Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL737
2008-04-11 07:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

FORMER FM FRETS: MB'S TEAM UP TO THE TASK?

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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R 110731Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9320
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4089
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8660
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4240
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000737 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER FM FRETS: MB'S TEAM UP TO THE TASK?


Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000737

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER FM FRETS: MB'S TEAM UP TO THE TASK?


Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a frank April 11 lunch meeting, former
Foreign Minister Yoo Chong-ha gave poloffs his view of Lee
Myung-bak and said he hoped Lee would play it safe during the
April 18-19 summit with President Bush. Yoo said he would
continue to advise President Lee whenever called, as he was
April 9 to prepare for the summit. Yoo expressed doubts
about Lee's foreign policy team and vision and noted Lee
needed to focus less on the economy and more on North Korea.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
ROK-U.S. Summit: Don't Screw it Up!
--------------


2. (C) Yoo said he met with President Lee Myung-bak for two
hours on election day (April 9) and gave him some advice
about the upcoming April 18-19 summit. His most important
directive to Lee, which he included in a one-page briefer,
was that President Lee should not say the alliance is in
Korea's national interest. Everybody knows that, Yoo said.
He reminded him that the U.S. had made the "ultimate
sacrifice" for Korea and would again if needed. Instead, Yoo
suggested that Lee frame the relationship the way Ambassador
Vershbow had -- an alliance and relationship based on a
"common destiny." Yoo also said he told the president to
"just not screw up." Every summit has a "headline" that
defines the summit, and Lee just has to make sure he does not
make a mistake that could end up as the headline.

--------------
Learning Curve
--------------


3. (C) Yoo said the information that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) provided to President Lee Myung-bak
is like foodstuff. They provide the ingredients, but the
Blue House, specifically the National Security Advisor,
decides what to make and how to "cook" it.


4. (C) Yoo said he told the president to stop worrying so
much about the economy and pay more attention to South
Korea's relations with the North and with the outside world.
History will judge you, Yoo told the president, on your
foreign policy not on your economic policy. Part of the
problem is the inexperience of Lee's foreign policy team --

particularly National Security Advisor Kim Byung-kook. When
asked if this was just part of the administration's learning
curve, Yoo said experience was one thing you could not gain
in a short amount of time.


5. (C) Yoo, who advised Lee Myung-bak throughout his
campaign, said President Lee does not like him very much.
The reason is that Lee is surrounded by sycophants, whereas
Yoo just tells him the truth. In this case, he said with a
smile, Korea's seniority system worked in Yoo's favor. Yoo
said Lee Myung-bak's older brother, the recently re-elected
lawmaker and Vice-Speaker Lee Sang-deuk, would probably
continue to advise the president throughout his term in
office. Yoo said he counseled President Lee to listen to his
brother, who he -- and most others -- thought was a
reasonable man. The elder Lee's recommendations on domestic
politics had all turned out to be sound so Yoo hoped
President Lee would take his brother's counsel.

--------------
Need to Engage on Policy
--------------


6. (C) On North Korea policy, Yoo told Lee that he had to
get more involved -- foreign policy could not be delegated
even to the Foreign Minister -- and that U.S.-DPRK meetings
like the recent Geneva and Singapore negotiations should
never happen again. The North Koreans already had the
attitude that they were talking to Seoul's "boss" (i.e., the
U.S.) so South Korea did not need to be at the table. South
Korean tax payers would inevitably pay for whatever proposals
the U.S. and North Korea agreed to, and they would get very
angry if their president was not advocating their interests.
Talks should occur in parallel, Yoo said. They should
complement each other, but South Korea had to be more
actively engaged in the process. This could mean more
trilateral negotiations and/or better coordination with the
U.S. He also told the president that South Korean officials
had to stop provoking the North with harsh statements; this
was not constructive especially when sensitive discussions
were ongoing.

--------------
Good Old Days
--------------


7. (C) Yoo recalled a time when he was foreign minister and
a North Korean submarine ran aground on the East shore in
South Korean territory. South Korea wanted an apology, but
the initial agreement the DPRK would apologize was negotiated
between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea finally agreed
to issue an apology to the United States in English. Yoo
said he stepped in at that point and said South Korea would
only accept a public apology from the foreign ministry
spokesman in Korean. Then U.S. Ambassador Laney became very
angry, but North Korea eventually backed down and issued the
apology to the South's specifications. Only then did South
Korea return the bodies of the North Koreans who were killed
during the incident. Yoo said he had told South Korean
officials to take very good care of the bodies, because he
wanted the families to get them back in good condition; South
Korea had to be humanitarian.

--------------
MOFAT Personnel
--------------


8. (C) Yoo said he thought it was positive that Korean
Ambassador to the U.S. Lee Tae-shik had been reappointed and
speculated Lee would continue in that position until the end
of the Bush administration. Yoo said Lee had been very
active in promoting the KORUS FTA, which argued strongly for
his continued posting in Washington -- it was wrong he said
to "change horses in the middle of the race." Yoo was
relieved that a career diplomat had been named as Ambassador
to Beijing. That was too tricky a relationship, especially
with the Six Party Talks, to appoint someone unfamiliar with
negotiations and without significant China experience. Yoo
said the Chinese had been expressing concern through many
channels about the lack of China specialists in the Blue
House, which had led in part to China expert Kim Ha-joong's
appointment as Minister of Unification.

--------------
You Scratch My Back...
--------------


9. (C) Yoo said that former President Kim Young-sam, Yoo's
old boss, is very angry at President Lee. Kim is well aware
that his support for Lee Myung-bak in the primary gave him
about a five percentage point boost, enabling Lee to beat out
Park Geun-hye. Kim could accept the fact, Yoo said, that the
Grand National Party (GNP) refused his son a nomination for
the general election because of his son's past corruption
charges. What really made Kim mad was that three of his
closest advisers were also refused nominations -- one because
the party claimed he had not submitted his application in
time. Kim was still angry about the nomination process, but
President Lee had promised to "fix" it -- probably, Yoo
speculated, by giving them party jobs.

--------------
Canal Characterization
--------------


10. (C) Yoo said he thought the canal was a good idea but
thought it might not be built because of significant
opposition to the plan. The problem, Yoo said, was in
characterizing it as a "canal" when Lee should have just said
it was a project to connect Korea's rivers and increase
Korea's water reservoir capacity. Yoo said in his hometown
of Andong the river was now dry except in the two months of
the rainy season, because too many people siphon the water
off. As it is, most of the overflow runs into the Han River,
which just drains into the Sea of Japan. The canal would
have been an important project to try to conserve more of the
rainfall.

--------------
Teach Me!
--------------


11. (C) Yoo said one of the most important contributions the
two countries could make to the alliance is to increase
interaction between the young people of Korea and the U.S.
The youth, Yoo said, have forgotten history and forgotten the
true nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance.


12. (C) In describing what is clearly his new pet project,
Yoo became very animated about the need to bring more
Americans to Korea to teach English. The government needs to
take over English education, because, as it stands now, only
the wealthy can afford the extra schooling necessary to gain
a command of the language, thus giving those kids an
important advantage in getting into good schools and getting
good jobs. In this way, Yoo said, both wealth and poverty
are inherited. Yoo pointed out that both parties agreed to
address the problem during the presidential campaign late
last year. Yoo proposed bringing 5,000 to 10,000 Americans
to Korea to teach English. He said the ROKG would bear most
of the costs; he pointed out that the Lee government was
ready to spend US 1 billion dollars per annum on funding
English education. All the U.S. would have to do is give
these teachers some sort of English-language teaching
certificate -- through an institution like the Institute for
International Education -- to ensure that the teachers were
properly trained. In return, Yoo suggested, the Korean
government could set a program that would pay for Koreans to
go work in local governments in the U.S. for a year. This
would help them with their English, provide free employment
in government offices throughout the U.S. and also give the
Koreans involved better insight into American culture and
governance practices.

--------------
I Hear You...
--------------


13. (C) When asked about the president's English capability,
Yoo said that he could understand quite well, but Lee's
spoken English is "not refined." Lee hoped to listen, in
informal settings, without an interpreter, but would probably
rely on the interpreter in responding.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) Yoo has no position in the current administration,
but as the Foreign Minister from 1996-8 and a friend of Lee
Sang-deuk, it is likely that his advice will be solicited and
used by the President for at least the early part of Lee's
term. A career diplomat, Yoo's passionate interest remains
foreign policy. He is related by marriage to Ambassador Lee
Tae-shik.
STANTON