States prior to his
inauguration in May. Although Ma would be a private citizen
traveling on a private passport, he is nevertheless Taiwan's
President-elect and, as such, a visit would present many
problems for China. How easy it would be for Beijing to accept
would depend on many factors. Beijing would be concerned that
Ma would use a U.S. visit to increase his leverage in dealing
with the mainland. Wu noted that Ma is already known to be
close to the United States. A Ma visit would not be

substantive, but symbolic: if Ma wants to talk substance with
America, he can do it in Taiwan.


3. (C) Beijing's main concern would be with the manner in which
Ma would be received. If he went to Washington, that would be a
serious problem. On the other hand, Wu mused, as a Harvard
alumni, Ma might accept an invitation his alma mater to give a
speech on Taiwan (but not cross-strait relations),and while in
Boston might perhaps communicate with some senior USG officials.
Although uncomfortable, Beijing might consider such a visit
tolerable. (Comment: Wu's implied analogy to Lee Teng-hui's
1995 visit to Cornell is interesting, if only to show how
mainland perspectives have evolved. End comment.)


4. (C) If Ma is allowed to visit, it is imperative that the
United States notify Beijing, not to seek approval, but merely
to give advance notice as a courtesy. In any case, Wu
emphasized that it is in the interests of Taiwan and the U.S. to
preserve whatever goodwill Ma currently has with the mainland.
Wu added that the Taiwan military had yet to declare its
allegiance to Ma -- something they had quickly done in 2000, at
the last change of ruling party -- and speculated that Ma might
even face a coup if he left Taiwan before his May inauguration.

Taiwan's election shows a more mature democracy
-------------- --


5. (C) Wu was not surprised by Ma's decisive win in the March 22
election, given the KMT's victory in the legislative elections
earlier this year. However, it is too soon to say whether Ma's
victory was truly a vote for the KMT, or simply a vote of "no
confidence" in Chen Shui-Bian's bad governance. In four years,
Taiwan voters will reassess Ma's leadership based on his
first-term performance, and will have forgotten the current
dissatisfaction with Chen's DPP leadership. Ultimately, Ma's 17
percent margin of victory represents broad, albeit conditional,
support. The DPP retains significant support. Wu had
previously met Ma Ying-jeou on several occasions, when Ma was

SHANGHAI 00000122 002 OF 003


Taipei Mayor. In Wu's assessment, Ma is a serious, credible man
of substance. Nevertheless, the KMT should not get carried away
by Ma's election results; future Taiwan voter confidence will
depend on Ma's successful leadership. For Wu, the March 22
election demonstrates that Taiwan's democracy is maturing.
Taiwan voters judged candidates based on leadership qualities,
rather than reflexively voting for "the native Taiwanese
candidate." Moreover, unlike the past two Taiwan elections,
this year's election had a decisive result. Nor was there any
indication of "foul play" or "trickery."

Possible Mainland Gestures: Political for Economic
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Wu believes that Ma's victory opens a window for
improvement of cross-strait relations, both economically and
politically. Wu expects Ma Ying-jeou's victory to improve
cross-strait ties. Before the election China had made economic
gestures in order to achieve a political result (the KMT
victory),and now the PRC will need to make political gestures
in order to obtain economic benefits. Before the election, the
mainland proposed a variety of economic measures that would
benefit the Taiwan economy, including increased mainland tourism
to Taiwan and greater market access for Taiwan agricultural
products. According to Wu, the PRC would like to see
implementation of direct air and sea links, fewer restrictions
by Taiwan on mainland-destined investment, and greater market
access for mainland goods in Taiwan. Now that the Taiwan people
have chosen a leader more willing to cooperate with the
mainland, Wu believes it is time for China to make unilateral
concessions as a show of support and good faith.


7. (C) Wu noted that Hu Jintao has already indicated
willingness, if Taiwan's leaders accept the "one China
principle," to be more flexible regarding to Taiwan's
"international space," ceasing its objections to Taiwan
participation in international organizations for which statehood
is not a pre-requisite for admission (e.g., the World Health
Assembly). Additionally, Wu believes that China can take some
measures to reduce military tensions. China could make its
military presence in coastal areas less visible and less
threatening to Taiwan. This might included redeploying missiles
away from the area. In return, Beijing hopes that Taiwan will
relax, or eliminate, economic restrictions on trade and
investment by mainland Chinese. Beijing could have taken Taipei
before the WTO over its restrictions on imports from the
mainland, but chose not to do so for political reasons. Wu
speculated that Taiwan might well have welcomed such a move for
its sovereignty implications, but the mainland was not eager to
"internationalize" the cross-strait trade relationship.

ARATS and SEF will resume dialogue
--------------


8. (C) Wu expects the dialogue to resume between Taiwan's Strait
Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS),the two organizations
established in the 1990s to serve as non-governmental channels
for managing the cross-strait relationship. Both sides will
want to select new leaders for their respective entities. On
the PRC side, Wu noted that State Council Taiwan Affairs Office
director Chen Yunlin is already past the age of retirement and
would have already stepped down, except for the need to remain
through the Taiwan election. He thought Chen was the most
likely new chief of ARATS. Although there has been speculation
that former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen might take on the role,
he is probably too senior and too old. The Hong Kong media has
reported that Yan Mingfu, former Director of the United Front
Work Department, is also under consideration; Wu opined that Yan
has both the experience and the family background to become the
new ARATS head, but whether he was a serious candidate depends
on Yan's relationship with Hu Jintao. In any event, Wu is
confident that semi-official dialogue between ARATS and SEF will
resume after Chen Shui-Bian leaves office in May.

Hu and his legacy
--------------


9. (C) According to Wu, Hu Jintao strongly desires to see a

SHANGHAI 00000122 003 OF 003


resolution of the Taiwan issue as his legacy. In fact, the
current, improved situation is the result of Hu's policies.
Nevertheless, Wu did not expect rapid progress on the
fundamental political issues across the strait, such as
agreement on the definition of "one China" or resolution of
Taiwan's political status. Economic priorities such as the
"three links" and tourism liberalization are more deliverable
goals. Initial deliverables will need to be exchanged before
broader political resolution can be achieved. Speaking
personally, Wu thought that the Taiwan proposal from ten years
ago, of "one China, two governments," might even be acceptable
to China, even as it may no longer satisfy some elements on
Taiwan.


10. (C) Hu Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou's respective terms of office
are an additional complication in reaching a political solution.
Ma will probably have to wait until a second term to make
significant movement on the most sensitive political issues,
such as defining "one China," sovereignty, and Taiwan's
political status. However, by that time Hu Jintao will be in
the final year of his five year second term as President, and it
may be difficult for him to make any major moves.

Tibetan unrest
--------------


11. (C) Wu, who spent the academic year 2006-7 in Washington as
a fellow at the Brookings Institution, told us that he has been
active in some unofficial dialogue with Tibetan exile
organizations. As such, he believes that the recent Tibetan
disturbances should remind Beijing of the importance of dealing
with the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama is much more likely to
reach accommodation with Beijing than are others in the exile
community. Although they may appear extreme to some in Beijing,
the Dalai Lama's demands are negotiable. However, hardliners in
Beijing can now point to unrest in Tibet, and use this as an
additional excuse to further attack and alienate the Dalai Lama.
In this Olympic year domestic political issues are even more
sensitive. Wu said that he had been hopeful that dialogue with
the Dalai Lama could resume but he no longer holds that hope.
Ultimately, Tibetan unrest in this Olympic year damages this
dialogue, perhaps irreparably.


12. (C) According to Wu, China's initial concern over the
Tibetan protests was that a forceful response to unrest might
negatively impact the Taiwan election. Now that the Taiwan
election is past, Beijing is worried about Tibet's impact on the
Olympics and the world's perception of China. With this in
mind, China is trying its hardest to handle Tibetan unrest in
the least damaging way to its public image. China's efforts so
far have been successful, in Wu's assessment. In March 1989,
Tibet experienced similar unrest. At that time, martial law was
declared and China was heavy-handed in its suppression of the
protests. Currently, however, China is trying its hardest to
open Lhasa back up, not shut it down. It wants journalists --
first Chinese, but ultimately western as well -- to be able to
return to Tibet and report positive stories. Many rioters have
surrendered, which according to Wu, meant that China would be
able to take a more lenient approach to their punishment.
Nevertheless, several key figures remain at large, and the
situation has not yet fully stabilized.

Wu's Washington Trip
--------------


13. (C) Wu told us that he will travel to Washington over the
weekend for a conference as well as meetings. He said that he
expected to see EAP DAS Christensen, Dennis Wilder at the NSC,
Peter Yeo at the Congressional Research Service, as well as
Frank Jannuzi on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He would also meet with think tank scholars,
including Richard Bush at the Brookings Institution. Wu is also
looking forward to seeing the U.S. Presidential election
campaign up close. The week before, he had given a talk at his
15-year old son's high school on the election, and he was
surprised at the level of interest among the students. They
were all familiar with the different candidates and had strong
views on them.
JARRETT