ROKG'S CALM RESPONSE TO DPRK RHETORIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: ROKG'S CALM RESPONSE TO DPRK RHETORIC

REF: A. SEOUL 616


B. SEOUL 623

Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak told the
Ambassador on March 31 that recent DPRK rhetoric was an
effort to test the new government's dedication to
denuclearization, but that the ROKG would "respond calmly"
without backing down. Assistant Minister of Unification Park
Chang-bong pointed to the DPRK's recognition of its economic
dependence on the ROK as a mitigating factor, but he noted
the underlying issue of denuclearization as a structural
problem in the South-North relationship. Both Kwon and Park
expected the rhetorical battle to subside, since neither side
wanted it to escalate further. END SUMMARY.

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ROKG STATEMENTS -- DPRK RESPONSES
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2. (SBU) After a month of "wait-and-see" silence following
President Lee Myung-bak's February 25 inauguration, the DPRK
expelled 11 ROKG officials from the Kaesong Industrial
Complex on March 27 (ref A) and test-fired short-range
missiles on March 28 (ref B). More disturbing was the
accompanying rhetoric:

-- On March 28, while not acknowledging the missile firings,
the DPRK Naval Command issued a statement carried by KCNA on
March 28 that rejected March 26 comments by ROKG General Kim
Tae-young, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) at the National Assembly, that "the NLL (Northern Limit
Line) is a line that we have to defend." The KCNA statement
referred to the NLL as a "ghost line" and accused ROK
warships of violating "North Korean territorial waters,"
warning of an armed clash if such actions were repeated. The
ROK JCS in turn dismissed the DPRK accusation, saying that,
"South Korean Naval ships have never violated the NLL."

-- On March 29, the North Korea's chief military negotiator
with the ROKG, Major General Kim Young-chul, sent a letter to
his ROKG counterpart. The letter criticized JCS Chairman Kim
for remarks that Kim also made on March 26 at the National
Assembly that if the DPRK were found to be preparing a
nuclear attack on the South, that the ROKG would undertake
"strikes in advance" on relevant facilities. The letter made
three points: that the DPRK would respond "more powerfully"
to any ROKG sign of a preemptive strike; that the ROKG should
retract and apologize for Kim's statement; and that, if no
apology were forthcoming, the DPRK would take stern measures
by preventing ROKG officials and military personnel from
crossing the Military Demarcation Line.


3. (SBU) North Korea intensified this rhetoric on March 29
after a senior official at the ROK Ministry of Defense (MND)
remarked that JCS Chairman Kim,s remark was "not something
we have to apologize for," adding that the ROKG would make a
decision within two or three days on whether to send a
written response to the DPRK. Immediately, the DPRK, through
a KCNA editorial, reiterated Saturday,s demands, adding a
warning that it would retaliate if South Korea showed any
sign of initiating a preemptive strike against the North,
"burning everything to ashes." The ROKG again tried to calm
the situation with a public comment on March 31 that it was
taking a long view toward North Korea.

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SENIOR MOFAT AND MOU OFFICIALS CALM
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4. (C) In a March 31 meeting with the Ambassador, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak
likened North Korean authorities to new first grade students
who had to make the change from being coddled by the previous
ROK administrations. There would now be a learning process,
since the DPRK had to adjust to the new environment. The
recent DPRK statements were meant to "intimidate us and test
our will," but the ROKG would not be swayed from its emphasis
on the need for denuclearization, even though the DPRK hoped
that ROKG concern for economic progress in the North would
trump that concern.


5. (C) Commenting on the changed international environment,
Kwon said that the DPRK had "no escape route," because China
was now active in the Six-Party Talks process, and Japan,
like the U.S. and ROK, remained firm. Hence, Kwon reasoned,
the bottom line was that the DPRK would not "isolate itself"
for long by maintaining its defiant, provocative stance. He
did not see a likelihood of the DPRK's provocative rhetoric
affecting the April 9 National Assembly elections.


6. (C) The ROKG did not want to provoke the DPRK, but the
DPRK needed to know that the situation had changed, Kwon
said. The DPRK's rhetoric and actions caused some South
Koreans to be nervous, but even in the face of such
provocations, the ROK maintained "peace in our minds." The
DPRK knew that it needed food and fertilizer assistance, but
it could be holding back from asking the ROKG for assistance
out of hope that either the USG or China (which Kwon said was
proposing 150,000 metric tons of maize assistance) would move
first. Kwon said that the ROKG had previously conveyed to
the DPRK (nfi) that if the DPRK were to request humanitarian
assistance, the ROKG would be willing to talk.


7. (C) Kwon noted that ROKG-DPRK Energy and Economy
Cooperation Working Group talks had proceeded without a
problem in Panmunjom on March 27-28, despite the rhetoric and
actions seen elsewhere, because the DPRK soberly recognized
that it needed ROKG energy assistance. (Note: MOFAT Nuclear
Negotiation Division Director Kim Gunn also told us on March
31 that the March 27-28 talks proceeded professionally
without incident. End Note.)


8. (C) Separately, Assistant Minister of Unification Park
Chan-bong told Pol M/C on March 31 that he, too, saw the
North's harsh rhetoric as having limited duration, because
the North recognized the fundamental fact of its dependence
on South Korean economic assistance. That was why the North
Koreans had carefully expelled only South Korean officials
from the KIC, but did nothing to ROK private companies and
workers there.


9. (C) Unlike Kwon, Park suggested that ROK officials should
react more carefully. JCS Chairman Kim's remarks about an
advance strike were "too frank," and bound to provoke a
reaction from the DPRK. Kim could have answered the
questions in National Assembly a lot more tactfully.


10. (C) Looking ahead, Park saw the situation improving soon
since neither the ROK nor DPRK were interested in escalating
the tensions. However, Park argued, there remained a
structural problem, which was that the Lee administration had
said clearly that as long as the DPRK made no progress in
denuclearization, the ROK could not re-engage in South-North
dialogue. On the issue of South-North meetings, Kwon told
the Ambassador that no high-level meetings were currently
planned, and that the DPRK would have to request such
meetings for the ROKG to act.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) Leaving aside Vice Foreign Minister Kwon's excess
zeal, nobody in the ROKG wants an escalation in tensions with
North Korea. Our guess is that the remarks by JCS General
Kim and MOU Minister Kim that triggered the sharp reaction
from Pyongyang were mostly accidental. They did not mean to
veer off into the unknown. Simply put, they are not used to
answering "what if" questions on North Korea. Still, our
contacts are clearly right in pointing out the structural
impediment in the North-South dialogue: the lack of progress
in denuclearization. It was, therefore, a matter of time
before the Lee administration's "reciprocity" policy was
tested. This time, the test involved words only. We don't
expect either side to further aggravate the situation now.
However, it is probably only a matter to time before the ROKG
is confronted more seriously over this structural issue in
the relationship, particularly if the deadlock over the
nuclear declaration continues.
VERSHBOW