FM YU DISCUSSES 6PT, ROK-PRC DIALOGUE DURING PRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000596

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: FM YU DISCUSSES 6PT, ROK-PRC DIALOGUE DURING PRC
VISIT

Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

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Summary
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1. (C) On March 24 MOFAT officials briefed us on Foreign
Minister Yu Myung-hwan's March 20-21 trip to Beijing, his
first overseas visit as FM. Yu met with Premier Wen Jiabao,
State Councilor Dai Bingguo, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi,
and Wang Jairui, Chief of the International Liaison
Department of the Communist Party, to lay the groundwork for
President Lee Myung-bak's summit meeting in Beijing in the
latter part of May. In his meetings, FM Yu presented a
tougher ROK position on North Korea, while the Chinese urged
patience and counseled against putting too much pressure on
North Korea. The Chinese also proposed that the ROK
establish a bilateral "strategic dialogue" with the PRC, an
offer that may reflect Chinese concern about the new Korean
Government's stronger policy toward North Korea and its
interest in improved relations with the U.S. and Japan. END
SUMMARY.

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Six Party Talks
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2. (C) In a meeting with the DCM on March 24, newly-installed
Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Yong-joon commented on FM Yu
Myung-hwan's visit to Beijing. DFM Lee noted that Yu had
used "strong language" with the Chinese to convey the new
Korean Government's views on the North Korea nuclear issue.
The Chinese should not have had any difficulty understanding
the ROK's position, Lee said, indicating that Yu had taken a
much tougher stance toward the DPRK than that of his
predecessors.


3. (C) MOFAT Northeast Asian Affairs Bureau Director General
Cho Tai-young provided further details to the Pol M/C in a
separate meeting later in the day. According to Cho, FM Yu
stressed to the Chinese that the U.S. had done its best to
give the DPRK a face-saving way to move forward with its
nuclear declaration and that North Korea should not miss this
opportunity. Cho related that Yu had used a saying he had
heard Americans use to illustrate his point, telling the
Chinese that "North Korea had never missed an opportunity to
miss an opportunity." Yu strongly urged the PRC to persuade
North Korea not to miss the opportunity for further progress
in the Six-Party process. Yu also told his Chinese
counterparts that President Lee Myung-bak wanted a policy of
"reconciliation and cooperation" with North Korea, but that
the Korean people required that North Korea reciprocate their
goodwill. He warned that the DPRK must realize that South
Korea would not provide substantial assistance to the DPRK
without progress on the nuclear issue.


4. (C) Cho said that the Chinese, while sharing the Korean
assessment that the Six-Party Talks had reached a critical
juncture, appeared frustrated with the process and were most
likely distracted by events in Tibet and Taiwan. The Chinese
urged the ROKG to be cautious about putting pressure on North
Korea, calling instead for patience, saying it was "unhelpful
to fixate on things from the past" in the effort to reach
agreement on North Korea's nuclear declaration.

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ROK-PRC Relations
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5. (C) In addition to FM Yu's discussions with the Chinese on
North Korea, the second point worth noting, according to DFM
Lee, was that the Chinese had proposed to Yu that the ROK
establish a bilateral "strategic dialogue" with China. Yu
had responded that President Lee Myung-bak also desired a
more comprehensive bilateral dialogue with China that could
be announced when Lee visited Beijing. DG Cho added that
although there had been no ROK decision on what to call the
dialogue, it would likely be held at the 1st Vice Minister
level with Wang Yi.


6. (C) What was interesting about the Chinese proposal, DFM
Lee observed, was that it was the ROK that had first proposed
such a bilateral dialogue two years ago, and at that time it
was the Chinese who had expressed reservations because of
concerns over how North Korea would perceive such a move.
Lee speculated that the new Chinese offer was in reaction to
President Lee's adoption of a firmer policy toward North
Korea. The DCM noted it might also be a response to
President Lee's emphasis on improved relations with the U.S.

and Japan, as well as with China. DFM Lee agreed.


7. (C) Yu had also expressed to the Chinese the ROK's strong
hope of further strengthening relations between the ROK and
the PRC. FM Yu emphasized that the ROK's relationships with
the United States, Japan and China should be viewed as a
win-win situation, not as a zero-sum game, according to DG
Cho. Yu's Chinese interlocutors had agreed with this view,
while also similarly expressing a desire for stronger
bilateral relations. In addition, the Chinese had expressed
their appreciation that Yu had chosen to make China the first
country he visited as Foreign Minister.

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Comment
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8. (C) The Koreans initiated the meetings with both the DCM
and the Pol M/C. This unprompted information sharing by the
new ROKG marks a notable departure from the previous
administration's practice. It appears to be an attempt to
foster greater trust with the U.S., and is further concrete
evidence of the Lee Myung-bak administration's intention to
improve the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW