Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL856
2008-04-28 07:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

SPI 17: U.S.-ROK 17TH SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE

Tags:  MARR MNUC PARM PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0856/01 1190757
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 280757Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9593
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4160
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8651
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4306
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 2622
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
S E C R E T SEOUL 000856 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: MARR MNUC PARM PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: SPI 17: U.S.-ROK 17TH SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE
TALKS PART 1 OF 2

Classified By: A/POL Brian D. McFeeters, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SEOUL 000856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: MARR MNUC PARM PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: SPI 17: U.S.-ROK 17TH SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE
TALKS PART 1 OF 2

Classified By: A/POL Brian D. McFeeters, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) The 17th Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks were
held in Seoul on April 8, 2008. The U.S. Delegation was
headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for
East Asia David Sedney, with Ministry of National Defense
(MND) Deputy Minister of Defense for Policy Jeon Jei-guk
leading the ROK Delegation. Both sides highlighted SPI-17,
the first SPI under the new Lee Myung-bak (LMB)
Administration, as an opportunity to begin crafting a
forward-looking, more strategic-oriented Alliance, while
resolving remaining Alliance issues. The talks were
characterized by mutual support for reinvigorating and
broadening the Alliance with an emphasis on initiating
positive momentum on defense issues ahead of the upcoming
Presidential Summit. Both sides agreed that the next
Presidential Summit joint statement should include a vision
for the Alliance. There was general satisfaction with
progress made on the majority of SPI topics covered,
including preparation for the transfer of wartime operational
control (OPCON),ROK Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) plans,
past ROK contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Armistice
Maintenance Responsibility (AMR) transition, Yongsan
Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan (YRP/LPP),ROK
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Status upgrade, 8th Army
Transformation plans, and the need for further cooperation in
space policy. Despite hopes that the improved general
atmosphere surrounding the Alliance would lead to a quick and
smooth return of nine USFK facilities this year, thus
avoiding a replay of the acrimony in the press and damage to
the Alliance that occurred during 2007's returns, discussions
revealed that there remains a fundamental difference in
perception of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK)'s compliance with
the relevant environmental standards. Both sides agreed to
convene a Special Joint Committee Session of the U.S.-ROK

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with two-star general
officer level representation to further discuss the issue.


2. (SBU) SPI-18 is tentatively scheduled for June in
Washington, DC.

--------------
CLOSED SESSION
--------------


3. (S) In the 75-minute Closed Session that preceded the
plenary, DASD Sedney apologized for the difficulty they had
encountered in scheduling Minister of National Defense Lee
Sang-hee's May visit to Washington to meet with Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) Gates. He explained the competing demands
on the SECDEF's schedule made scheduling a meeting difficult.
DASD Sedney emphasized that the SECDEF looked forward to
meeting with Minister Lee during his planned travel to Seoul
for the USFK change of command ceremony in June 2008. Jeon
replied that Minister Lee also looked forward to their
meeting in June, adding that due to heightened tensions in
relations between North and South Korea, he would be unable
to travel outside of the country anytime soon.


4. (S) DASD Sedney expressed serious U.S. concerns over the
sudden ROKG decision to suspend actions to obtain the Global
Hawk intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
capability for the ROK military. He reminded Jeon that at
SPI-16 in Washington, Jeon had made a strong presentation on
the issue and had asked that he and East Asia Pacific (EAP)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Arvizu do all they
could to secure USG approval to sell the Global Hawk system
to the ROK. DASD Sedney further explained that he and DAS
Arvizu had made this an urgent issue within both the Defense
and State Departments and now as a result of the new ROK
position that our ability to respond quickly in the future
would be greatly affected. Jeon thanked the U.S. Government
for its efforts, and assured DASD Sedney that the ROK
decision to reconsider acquiring Global Hawk was unrelated to
its commitment to assume wartime OPCON in April 2012. Jeon
explained that budgetary and military planning reasons
necessitated a ROKG internal review before the decision to
proceed with the purchase was made. "We are not canceling
the plan, we are reviewing it," Jeon said. DASD Sedney
replied that even if the ROK was not ready to make the
decision today, it would be better if it briefed the U.S.
delegation at SPI on its Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements and concept of operations
(CONOPS) for the use of Global Hawk to demonstrate its
continuing interest in acquiring the system at an appropriate
time. (Note: After the meeting Jeon ordered his staff to
deliver the ISR requirements and CONOPS brief at SPI later
that afternoon.)


5. (S) Turning to the issue of whether or not to halt the
reduction of USFK troops in Korea at 28,500, Jeon expressed
his view that it was a good idea to halt the drawdown. He
said that if it were raised during President Lee Myung-bak's
April visit to Washington, it could be agreed to in
principle, with the details to be worked out by the time of
the U.S.-ROK defense ministerial in June. DASD Sedney
welcomed the news, stressing that the U.S. side had been very
disappointed to read the public quote by an MND source
stating that the U.S. had proposed to halt the drawdown
because it wanted a bargaining chip to use during this year's
Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations. Jeon
requested more details regarding the capabilities that would
remain in place if the troop level were kept at 28,500. He
added that it was not important which country had asked for
it if the CFC recommended it as the prudent military thing to
do.


6. (S) Most of the meeting was then spent discussing the
issue of using the ROK's contribution of burdensharing funds
through the SMA to pay for the movement of the 2nd Infantry
Division (2ID) to the new facilities now being constructed at
the expanded Camp Humphreys site in Pyeongtaek under the LPP.
Jeon said he had been taken aback by General Bell's
statement before the Congress that the ROKG would pay for 50
percent of the 2ID move. Brigadier General (BG) Kim
Byung-ki, Deputy Director General of the MND International
Policy Bureau, came to our defense by explaining that it had
been clearly understood by both sides that SMA funds could be
used for LPP when that agreement was concluded in 2004, in
fact, that it was understood dating back to the initial
discussions of LPP in 2001. However, he joined the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and MND chorus calling
for USFK to provide figures on the exact mix of U.S. funding
and SMA money that would be used to fund the 2ID move,
arguing that they needed hard numbers with which to make a
convincing case to the National Assembly. "We bureaucrats
cannot do policy without having the facts," MND International
Policy Bureau Director General (DG) Song Bong-heon added.


7. (S) Jeon also used the occasion to argue that a more
accurate calculation of the ROK's contribution to USFK's
non-personnel stationing costs (NPSC) was needed. He took
issue with the USFK Commander-designate's testimony the
previous week that the ROK SMA contribution covered only 41
percent of that total cost. In his response, DASD Sedney
firmly reiterated the U.S. position that SMA can and would be
used for LPP in accordance with the 2004 agreement. He also
made clear that the process was transparent and information
had been provided on the use of SMA funds. DASD Sedney
emphasized that what is quite clear is that SMA funds are
used responsibly for things that the SMA allowed: labor,
logistics, and construction. Embassy PolOff added that the
addition of more level of detail to the information already
provided is not the solution to the current problem and
highlighted that whether the funds are used at current
facilities to support 2ID soldiers or for construction of new
facilities to support 2ID soldiers should not matter. The
point is that SMA funds are being used for the intended
purpose, he said. DASD Sedney stated that even if the ROK
increased is contribution to cover 50 percent of the NPSC, it
would only cover 18 percent of the total cost borne by the
U.S. to station forces in defense of the Republic of Korea.
"So don't get too excited arguing about small parts of small
amounts," he concluded.

-------------- --------------
OPEN SESSION: ROK PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) PLANS
-------------- --------------


8. (S) Following the opening remarks and ROK explanation of
ongoing and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Jeon
discussed the ROKG commitment of PKO missions around the
world. Jeon remarked that there were currently 1078 ROK
troops deployed in 14 countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, and
Kuwait, as part of ongoing PKO missions. "The new ROK
administration designated strengthening the ROK's PKO
capabilities and streamlining their deployment process as a
key priority," Jeon said. At present, the ROK constitution
requires the National Assembly to approve every deployment,
sometimes delaying appropriate action. Jeon explained the
ROKG plan was to create and provide appropriate training for
a standing PKO force of 1000 troops with all relevant
specialties that could be quickly deployed. New PKO
legislation defining the scope of application and a
streamlined approval process would be needed, Jeon explained.
Currently there were three versions of PKO legislation under
consideration by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
National Assembly. Jeon said that MND would push for
introduction of the bill in the next National Assembly
session this summer. The ROKG also plans to establish a
national PKO training center under the control of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in order to expand its PKO-related
external military training cooperation.


9. (S) DASD Sedney thanked the ROK side for the update.
Embassy Poloff David Wolff expressed U.S. appreciation for
Korea's PKO efforts around the world, citing the ROKG
decision to send 38 Korean troops to participate in this
year's Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise
in Bangladesh. DASD Sedney noted that the U.S. had proposed
a few years ago that the ROKG contribute to the
U.S.-established PKO training center in Mongolia. DASD
Sedney suggested that the ROKG take into consideration the
operations of this center to identify synergies for further
cooperation and avoid duplication of effort as the ROKG plan
for an upgraded PKO training center develops.

--------------
SECURITY COOPERATION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
--------------


10. (S) Jeon commented that the ROK planned to withdraw its
military troops from Iraq by December of this year. He said
he thought that the withdrawal would occur as planned.
However, he noted that the plan could be reviewed. Regarding
the ROK role in Afghanistan, DASD Sedney stated that the ROK
could contribute further in the following areas: training
Afghan security forces, including the Afghan National Police,
at locations such as the Afghan National Police Training
Center; expanding vocational training opportunities in
Afghanistan, especially in places like Kabul; and providing
grant-aid defense articles or assistance credits to equip
Afghan security forces. DASD Sedney suggested that the ROKG
dispatch a survey team to Kabul to see firsthand the
requirements.

--------------
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS WITH CHINA
--------------


11. (S) DASD Sedney briefed the status of U.S.
military-to-military relations with China during the Bush
Administration. He highlighted the U.S. objective of
broadening engagement with China in order to bring it further
into the international system as a responsible stakeholder.
From a low point with the 2001 EP3 incident, U.S. mil-to-mil
relations with China have grown to include a number of
high-level visits, including a recent visit by Secretary
Gates. There are regularly-scheduled defense policy
coordination talks twice a year. DASD Sedney said that the
U.S. emphasizes its "One China Policy" in these meetings,
noting that the U.S. "One China Policy" differs from the
Chinese "One China Policy." At the meetings, China raised
concern about Taiwan and specifically U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan. Overall, however, DASD Sedney surmised that cross
straits relations had stabilized in recent years as cultural
and economic ties between Taiwan and China had deepened.
DASD Sedney concluded with four success stories from China
mil-to-mil engagement: 1) The U.S. and China reached an

agreement, after seventeen years of negotiation, to access
China's records from the Korean War which would prove
valuable in the U.S. effort to locate missing personnel from
that war; 2) An agreement was reached to discuss nuclear
strategy and policy; 3) China provided the U.S. its white
papers on China's military power; and 4) The military hotline
between DOD and the People's Liberation Army is now
operational. The U.S. engagement continues, but China asked
to slow down exchanges because of the 2008 Summer Olympics.


12. (S) Jeon said that the ROKG was very interested in
China's development, particularly, its military development.
Given China's direct influence on regional security and its
ability to influence North Korea, Jeon highlighted two
primary concerns vis-a-vis China: the transparency of its
military budget and China's ultimate objective in its
military force enhancements. DASD Sedney agreed that the PRC
had had an aggressive and successful military modernization
program, highlighting the Chinese focus on anti-satellite,
cyberwarfare, and nuclear programs. Jeon said that since the
ROK established diplomatic relations with China in 1992,
MND's China engagement strategy was to encourage China to
play a more constructive role toward peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, including using
its influence with North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue.
Like the U.S., the ROK focused its efforts on increasing
bilateral exchanges. The ROK held annual defense ministerial
talks for the past three years. The ROK also conducted a
combined search and rescue exercise and agreed to establish
navy and air force hotlines, said Northeast Asia Policy
Division Director Colonel (COL) Lee Nam-woo. The ROK and PRC
militaries also conducted a total of seven intel exchange
meetings.


13. (S) DASD Sedney thanked MND for their briefing and asked
if the hotline was established because of a specific problem
or potential for dangerous incidents in the future. Jeon
responded that the hotline was established as a way to
mitigate misunderstandings, especially given the close
proximity in which the air and naval forces of the two
countries operate within the region. He further elaborated
that while the ROK Navy proposed an annual joint search and
rescue exercise (SAREX) with China, China declined and the
last formal exercise was conducted two years ago. The
current plan is hold joint SAREX training in conjunction with
port call visits. DASD Sedney asked if China shared any
information about their relationship with North Korea during
the ROKG exchanges with China. BG Kim Byung-ki responded
that no specific details were discussed concerning their
relationship with North Korea.


14. (S) DASD Sedney asked MND to share their experience with
China regarding strategic intentions. Jeon responded that
the relationship is in elementary stages and difficult to
discuss as China is reluctant to discuss many details.
MOFAT's North American Affairs Bureau Deputy DG Chang Ho-jin
asked if there were differences between the U.S. mil-to-mil
relationships with China and with Japan. DASD Sedney
explained that there were many differences, noting that as a
treaty ally, Japan and the U.S. shared a very close, broad,
and deep relationship.

--------------
NORTH KOREA MISSILE THREAT
--------------


15. (S) The ROK side presented a frank assessment of the
North Korean missile threat. Jeon called for greater
U.S.-ROK intelligence sharing, noting that the missile threat
would continue to grow because North Korea saw its missile
development program as a means of ensuring regime survival
and acquiring foreign currency. COL Nam Dong-wo presented an
overview of the ROK's assessment of the North Korean missile
threat focusing on the KN02, SCUD, No Dong, IRBM, and Taepo
Dong 2 missiles (copies of ROK briefing slides have been
transmitted through DIA channels). He noted that North
Korean ballistic missiles are increasingly becoming a threat
to its neighbors in the region.


16. (S) DASD Sedney noted that the U.S. and ROK assessments
tracked closely. He stressed that North Korea's growing
capabilities and continued development of its missile
program, combined with its demonstrated WMD and nuclear
capability, enabled it to hold its neighbors and the region
hostage. As a basis for further cooperation and information
sharing, DASD Sedney requested a JCS brief on its
requirements at the next SPI and suggested a U.S-ROK missile
joint analysis in order to identify problems and areas for
cooperation. He noted that the U.S. Missile Defense Agency
would be willing to brief its concept for conducting a joint
analysis process at the next SPI.


17. (S) USFK J-5's Major General (MajGen) Frank Panter echoed
DASD Sedney's remarks, thanked MND for the briefing and added
that the ROK and U.S. missile threat assessments were very
close; this threat had been very important to USFK as
highlighted by USFK Commander-designate Lieutenant General
Sharp's Congressional confirmation testimony the previous
week. Jeon agreed that a joint threat assessment would be
beneficial, and noted that deeper exploration of the topic
should be made at the next SPI.

-------------- -
U.S.-ROK-JAPAN TRILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION
-------------- -


18. (S) Recalling Secretary Gates's call at the 39th Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM) for increased trilateral
cooperation to promote regional security, DASD Sedney said
the U.S. would enthusiastically welcome resumed trilateral
security cooperation with Japan and South Korea. He added
that his colleagues at the Japanese Ministry of Defense were
similarly enthusiastic. DASD Sedney noted that the PACOM J-5
already engaged in a trilateral process with the ROK and
Japan through the annual Trilateral J-5 Strategy Talks, as
well as a trilateral search and rescue exercise planned
following the RIMPEC Exercise in Hawaii this summer. He
noted that the U.S. side was looking to further
operational-level cooperation, but stressed it was also
important to resume strategic policy discussions among the
three defense departments. DASD Sedney said the U.S. would
be willing to host, as would Japan probably, although he
understood the ROK was the next in line to host discussions
under the previous process. DASD Sedney stressed that the
proposed discussion would be based upon shared interests as
both the ROK and Japan are U.S. treaty allies with common
values. The process was not intended to counter other
nations, nor meant to be exclusive.


19. (S) Jeon agreed that security threats had evolved,
becoming even more complex and transnational, thereby
increasing the need for greater trilateral cooperation. He
did, however, express continued concern that too much
visibility might lead to greater Chinese and Russian
cooperation to counter a perceived threat. Jeon asked that
the U.S. work to confirm Japanese interest, which DASD Sedney
promised to do the following day when he visited Tokyo. DASD
Sedney emphasized the importance of the ROKG contacting Japan
as well. Jeon said he would try and stressed that
minister-level approval would be needed on the ROK-side
before topics or specifics were discussed, but looked forward
to further initial coordination at the working-level. He
asked DOD to take the lead on this matter. DASD Sedney
emphasized that Secretary Gates fully supported resuming
trilateral security cooperation and noted that OSD's John
Hill would visit Seoul in late May to coordinate
working-level discussions in preparation for higher-level
meetings.

--------------
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) STATUS UPGRADE
--------------


20. (S) Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K)
Chief COL Kevin Madden stressed that the U.S. side had
secured strong, high-level support within the Departments of
State and Defense for ROK FMS Status Upgrade. COL Madden
explained that General Bell had made a strong case for the
upgrade in his March 12 Congressional testimony. He noted
that, to date, the legislation had received 25 co-sponsors in
the House of Representatives and four in the Senate. Noting
that Congress viewed specific issues such as the FMS Status
Upgrade from the perspective of overall U.S.-ROK relations,
COL Madden urged the ROKG to cooperate closely on a range of
Alliance issues, as well as to continue actively engaging
U.S. legislators.


21. (S) DASD Sedney pointed out that there had been positive
movement in the U.S. Congress. He echoed statements of
strong support within DOD for legislation to upgrade the
ROK's FMS Status, noting that Secretary Gates fully supported
the upgrade as an important symbol of strengthening the
Alliance and as a way to improve U.S.-ROK interoperability.
As part of continued cooperation to improve interoperability,
DASD Sedney encouraged the ROK to share with the U.S. their
analysis of interoperability requirements as we move toward
OPCON transition and beyond at the next SPI.


22. (S) Jeon remarked that the FMS upgrade would have many
implications for the Alliance and offered his assurances that
the ROK would do everything possible to gain U.S.
Congressional support. Jeon conveyed appreciation for the
Secretary's and SECDEF's support, which he believed would

SIPDIS
help achieve a successful result. EAP/Korea's Jim Heller
noted that the Secretary would send letters to key
Congressional leaders in the coming days supporting the
upgrade.

--------------
INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION STRATEGY
--------------


23. (S) In response to the ROK request for greater
international space cooperation at SPI-16, DASD Sedney noted
that there were a number of space courses available for ROK
participation. DASD Sedney urged MND to review course topics
and work with JUSMAG-K to obtain additional information and
arrange ROK enrollment through the FMS process. He noted
that the National Security Space Institute was in the process
of reviewing its curriculum to devise a course for
international students that may be available for ROK
involvement at some future point. DASD Sedney stated that
the foundation of a new defense space cooperation
relationship was the clear understanding of the requirements,
desires, knowledge level, plans, and capabilities of a
potential space partner. DASD Sedney offered to facilitate
discussions between the ROK and the DOD Office of Space
Policy and provided a list of DOD questions for the ROK side
to consider in preparation. He noted that before DOD could
begin consideration of a service-to-service-level MOU
regarding space cooperation, DOD would need to first
understand ROK requirements and objectives. Jeon thanked
DASD Sedney for the quick response to the ROK's request and
asked for continued interest by the U.S. in further
international space cooperation.

--------------
WARTIME OPCON TRANSITION
--------------


24. (S) Jeon assured the U.S. side that the Lee Myung-bak
Administration was committed to the smooth implementation of
wartime OPCON and had designated it as one of the new
government's core tasks. JCS Chief of the OPCON Transition
Unit COL Choi Young-bum outlined the progress made in
implementation of the OPCON Strategic Transition Plan (STP).
Of the 19 STP tasks identified, Choi quoted a completion rate
between 25 to 35 percent, noting that the implementation
process was on schedule. Specifically, he reported that
discussions were ongoing to draft the Integrated Planning
System Memorandum of Agreement, a joint roadmap specifying
Alliance Maintenance Coordination Cell roles and functions,
as well as standard operating procedures for the Joint
Operations Coordination Center and Warning and Intelligence
Operations Center. MajGen Panter concurred with the ROK
briefing that the process was on track to achieve transition
by April 2012 as scheduled.


25. (S) MajGen Panter expressed hope that both sides would
discuss and reconfirm their commitment to OPCON transition at
the upcoming Presidential Summit. He stressed that
appropriate budget and resource allocation as well as fully
utilizing the limited number of exercises for training
purposes remained of key importance as STP implementation
continued. MajGen Panter said that while the U.S. would
provide needed bridging capabilities after OPCON transition,
this would only be a temporary solution until the ROK
military obtained their own capabilities. The ROK must
budget and allocate resources as appropriate to meet these
requirements, he added. MajGen Panter said that the
transition of wartime OPCON was not dependent on acquisition
of additional systems, and that U.S. military leaders
assessed the ROK is capable of assuming OPCON today. He
clarified that those additional capabilities identified in
the STP would only enhance already sufficient warfighting
capabilities. He went on to add that the Joint Force
Headquarters (JFHQ) was key and represented an important step
toward achieving effective training capabilities. Jeon
stated that MND was fully aware of the issues, but admitted
there were some unresolved problems with personnel and the
structure of the JFHQ.


26. (S) Jeon offered a positive assessment of the Key
Resolve/Foal Eagle (KR/FE) 08 combined U.S.-ROK exercise in
preparation for wartime OPCON transition. This year's KR/FE
exercise was observed by ROK JCS and included 44 training
events to achieve jointness, integration, and
synchronization. Through KR/FE participation, ROK JCS
identified the need for a ROK-led joint exercise system and
verified the feasibility of a Korea Joint Command and Control
System (KJCCS) oriented interface system. Looking ahead, ROK
JCS plans to move from a combined to ROK-led over a series of
two theater-level command post exercises annually. The
upcoming Ulchi Focus Guardian (UFG) 08 exercise will test the
capabilities of separate ROK and U.S. warfighting
headquarters.


27. (S) DASD Sedney remarked that the ROK JCS appeared to
have benefited from participation in KR/FE, noting how
important it was to have the right people in the right job
participate in the right training in order to gain needed
skills. He urged ROK JCS to take full advantage of the
remaining four UFG exercise events before assuming wartime
OPCON in 2012 in order to benefit from lessons learned along
the way. MajGen Panter stressed that the U.S. remained
committed to KR/FE and UFG to ensure preparedness for a joint
defense of the Korean Peninsula. While training through
exercises is critical, he also urged continued emphasis on
developing separate national operational plans and stressed
the need to pay close attention to interoperability,
particularly as the ROK acquired C4I capabilities. He
cautioned that C2 would "fall apart" if interoperability was
not sufficiently addressed.

--------------
ARMISTICE MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES
--------------


28. (S) MND Director of International Peace Cooperation
Division COL Park Hee-chol explained that the United Nations
Command (UNC) Armistice Maintenance Responsibility (AMR)
Senior Working Group (SWG) had achieved broad understanding
on four categories, namely 1) General/oversight; 2)
Jurisdiction and Administration of Military Demarcation Line
(MDL)/Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); 3) Specific Means to Maintain
the Armistice/Control Forces in order to Maintain the
Armistice; and 4) Operate and Support the Military Armistice
Commission (MAC)/Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
(NNSC). Each category would include the relevant specific
responsibilities identified in the Armistice Agreement. Park
said that the SWG would further discuss the specific language
in the title for categories 1 and 3, as well as the placement
of some specific responsibilities. However, Park reported
that the SWG was on track to complete phase one tasks,
including the identification of specific and implied
responsibilities along with a review of requisite authorities
associated with each responsibility, and would report the
results to the 40th SCM later this year. Jeon and MajGen
Panter both praised the progress made by the SWG and agreed
that the remaining differences were minor and would be
resolved promptly through further discussion. MajGen Panter
stressed that UNC AMR and OPCON transition issues were not
connected, clarifying recent ROK press reports that tied the
two together. MajGen Panter noted that the mismatch of
authority and UNC AMR has long been a problem that will only
worsen after wartime OPCON transition.
VERSHBOW