Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL67
2008-01-13 22:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

NEVER SAY DIE -- UNIFICATION MINISTER ARGUES FOR

Tags:  PROG PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0067/01 0132219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 132219Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8021
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3704
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8440
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3838
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2405
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000067 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: NEVER SAY DIE -- UNIFICATION MINISTER ARGUES FOR
3-PARTY SUMMIT ON HIS WAY OUT OF OFFICE


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000067

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: NEVER SAY DIE -- UNIFICATION MINISTER ARGUES FOR
3-PARTY SUMMIT ON HIS WAY OUT OF OFFICE


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 8 meeting with the Ambassador,
Unification Minister Lee Jae-jung stressed the need for a
three-party summit between the U.S., DPRK and ROK, to declare
an end to the Korean War and provide the necessary incentive
for Kim Jong-il to give up his nuclear weapons. Lee listed
joint rail links, Mt. Paekdu tours, and easing border
restrictions to the Kaesong Industrial Complex as his top
three North-South cooperation project priorities for his
final two months in office. Lee also gave his thoughts on
the future of the ministry under the new Lee Myung-bak
administration, as well as what he believed was a positive
DPRK silence concerning the new administration. END SUMMARY.

--------------
3-Party Summit
--------------


2. (C) Speaking with near-religious fervor, Lee stressed the
need for a three-party summit between the U.S., DPRK, and
ROK, claiming that such a summit to declare the end of the
Korean War was what was needed to propel the Six Party Talks
into the third phase. Lee said that Kim Jong-il himself had
proposed such a summit to President Roh at the October
summit, but that the intended audience was actually President
Bush. Kim had expressed interest in President Bush's Hanoi
and Sydney statements, and Lee believed that Kim would convey
a personal assurance to President Bush guaranteeing North
Korea's denuclearization. Lee claimed that, while the U.S.
wanted to pursue denuclearization before normalization, the
DPRK wanted normalization before denuclearization. Lee
mentioned that 2012 was the 100th anniversary of Kim
Il-sung's birth, and speculated that the DPRK might attempt
to complete denuclearization and normalization with the U.S.
by that point.


3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. would want the
situation on the Korean peninsula to evolve to a point where
such a summit would be possible, but that the time for such a
measure had not yet arrived. At this point, the Ambassador
said, such a summit would suggest that U.S. acceptance of the
DPRK's nuclear status, which the U.S. was emphatically

opposed to. While a "kickoff statement" for negotiations on
a peace regime was possible once a complete and correct
declaration of the DPRK's nuclear programs had been provided,
the summit would have to wait.

---
6PT
---


4. (C) Lee suggested that the U.S. move first on DPRK's
removal from the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA) and the
State Sponsors of Terror list, after which the DPRK would be
given a 45-day window to provide its declaration. If it did
not deliver, the U.S. would keep the DPRK on both lists. The
Ambassador replied that the DPRK had been informed of the
U.S.'s own internal political constraints, and that the
October 3 agreement of synchronized actions had been the
result. The DPRK could not unilaterally rewrite the rules
now in their favor. Furthermore, while a declaration was
sensitive for the DPRK, we were only asking for the type of
transparency that is expected of countries with IAEA
safeguards agreements, said the Ambassador.


5. (C) Lee claimed that suggesting that the North Koreans
uphold their "morality" by keeping their Six Party agreements
would be more likely to achieve results on the declaration
than appealing to a "profiteering" mentality with "carrots,"
such as delisting from TWEA.

--------------
Lee's Final Two Months
--------------


6. (C) Developing joint rail links, modernizing the Mt.
Paekdu tour site, and improving communications, customs
procedures, and access for entry into the Kaesong Industrial
Center (KIC) were the top items left to be implemented on the
Minister's agenda for his final two months. North and South
Korea agreed at the October summit to send a joint cheering
squad to Beijing for the 2008 Summer Olympics via a
North-South railway line. In order to prepare for this, the
two sides had finished two site surveys on North Korea's rail
lines from Kaesong to Sinuiju. They found that there were no

serious problems, and that even allowing for very
conservative estimates on repair time, the railway link
should be ready in time for the Olympics.


7. (C) Lee mentioned that a portion of the proposed joint
railway line included the construction a commuter rail link
between the city of Kaesong and the KIC. With 65 factories
at the KIC, 21,000 workers were already commuting to the KIC
via bicycle or bus; 1000 more employees were being added each
month. The need for such a commuter line was obvious, said
Lee.


8. (C) Two major sets of repairs to the Mt. Paekdu site
needed to be taken, said Lee. The first was the airfield and
control tower at the site, and the second pertained to the
tourism facilities. Lee stated that May 2008 was the target
date for the opening of the site.


9. (C) The Ministry of Unification was negotiating with the
DPRK to ease the costs of doing business at the KIC.
Specifically, this included installing internet and phone
communications at the KIC, easing the customs requirements to
cross the DMZ, and gaining less restricted access to the KIC,
especially after business hours. Beginning the construction
of shipyards in North Korea, particularly in Haeju, was also
a priority. A site survey team was planned within the next
few weeks, Lee said. As for another Minister-level meeting
with the DPRK, Lee said he did not expect one for him before
he left office, though he did say that 2-3 meetings on a
lower level could take place.

--------------
Lee's Views on LMB
--------------


10. (C) Lee did not believe the Ministry of Unification was
about to be eliminated altogether, but a downsizing or
restructuring of the ministry was possible. Lee expressed
concern that the new government would attempt to make
inter-Korean relations merely one part of South Korea's
broader foreign policy, and that MOFAT would thus absorb many
of the functions of MOU. Making North-South engagement
contingent upon progress in the Six Party Talks was a
"dangerous idea," said Lee, and instead the two processes
should augment each other in a mutually-reinforcing,
"virtuous" cycle.


11. (C) The Ambassador replied that while the U.S. and the
ROK had minor differences during the last year over the
relationship between the Six Party Talks and North-South
engagement, these differences tended to be over the
sequencing of events rather than any end goal. Coordination
and cooperation between the two governments, and particularly
between the Embassy and MOU, had remained strong. Still, it
made sense to focus the combined leverage of both governments
on denuclearization first, as the DPRK's nuclear program
remained the main impediment to improvement in North-South
relations, said the Ambassador.


12. (C) Lee believed that, while North Korea had yet to
signal its view of Lee Myung-bak, its silence on Lee
Myung-bak's victory in the Presidential election was a
positive sign. (NOTE: President-elect Lee Myung-bak also
expressed a similar sentiment during a meeting with Assistant
Secretary Hill on January 10. END NOTE.) The remarks that

SIPDIS
North Korea had made emphasized cooperation, Lee noted. As
for the incoming President, Lee said he was still optimistic
about North-South engagement, but that the new government had
made it clear that North Korean denuclearization was its
central policy with respect to North-South relations.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) While still a strong advocate of the Sunshine Policy,
Lee appeared resigned to both a decreased role for MOU and a
reduction in the pro-engagement policies and programs of the
Roh administration once the Lee Myung-bak government takes
office. Wistful that peace on the peninsula was not achieved
during his tenure, Lee requested that the Ambassador endeavor
to achieve that during his remaining time in Seoul. It is
likely that Lee believes that the Roh government would have
succeeded had it not run out of time, and had it persuaded
the U.S. to agree to an early summit with Kim Jong-il. END
COMMENT.
VERSHBOW