MINISTER HAN SEUNG-JOO SLAMS LMB'S FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000575

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: MINISTER HAN SEUNG-JOO SLAMS LMB'S FOREIGN POLICY

Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In remarks delivered at the monthly dinner
meeting of DCMs in Seoul on March 19, former Foreign Minister
and Ambassador to the U.S. Han Seung-Joo presented a
surprisingly negative assessment of the foreign policy
direction of the new Lee Myung-bak Government. While
acknowledging that LMB's Government had only been in power a
month, he thought that it was off to a bad start, and was
already facing a series of domestic and international
challenges, including unrealistically high expectations both
domestically and internationally that LMB would not be able
to meet. LMB also faced political problems both inside and
outside of the GNP and an upcoming National Assembly election
in which the GNP would "at best break even." END SUMMARY.

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PRAGMATISM WITH NO SENSE OF DIRECTION
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2. (C) Former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the U.S. Han
Seung-joo told the DCMs that thus far LMB had stressed
pragmatism in foreign policy and this was correct if by
pragmatism you meant a foreign policy not based on ideology,
emotions, or politics. What we were seeing, however, was a
"super-pragmatic policy almost devoid of values." He cited as
an example LMB's recent meeting at MOFAT where it was
reported that 90 percent of the time was given over to a
discussion of energy security. Even 10 percent of LMB's
attention to this issue, however, would have been too much
because energy was primarily in the hands of the private
sector, Han said. Meanwhile, according to all accounts, LMB
had made no mention of North Korean nuclear weapons or other
security problems. Contrasting LMB's approach to foreign
policy with his own when he was Foreign Minister in the early
90s, Ambassador Han argued that LMB's policy was not
multidimensional and was so pragmatic that there was no
overall sense of direction, and that this had been especially
apparent in LMB's inauguration speech.


3. (C) Ambassador Han expressed concern about where LMB's
pragmatism would lead Korea. As an example, he cited the
current difficulty in assigning Ambassadors to the most
important countries for Korea: the U.S., Japan, China, and
Russia. Of these, only the Ambassador to Russia had been
recently appointed, so he was likely to stay in place. Now
that the Korean Ambassador to Japan had been become Foreign
Minister, however, and the Korean Ambassador to China had
become Minister of Unification, those positions remained
unfilled, and there had been no movement on naming a new
Ambassador to the U.S. The main reason these positions
remained empty, Ambassador Han said, was political. The ROKG
was waiting to see which politicians would be elected in
April, and if not elected, would need those jobs.

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CHALLENGES AHEAD
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4. (C) Meanwhile, Ambassador Han continued, major challenges
outside of Korea were taking place. For example, all the
major countries of importance to Korea had undergone or were
facing changes in leadership including in Russia, Japan,
Taiwan, Mongolia, and the U.S. All these changes would
produce a new environment in which Korea would have to
operate. In the United States, "the country that matters most
to us," we did not know who would be elected or what his or
her foreign policy would be like. Economically, contrary to
the expectations of immediate economic benefits from the
election of LMB, Korea was now facing new economic challenges
including the high price of oil, the curiously high value of
the U.S. dollar in Korea alone, and high prices for
commodities. In addition, financial troubles stemming from
the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. were not having a "ripple"
effect, but a "wave" effect and possibly in the future might
have a "tsunami" effect. Korea would have to deal with all of
these challenges but LMB was focusing on energy security
where the ROKG, while it might assist, would not be the major
player. At the same time, the KORUS FTA was facing more and
more difficulties and the prospects were not good for
ratification before LMB's visit to Washington. Negotiations
with the EU on an FTA were continuing but it would be a long
time before a successful outcome would have a major effect on
the Korean economy.

-------------- DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA
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5. (C) Ambassador Han said that the good news on the North
Korean nuclear issue, which LMB had either "consciously or
unconsciously avoided" at MOFAT, was that it had not
developed into a major crisis. The bad news was that
denuclearization of North Korea had not really begun, either
because Pyongyang was skillfully doling out small concessions
or because South Korea and the U.S. eagerly construed any
concessions as progress. Moreover, as a China scholar had
told Han, China would not put any pressure on North Korea
before the Olympics or even before the end of this year. It
appeared that no one wanted to make an issue of North Korea's
denuclearization even if the price was that North Korea kept
its weapons and its secrets about uranium enrichment and
nuclear cooperation with Syria. Meanwhile, North Korea
continued to use its nuclear weapons as a threat if it did
not get what it wanted.

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POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.
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6. (C) Turning to the U.S., Ambassador Han noted that LMB had
stressed the need to "restore" and more recently to
"strengthen" relations with the United States. This was a
reaction to the erosion of U.S. confidence in South Korea
during the administration of Roh Moo-hyun, who had tired to
balance Korea between China and the United States and was
very therefore very reluctant to move ahead on programs such
as PSI and Missile Defense. While it was still unclear what
Korea would do on Missile Defense, the current administration
appeared to be trying to find a way out of the PSI problem by
redefining it as an issue of "more or less" rather than
"either/or," offering greater PSI participation. Unlike the
previous government, it also appeared the LMB administration
would be more forthcoming in discussing possible
contingencies for dealing with North Korea, including OPLAN
5029 in the event of the North's collapse. At the same time,
Ambassador Han said, he did not think South Korea's policy on
aid and engagement with North Korea would change all that
much, although there would be less "embracing" and more
reciprocity and conditionality.


7. (C) Ambassador Han noted that late-19th-century
pragmatism, especially in the U.S., was to some extent a
reaction to German idealism. In a similar way, Ambassador Han
thought LMB's pragmatism, which had resonated with the Korean
public, had resulted from a rejection of President Roh's
"ideologically and sentiment-dominated" policies. But Roh
had spoken more ideologically than he had acted. Ambassador
Han concluded that if LMB's pragmatism simply meant finding
resources, avoiding trouble, and playing politics, it would
not compensate for an inadequate foreign policy. LMB's
domestic honeymoon was already over, Amb. Han added, but it
was still continuing internationally.

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POLICY ADVICE
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8. (C) Asked what he thought the ROK's policy toward North
Korea should be and what advice he would give LMB if he were
Foreign Minister, Ambassador Han said the first step should
be a very frank discussion with the U.S., China, Japan and
Russia before "jumping into action" on the best way to deal
with the North Korean nuclear problem and North Korea in
general. In recent years there had been more time spent on
trying to iron out differences between South Korea and Japan
and South Korea and the U.S., and between hard- and
soft-liners in the U.S, than in dealing with North Korea in
any way other than public pronouncements. South Korea should
also be more outspoken about human rights in North Korea and
increase the number of North Korean refugees it takes, and
take appropriate action on Korean abductees and soldiers
still being held in the North. In a broader sense, ROKG
policy on human rights needed to be more measured and
balanced, and the ROK needed to be more willing to address
problems rather than ignore them. The biggest challenge for
the ROKG in this regard might be if something even more
drastic or tragic occurred in Tibet -- how would the ROKG
react if the issue were China?

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COMMENT --------------


9. (C) Some of Han's criticism should be taken with a grain
of salt. Han had hoped for a major position in the LMB
administration, perhaps even Prime Minister, which went to
another Han, Han Seung-soo. Also, Han's most prominent
protege, Hyun In-taek, was the odds-on favorite to be Lee's
national security advisor, which ended up going to Kim
Byung-kook, another Korea University professor; Hyun went
back to academia. Still, former Foreign Minister Han, a
conservative himself, has a point. So far, Lee Myung-bak's
policies, whether foreign or domestic, have lacked substance
and coherence. The most often cited reason is the April 9
National Assembly elections which are trotted out to defend
inaction for everything, from resolving our beef issue to
replacing the Roh administration's holdover personnel. Even
if the Lee administration does get truly busy after April 9,
President Lee has already squandered considerable momentum
and good will, as Han Seung-joo argues.
VERSHBOW