Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL919
2008-05-02 08:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

KOREA-JAPAN POST SUMMIT: LOOKING FORWARD BUT NOT

Tags:  PGOV PREL JP KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0919/01 1230832
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020832Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9724
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4238
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8701
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4382
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000919 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL JP KS KN
SUBJECT: KOREA-JAPAN POST SUMMIT: LOOKING FORWARD BUT NOT
MOVING FORWARD

Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000919

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL JP KS KN
SUBJECT: KOREA-JAPAN POST SUMMIT: LOOKING FORWARD BUT NOT
MOVING FORWARD

Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Since his inauguration in February, ROK
President Lee Myung-bak has consistently said that he intends
to focus on the future of relations with Japan and not dwell
on past issues. Holding two summits with Japanese Prime
Minister Fukuda already within his short time in office is
one clear sign that President Lee is backing up his words
with actions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's
Director for Japan, Joo Joong-chul, described the April 21
Lee-Fukuda Summit as setting a favorable tone for the
bilateral relationship, but the remainder of his comments
conveyed the sense that the ROKG was not eager to rush
forward to make changes. Instead, the ROKG would proceed
cautiously on the political side both because they were
unsure of Fukuda's political prospects and because of concern
that Japan could say or do something about historical issues
that would irritate the Korean public. On the economic side,
similarly, the ROKG had resisted GOJ calls to talk about jump
starting FTA negotiations in their joint statement, because
ROK companies, particularl "chaebols like Hyundai," were
reluctant to allow Japanese manufacturing into the ROK, and
it was clear that Japan had no intention to open its
agriculture market. The likely result was a better tone to
the relationship but few substantive changes, for now.


2. (SBU) Standing at odds with Lee's forward thinking are
several institutions in Korea, founded under the previous
liberal administrations, which are specifically required to
look at the past and bring to light details of Japan's
relationswith Korea throughout the 20th century. As public
sentiment for Prime Minister Fukuda erodes in Japan and
Korean think tanks continue to raise historical animosities,
President Lee's and Prime Minister Fukuda's willingness to
focus on the future will be strongly tested as they both work
to reinvigorate the idea of shuttle diplomacy and closer
cooperation. END SUMMARY.

--------------
LEE REACHES OUT TO JAPAN
--------------



3. (SBU) In Lee's inauguration speech, he said that "We will
attach importance to our policy towards Asia. In particular,
we will seek peace and mutual prosperity with our close
neighbors, including Japan, China and Russia and promote
further exchange and cooperation with them." Even prior to
officially taking office, the president-elect sent his
brother, National Assembly Vice Speaker Lee Sang-deuk to
Tokyo as his special envoy in January. The Japanese
responded favorably and Prime Minister Fukuda accepted the
invitation to attend Lee's inauguration in February. Lee
also appointed then Ambassador to Japan Yu Myung-hwan as his
Foreign Minister which is likely to keep Japan issues on the
agenda with a sympathetic ear at the top of MOFAT.


4. (SBU) Following Lee's summit in Japan on April 21, Fukuda
thanked the President for visiting Japan during his first
overseas trip. "That shows President Lee's policy to
prioritize his country's relations with Japan," Fukuda said.
The two leaders agreed to restart "shuttle diplomacy" or
reciprocal visits between the top leaders at least once a
year. The agreement to hold these talks was suspended in
2005 when then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi paid a visit
to Yasukuni Shrine which prompted then South Korean President
Roh to cancel his visit to Japan in protest. Following the
April summit, Fukuda said that he wanted to "open a new era
in Japan-South Korea relations" while President Lee stated
"historical truth must not be ignored but we can no longer
afford to give up future relations due to disputes over the
past."

--------------
MOFAT'S VIEWS ON THE SUMMIT AND GOING FORWARD
--------------


5. (C) MOFAT's Director for the Japan Division, Joo
Joon-chul, summarized Lee Myung-bak's approach toward Japan
as one of avoiding confrontation and keeping public sentiment
"subdued." After President Lee took office in February,
Director Joo said that MOFAT began discussing ways to
stabilize Korea's relationship with Japan. The conclusion
was to work with Japan on less sensitive areas of mutual

concern (youth exchanges, economic agreements, energy
copperation) and avoid sensitive issues (Yasukuni Shrine
visits, Liancourt Rocks territorial disputes, and Comfort
Women). Joo said that problems with Japan arose in the past
when Japanese politicians, namely the Prime Minister, would
do or say something intended to garner support with domestic
constituents while angering Koreans.


6. (C) According to Joo, Japan "urgently" requested that a
resumption of Free Trade Agreement talks be included in the
joint press statement following the April 21 summit. Korea
agreed to discuss the possibility of reopening the stalled
talks but did not commit to an official restart. Joo
downplayed the substance of the Economic Partnership
Agreement that was also introduced in the statement saying
they intentionally did not strive for anything too ambitious
in this part of the statement. Joo said ROK companies,
especially chaebols, were against opening Korea to
manufacturing companies from Japan, so FTA talks would not
move fast.


7. (C) Joo said that Fukuda was likely to come to Seoul in
September for the next summit meeting. In preparation for
that meeting, MOFAT would work to draft a more comprehensive
joint vision statement than the April 2008 statement. Former
President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi issued a
joint statement following their 1998 summit in Japan. Since
ten years had passed, Joo said it was a good time to reflect
on the 1998 statement and evaluate what progress Korea had
made over the past decade. Similarly, the statement that
will come out of the September 2008 summit would likely spell
out the vision for Korea and Japan ten years into the future.

--------------
JAPANESE VIEW OF THE FUTURE AFTER THE SUMMIT
--------------


8. (C) A political officer at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul
shared MOFAT's assessment of the Japan-Korea summit as
focused on strengthening economic bonds while avoiding
discussion of historical and territorial issues. He said he
expected the tone of relations to remain positive, noting
that Lee Myung-bak was likely to have "thicker skin" than
President Roh allowing him to weather minor troubles when
they would inevitably arise. President Roh was more
concerned about supporting Korea's image in the world and
felt he had to respond publicly when Japan made an affront to
Korea. When an issue arose, the two sides would need to be
careful to avoid politicizing the issue but rather manage the
issue and avoid conflict. The political officer said Japan
and Korea continued their efforts to discuss historical
issues through the Korea-Japan Joint History Research
Committee that was expected to issue their findings later
this year. The results of this effort were far less
important than the fact that the two groups were meeting
together and learning to listen to one another. The process
was the desired result.

--------------
NORTHEAST ASIA HISTORY FOUNDATION
--------------


9. (SBU) Standing in the way of President Lee's aspiration
for closer ties to Japan are several historically focused
think tanks. The ROKG-funded Northeast Asia History
Foundation began in 2004, during Roh Moo-hyun's tenure, as
the Goguryeo Project. The think tank was a direct response
to the PRC's 2004 launching of the Northeast Project. In
2006, the Goguryeo Project combined with scholars on the
Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo),Comfort Women, and other
controversial "historical" issues to form the current
Foundation. The Foundation's stated mission is to "establish
a basis for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia by
confronting distortions of history that have caused
considerable anguish in this region and the world at large,
and developing a correct understanding of history through
comprehensive long-term research and systematic and strategic
policy development." The Foundation is organized into six
divisions, each focusing on a different issue. The think
tank employs 80 professors to conduct its research.


10. (SBU) Dr. Hong Myeon-ki from the Planning Division of the
Foundation told us that his office is engaged in plans for

when Japan will next "provoke" Korea on one of the sensitive
historical issues. According to Hong, the historical issues
with Japan have strong ties with current issues and therefore
it is only a matter of time before Japan brings them to the
forefront again. Professor Yoon Hwy-tak from Hanyang
National University, and a former Foundation researcher, also
expressed his skepticism about the apparent warming relations
between Japan and Korea. Looking at the past two
administrations in Korea, both Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
expressed a desire at the outset of their tenure to improve
relations with Japan, Yoon said. Because of Japan's
increasingly hard-line view toward China and Korea, Prime
Minister Fukuda would not be able to continue along the
current path to restart shuttle diplomacy and will eventually
give in to public sentiment opposing Korea in some fashion.

--------------
COMPARISONS TO GERMANY
--------------


11. (SBU) Hong stated that Japan's role in the region will
also be limited because of its refusal to address historical
concerns. Drawing a comparison to post-war Germany, Hong
said Germany's willingness to address its past atrocities
allowed Germany to accede to its current level of leadership
in the region and the world. For now, Japan preferred to use
historical issues as a domestic political tool. When asked
what he recommended Japan do to begin to address the past,
Hong demurred but said that no one knows what Japan is
thinking about the future of Northeast Asia. Are they
interested in regional peace and security or only national
security and economic growth?


12. (SBU) Yoon pointed out that Germany's reconciliation with
the other European countries was facilitated by a foundation
of shared Christian beliefs and cultural similarities; the
same principles that supported the creation of the European
Union today. Another difference is that Japan was not
defeated by an Asian country in World War II; it was the U.S.
that handed Japan its defeat, not the ROK or China. Europe
remains a community of democracies with similar living
standards but Asia still has large gaps in the quality of
life of its people and vast differences in their ideology,
Yoon said. Japan's strong economic position makes it think
it has nothing to learn from Asia.

--------------
MORE ATTENTION ON REGIONAL PEACE
--------------


13. (SBU) Hong expressed his hope to have more dialogue with
the U.S. about regional peace and security issues noting that
much work will be required well in advance of actually
achieving lasting peace or security in the region. Even
though everyone agreed that regional peace would only come
after North Korea denuclearized, we should not wait for that
event to occur to make plans for the future. Professor Yoon
added that the Foundation was the only think tank in Korea
that was looking at historical issues and therefore increased
dialogue with all parties was essential to deal with
historical issues that could inhibit successful organization
of a regional peace mechanism.

--------------
SUGGESTION FOR A U.S. ROLE
--------------


14. (SBU) Hong asserted that the U.S. was likely to play a
significant role in how and when North and South Korea
conclude a peace agreement to officially end the Korean War.
Despite the strong U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances, Hong
said many people in Asia questioned the U.S. motives in the
region and whether the U.S. was only looking out for its own
interests or was concerned about regional stability as well.
As one possible suggestion, Hong offered that the U.S. could
play the role of intermediary and work to bring experts
together from Northeast Asia to begin discussing historical
issues in more detail. Although academics from the region
were already sharing ideas, there needed to be more exchange
at the government level, Hong said. The U.S. was a party to
historical events in the region and therefore it would be
acceptable for it to play a role going forward as well.

--------------
JAPANESE COLLABORATORS LISTED
--------------


15. (SBU) On April 29, the Institute for Research in
Collaborationist Activities, a private Seoul-based think tank
released a list of Korea's top collaborators with Japan
during its colonial rule of Korea from 1910-1945. The
Institute said that 4,776 people were selected to be featured
in three biographical dictionaries to be released in late
August. The books will be an updated version of a 2005
listing of 3,096 collaborators. The publication committee
was established in 2001 with 170 researchers and writers.
Supported by private donations, the Institute said it raised
USD 500,000 in 2004 after only ten days of fund raising.
While liberal politicians, scholars and civic groups released
statements of support for the publication, President Lee
expressed regret at the renewal of the colonial era
controversy. He also reconfirmed his intent to overhaul the
nation's Truth Commission, established to investigate and
reveal past wrongdoings noting that the previous
administration had named the members of these committees. In
a meeting with religious leaders on the April 29, Lee said
"the merits and demerits of collaboration with Japan's
colonial government should be seen with a balanced view."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) President Lee appears to be making a good-faith
effort to reach out to Japan and look for common ground to
move forward and build relations. Lee's campaign promise to
improve Korea's economic status relies heavily on attracting
foreign investment, including from Japan. Even if President
Lee is successful in injecting some conservatives into the
historically-focused think tanks, it would take some time
before these groups change their thinking about Japan and the
past, if ever. Until then, President Lee is likely to face
opposition from these groups who are eagerly awaiting a
misstep from Japan so that they can once again justify their
existence. As it seems that neither side is expecting to
make progress on historical issues and will actively work to
subdue public responses to provocations, there is reason to
be hopeful for a quieter, more mature relationship under
President Lee's Administration. Korea's ability to establish
a more mature relationship with Japan may boil down to
President Lee's personal ability to look to the future and
not dwell on the past and convince the Korean people that
this is in their interest as well.
VERSHBOW