Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL774
2008-04-16 08:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT LEE'S NORTH KOREA POLICY: ESTABLISHING

Tags:  KS KN PGOV EAID PREL 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0774/01 1070835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9414
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4101
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8669
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4253
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1665
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 3634
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000774 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: KS KN PGOV EAID PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LEE'S NORTH KOREA POLICY: ESTABLISHING
NEW GROUND RULES

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000774

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: KS KN PGOV EAID PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LEE'S NORTH KOREA POLICY: ESTABLISHING
NEW GROUND RULES

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Lee Myung-bak won the presidency on a conservative
platform, emphasizing a new approach toward North Korea.
Candidate Lee repeated over and over that ten years of
Sunshine Policy had yielded nothing. During that time, the
North, with newly acquired nuclear weapons, had become more
dangerous; its people more oppressed than ever; and its
economy in shambles. Two months into his presidency, and
with the all-important National Assembly elections out of the
way, President Lee's North Korea policy is beginning to take
shape with the following elements:

-- Sunshine Policy: Lee Myung-bak defines Sunshine Policy as
assisting North Korea without reciprocal demands. If that's
the case, this policy is over, because Lee will put
conditions on economic assistance. This is not to say that
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and Mount Kumgang tourism
will close; rather, they will be left in place, but with no
expansion, at least until the reciprocity conditions are met.

-- Denuclearization: This is the most important reciprocity
condition, that North Korea must make progress toward
denuclearization for Seoul to re-engage Pyongyang on economic
and infrastructural assistance.

-- Humanitarian Assistance: The Lee Administration has
defined humanitarian assistance as disaster assistance. The
huge annual flow of rice and fertilizer do not count, as they
address "structural" deficits in North Korea. We expect
limited fertilizer and food assistance to resume once the two
sides sit down to talk.

-- Human Rights: Like most South Koreans of his generation,
Lee relates well to the suffering endured by North Koreans.
ROKG representatives in various domestic and international
fora will condemn the abuse of human rights in North Korea.
Similarly, the Lee Administration will be more sympathetic to
the suffering of North Korean refugees in China and other
third countries. END SUMMARY.

--------------
END OF SUNSHINE POLICY
--------------



2. (C) President Lee Myung-bak, like a majority of the South
Korean public, rejects the unconditional aid aspect of
Sunshine Policy, as applied in practice. That doesn't mean
he wants to throw the baby out with the bathwater, however.
When former President Kim Dae-jung summarized Sunshine Policy
in 2002, he said, "I proclaimed my Sunshine Policy and its
three principles: first, we will not tolerate any armed
provocation from the North; second, neither would we seek to
harm the North or absorb it; and third, South and North Korea
should reconcile and cooperate, and live in peaceful
coexistence and exchanges." The South Korean public now
fully accepts this live-and-let-live philosophy, which was
also expressed in the 1992 Basic Agreement, and the vast
majority approves of economic cooperation. President Lee's
public remarks indicate that he does too. In March 26
comments to the staff of the Ministry of Unification (MOU),
Lee said, "Both sides...must work to successfully reconcile
differences, promote peace, and realize co-prosperity in both
economies."


3. (C) However, Lee and his advisors have taken aim at
Sunshine Policy's lack of reciprocity (which Kim Dae-jung's
government initially envisaged as a basis for cooperation,
before deciding that the South should show patience instead.)
National Assembly member-elect Park Jin, who led the foreign
policy side of Lee's transition team, told a talk-show
audience in January that the Sunshine policy was a failure
because it had assumed an "idealized" version of the DPRK,
rather than taking a "balanced" approach that would include
action-for-action reciprocity. The result was lack of reform
in the North and a deterioration in the Peninsula's security
situation. Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak and Deputy
Foreign Minister Lee Yong-jun have emphasized to us that
Lee's approach to North Korea is practical, that he wants get

something in return for offering economic assistance, and
that he is firm in his stance and willing to suffer a
downturn in inter-Korean relations if the DPRK rejects this
approach.

--------------
DENUCEARIZATION A MUST
--------------


4. (C) Lee's key policy step so far is to put the need for
North Korean denuclearization front and center, winning him
no friends in the North. Is his March 26 remarks at MOU, Lee
painted a picture of South-North relations "upgraded by not
just one notch, but even two notches." But he quickly honed
in on the importance of denuclearization as the "most
important issue between South and North." Suggesting a stock
taking of basic issues between the two Koreas, Lee said that
the key was for both to abide by the 1991 "Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation
between the South and the North," and the related agreement
to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Resolving the nuclear
issue would benefit the DPRK, he argued, because the nuclear
issue causes problems on the Peninsula, stands in the way of
unification, and prevents full-fledged economic cooperation.
Denuclearization was the route to economic assistance, which
would in turn "lay the groundwork for (North Korea's)
economic self-reliance."


5. (C) Apart from supporting the Six-Party Talks process,
Lee's insistence on denuclearization comes from the sense
that the North Korea's nuclear capability poses a direct
threat to the South, whereas the rest of its military
capability really does not, Blue House Assistant Secretary to
the President for Planning and Coordination La Won-chang told
us. He added, however, that North Korean progress on
denuclearization, rather than achieving full dismantlement,
might be enough for the Lee Administration to begin
discussing economic assistance -- the government was
maintaining flexibility on the issue. In this context, La
expressed great interest in expected progress on North
Korea's nuclear declaration.


6. (C) In his March 26 remarks at MOU, Lee offered an
expansive vision of cooperation after DPRK denuclearization.
The new ROK Government "aims at making Korea an advanced,
world-class nation," and it would be a shame, he implied, to
leave North Korea out as "the worst economy on the globe."
The ROK had already reached a per capita income level of USD
20,000 per year and was headed for USD 30,000, Lee said,
alluding to his offer to raise the DPRK's per capita income
to USD 3,000 (from about USD 1,000 now) -- after
denuclearization.


7. (C) Putting denuclearization front and center is a change
from President Roh Moo-hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy,
that economic cooperation would improve relations enough that
the DPRK would see the wisdom of denuclearization, and that
the Six-Party Talks process had the problem well in hand in
any case. Instead, Lee squarely points at the elephant in
the room.


8. (C) The new approach is reflected in the Ministry of
Unification's (MOU) revised approach to North Korea. MOU's
Strategic Goal for 2008 sounds much like that of the Roh
Administration: "Advancement of mutually-beneficial and
co-prosperous inter-Korean relations," but, in keeping with
Lee's emphasis on denuclearization, the supporting planks
have changed. The first aspect is to "create a new peace
regime," starting with denuclearization. That is a shift
from the Roh Administration's proposal, which it clung to
until the end of its term, to declare a new peace regime on
the Peninsula that would give the DPRK the sense of security
it needed to denuclearize. The second aspect of the MOU's
program, is to "form an inter-Korean economic community,"
after denuclearization, based on Lee's "Opening and 3000"
proposal to raise North Koreans' per capita income and invest
in infrastructure.

--------------
UNTIL DENUCLEARIZATION, LIMITED ASSISTANCE
--------------


9. (C) Until denuclearization progress, inter-Korean

relations are likely to go into a state of suspended
animation: the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),Kaesong
City tourism, and Mt. Kumgang tourism will continue, and the
South will offer limited humanitarian assistance, but there
will be no bold new initiatives. Preserving the main
elements of the status quo is in line with public opinion.
Conservative commentators, such as Korea University's Yoo
Ho-yeol, who chafed at the lack of conditionality under the
Roh Moo-Hyun Administration, have told us that Lee should be
careful to preserve the core of the existing engagement
framework, which has contributed to stability.


10. (C) Indications are that the DPRK too is trying hard to
preserve the core of the existing cooperation framework,
because it has been careful to leave KIC and Mt. Kumgang
operating, even after expressing displeasure by expelling
ROKG officials from both locations.


11. (C) In his March 26 comments, Lee hinted at plans to
reach out to North Korean authorities, saying that
"inter-Korean negotiations" in various areas should be
expected to begin after the April 9 National Assembly
elections, and that the two sides had to "define the
South-North relationship until nuclear abandonment." He
didn't spell out his expectations for that relationship in
detail, but stressed humanitarian assistance, based on
concern for the North Korean people, "One thing is clear: We
should love the North Korean people as we love the South
Korean people."


12. (C) Lee also made clear that the Kaesong Industrial
Complex and Mt. Kumgang tourism project -- the main economic
cooperation projects resulting from Sunshine Policy, both
operated by the Hyundai Asan company -- "must go on and the
South and North should work together" to make these "mutually
beneficial" projects succeed. But he included an allusion to
the nuclear issue by noting that for "genuine inter-Korean
business to take place...many of the inter-Korean issues need
to be ironed out."


13. (C) Hinting at flexibility in this interim stage before
DPRK denuclearization, Lee said that his government "would
approach South-North consultations with an open mind." He
also included references to his concern for the North Korean
people, a frequent theme of his comments on North Korea,
calling on MOU to work to give the North Korean people "at
least the minimum level of basic rights to pursue happiness,"
and to pursue unification "while respecting the will of the
70 million people of the combined Koreas."

--------------
HUMAN RIGHTS IS BACK ON THE AGENDA
--------------


14. (C) President Lee has also changed the dynamics of the
South-North relationship by speaking out about his concern
for the human rights of North Koreans, and by having
officials in his government raise the issue. The ROKG
supported a North Korea human rights resolution at the UN
Human Rights Commission in early March, and the National
Human Rights Commission, feckless until now, is planning to
investigate human rights conditions facing defectors.


15. (C) Lee talks about North Korean human rights out of what
his advisors say is deep personal conviction, also related to
his Christian faith. Human rights are important as universal
values, he has said, and the issue is not meant to be a stick
used to beat the North. In his March 26 MOU comments, Lee
also made a connection, "although not as a condition" between
humanitarian cooperation with the North and progress on
prisoners of war, abductees, and separated families. In
other words, Lee seemed to be saying, the North needs to
respect the human rights of POWS, abductees and separated
families. This is quite a shift from the Roh Administration,
when there was a loose linkage between fertilizer assistance
and separated family reunions, but POWs and abductees were
rarely even mentioned, at the North's request.

--------------
ROK PUBLIC SUPPORT
--------------


16. (SBU) North Korea may not like the medicine Lee is

offering, but the ROK public supports his shift from Sunshine
Policy's unconditional assistance approach. A Korea
Institute of National Unification survey of 1,008 randomly
selected South Koreans before Lee's inauguration showed that
82 percent believed that the ROKG's North Korea policy needed
fundamental change. In addition, 74 percent agreed that
denuclearization and economic cooperation should be linked;
81 percent agreed that the principle of reciprocity should be
applied; and 42 percent believed the nuclear issue should be
the main focus of South-North relations, compared to 26
percent who favored economic cooperation and 19 percent who
favored humanitarian issues.


17. (SBU) An April 2 RealMeter-CBS poll showed that 72
percent of potential voters thought that North Korea's harsh
rhetoric would have no effect on the April 9 National
Assembly elections, and the elections occurred with almost no
mention of North Korea. An April 2 editorial cartoon in the
Chosun Ilbo depicted a North Korean military officer calling
Kim Jong-il from unperturbed Seoul to say, "Chairman, I'm
going crazy. They're not paying us one bit of attention."

--------------
COMMENT: BIGGER ROLE FOR THE SOUTH
--------------


18. (C) The initial ROKG and DPRK statements have shown the
two sides talking past each other. Lee asserted that the
foundation for beginning a South-North discussion was the
1991 Basic Agreement, and the associated Korean Peninsula
denuclearization agreement. The North, in its scalding April
1 Rodong Sinmun attack on Lee as a "charlatan," said that Lee
was shutting the door on inter-Korean relations, "which have
developed favorably since the publication of the June 15
joint declaration," which does not mention denuclearization.
This pattern -- you say 1991 Basic Agreement, I say 2000
Joint Declaration -- has become shorthand for stressing
(ROKG) or ignoring (DPRK) the nuclear issue, and also relates
to issues such as recognition of the Northern Limit Line and
the continuing presence of U.S. forces in the ROK.


19. (C) The DPRK's reaction to Lee's call for the North to
open up has also been neuralgic. The April 1 DPRK article
said that Lee's call to open the DPRK regime "seeks to
tarnish the dignified system in the DPRK." An April 8 Rodong
Sinmun commentary reiterates this reaction, saying that Lee's
call for the North to open is "traitorous" because it would
amount to an effort to change the North to put it under the
South's "liberal democratic system."


20. (C) There are signs that the Lee government is quietly
taking aim at the "dignified" DPRK system, seeking to change
the ground rules for discourse before discourse begins and
assert the ROK's role. Lee would like that to be the lead
role, because the financing burden is borne by the South,
hence Lee's frequent use of "business-style" dialogue to
characterize what he has in mind. This would be a
significant change, because as Na told us, Lee, like most
South Koreans, believes that the North has "always had the
lead in the dance."
STANTON