Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL896
2008-05-01 07:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROK REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES: NEAPSM AND NORTH KOREAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0896/01 1220718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010718Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9678
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7261
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4210
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8697
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0354
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4356
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1675
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1251
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 3680
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000896 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES: NEAPSM AND NORTH KOREAN
REFUGEE POLICY

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

SUBJECT: ROK REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES: NEAPSM AND NORTH KOREAN
REFUGEE POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000896

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES: NEAPSM AND NORTH KOREAN
REFUGEE POLICY

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

SUBJECT: ROK REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES: NEAPSM AND NORTH KOREAN
REFUGEE POLICY


1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 30, POL M/C met with MOFAT Director
General for the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau, Huh
Chul, to discuss regional issues including a Northeast Asia
Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM) and North Korean
refugee policy. On NEAPSM, DG Huh said there had been very
limited progress on the issue since the last Working Group
meeting held in Moscow in August 2007. As a way to get the
dialogue started, Huh suggested identifying an issue, based
on consensus, where progress could be achieved to pave the
way for other areas of cooperation. On North Korean
refugees, Huh said that the ROKG had considered the option of
bringing refugees to South Korea and then determining their
preference for resettlement either to the ROK or a third
country, especially the United States, but ultimately deemed
this plan as "not feasible" given a number of legal and
practical constraints. Huh said that he hoped the U.S. would
find a way to reduce the time needed to process U.S.-bound
cases, because it was clear that North Korean refugees were
discouraged from choosing the U.S. as an option by the
lengthy process time required. Huh estimated that the number
of North Korean refugees may decline in the next year or two.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
LIMITED PROGRESS ON NEAPSM
--------------


2. (C) In an April 30 meeting with POL M/C, MOFAT Director
General for the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau Huh Chul
said that the Russia was "not engaged" as the Chair of the
Northeast Asia Peace and Security (NEAPSM) Working Group
under the Six-Party Talks. Although Russia had distributed a
paper on "guiding principles," this was only after the ROK
provided Russia with an initial draft that got the ball
rolling. DG Huh said that he was expecting input from the
U.S. on the draft principles, noting that the ROK could
better prepare its stance on the issue after consulting with

U.S.


3. (C) DG Huh said that NEAPSM and a peace regime for the
Korean Peninsula were separate, but related, issues.
Discussion of a peace regime should involve the "main
players" of the Six-Party Talks and should reinforce the
talks, but not be linked to the talks. According to Huh,
peace regime defines a state whereas NEAPSM defines behavior.
The two are related but different. Huh said that NEAPSM
could include many forms of generic behavior and look at
political, social and human rights issues. Issues relating
to energy cooperation might be best left for a future time
once the Energy and Economic Cooperation Working Group
(EECWG) had completed its mission to avoid any confusion with
the Working Group's efforts to assist North Korea.

--------------
POSSIBLE FIRST STEP FOR NEAPSM
--------------


4. (C) DH Huh offered the suggestion that the related parties
could begin a serious discussion about NEAPSM by focusing on
a specific issue such as joint search and rescue efforts and
then move on to tougher issues. If all of the parties agreed
to work on a common issue, such as search and rescue, it
could provide an "early success" on which the group could
then build upon and extend into other areas of cooperation.
Huh also expressed his hope that the NEAPSM Working Group
would be able to meet again, either before or after the next
plenary session of the Six-Party Talks.

--------------
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES
--------------


5. (C) In his role as DG for Korean Peace Regime, Huh is also
responsible for policy toward North Korean refugees outside
of the ROK. Following the inauguration of President Lee
Myung-bak, DG Huh said that MOFAT had led an in-depth
discussion on the refugee issue with all concerned agencies
in the ROK. At the root of the discussion was how the ROK
could better assist North Korean refugees and reduce the time
they spent in third countries waiting to be resettled to the
ROK. Huh said the ROK recognized that an increasing number
of North Korean refugees were leaving Korea to look for
resettlement in other countries, particularly in Europe.
According to Huh, many of these individuals made the choice
to come to the ROK as the quickest means to get out of the
extremely poor conditions of the foreign immigration
detention centers (IDCs) but never intended to remain
permanently in Korea.

--------------
ROK CANNOT BE A WAITING PLACE FOR ALL CASES
--------------


6. (C) One alternative that the ROK considered was bringing
all North Korean defectors to the ROK and then asking the
refugee to make a decision on where he or she wanted to
permanently settle. Huh said that this idea was "not
feasible" given a number of legal and practical
considerations. The amount of time that a refugee would have
to wait while a third country made a determination of whether
to accept the applicant or not could become a lengthy and
protracted situation. There was also no guarantee that the
third country would accept the refugee,s application. What
would the ROK do in the case the refugee was refused
admission in another country? Given that all North Koreans
are potential South Korean citizens, there could be serious
legal issues if individuals were in limbo for long periods of
time and it was not clear if they were subject to the
protections afforded under the ROK constitution.


7. (C) DG Huh suggested that the best way forward for the
U.S. was to find ways to shorten its processing time for
North Korean cases. By addressing this issue, many of the
other problems would go away, Huh said. He offered the
ROK,s continued support for these cases and said they would
be willing to consider the option of providing transportation
letters for North Koreans bound for the U.S. in an effort to
expedite their departure from a third country by transiting
Korea. POL M/C thanked the DG for the ROK,s ongoing support
for U.S.-bound cases and agreed that the U.S. should look for
ways to shorten the processing time of its cases. Still,
simply shortening the processing time for the U.S. cases was
not the only issue that needed to be addressed. Washington
remained concerned that there were many more North Korean
refugees in the region who wanted to resettle in the U.S.
than the current numbers reflect. This and other issues
could be discussed at the next bilateral consultation that is
typically held every six months, POL M/C said. Huh said he
would like to schedule a refugee bilateral soon.

--------------
POSSIBLE DECREASE IN NUMBERS
--------------


8. (C) Huh said that he had looked at all of the data about
North Korean refugee flows and came to the conclusion that
the number of refugees has probably already peaked or will
peak this year. Despite what many people believe, the food
situation in North Korea is not the main contributing factor
compelling North Koreans to leave their country, according to
Huh. The more relevant factor is the popularity of North
Koreans to migrate from China to other countries in the
region where they ultimately seek resettlement to the ROK.
As word spreads among the refugee communities in China and
elsewhere that life for a refugee in the ROK is not an easy
one, and that the ROKG resettlement subsidy has declined, Huh
said he estimated the numbers will drop in coming years.
VERSHBOW