Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL566
2008-03-20 08:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VFM KWON JONG-RAK

Tags:  PGOV PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0566/01 0800803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200803Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9025
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3996
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8592
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4149
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000566 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VFM KWON JONG-RAK

Classified By: Ambassador Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000566

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VFM KWON JONG-RAK

Classified By: Ambassador Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on March 19,
Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak discussed a wide range of
topics including the upcoming summit in Washington and the
associated joint statement. Paralleling statements made by
NSA Kim Byung-kook, who was then in Washington discussing the
same topic, Kwon said that the ROK preferred to release a
broad but concise statement in April in support of a broader
strategic alliance between the U.S. and the ROK, and then
release a more detailed statement (to be developed by DOD and
State experts) in July, when a second summit is likely to be
held. On the KORUS FTA, the Ambassador said it would be
helpful for President Lee to find time to meet individually
with key Congressional leaders to voice the ROK's support for
the FTA and update their image of Korea and the ROK-U.S.
alliance.


2. (C) Turning to the Six-Party Talks, Kwon said that since
North Korea had missed the December 31 deadline to deliver a
complete and correct declaration of the nuclear capabilities,
the other five parties had spoken too softly on the issue.
Kwon said he had encouraged President Lee to issue the
statement that South Korea "regretted that North Korea missed
the deadline" and hoped that other parties would also be more
vocal in encouraging North Korea to fulfill its obligations.
On humanitarian aid, Kwon said that the ROK would not link it
to denuclearization, but the Lee government would define
humanitarian aid much more narrowly than Roh's had. In
conclusion, the Ambassador inquired as to when the ROK
planned to make a formal decision on recognizing Kosovo as an
independent state. Kwon said that they have been studying
this issue closely and were likely to make an announcement
"sooner than later" as the ROKG had eventually decided to
support Kosovo's independence. The Ambassador also delivered
demarches urging full participation in PSI and support for
Israeli participation in the JUSCANZ group which will be
reported septel. END SUMMARY.

--------------
PRESIDENT LEE'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON
--------------



3. (C) In his March 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Vice
Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak reiterated the ROK's view that
it would be better to issue a broad statement during the
April summit and then a more detailed declaration following a
likely second summit in July. In the time between the April
and July summits, Kwon suggested that the ROK and U.S. hold
"high-level consultations" at the Deputy and Vice Minister
levels while the Ministry of National Defense (MND) would
work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to craft a
statement focusing on the military alliance. The Ambassador
agreed that utilizing the Security Consultation for Allied
Partnership (SCAP) and the Security Policy Initiative (SPI)
fora would be useful to flesh out the details of the July
summit statement and a vision for the alliance.


4. (C) Kwon pointed to the early date of President Lee's trip
to Washington as a positive sign in Korea-U.S. relations,
noting that former President Kim Dae-jung first visited the
U.S. in June and President Roh in May. Additionally,
President Bush's invitation to President Lee to stay at Camp
David was garnering positive coverage in the Korean media as
it shows the close friendship between the two countries.
Kwon reiterated the ROKG's hope that President Lee would be
given the opportunity to address a joint session of Congress
during his time in Washington. The Ambassador said that we
supported President Lee's ambition to address Congress, but
we also hoped he would take the opportunity while in
Washington to meet individually with key Congressional
leaders to voice the ROK's support for the FTA and update
their image of Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance. It would be
helpful if President Lee delivered a message that the
U.S.-Korea alliance transcends issues and short-term
interests and has "deeper roots" in shared values and
long-term strategic considerations.


5. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. appreciated the new ROK
administration's statement at the UN on North Korean Human
rights. He suggested that President Lee would find a
sympathetic ear in President Bush on the subject. During
their time at Camp David, President Lee should look for
opportunities for informal discussions on this and other
topics where the two Presidents could find common ground.
Kwon added the President Lee feels strongly that human rights
are an inalienable right. Lee believed that North Korean
human rights had to be improved and protected, independent of
political considerations. This is one of the most basic
human values and therefore it should not be ignored simply
for the sake of preserving amicable relations with the North.

--------------
SIX-PARTY TALKS
--------------


6. (C) Kwon lamented that, in the weeks following the missed
December 31 deadline for North Korea to submit a complete and
correct declaration of their nuclear capabilities, no one has
"turned up the heat" on North Korea. The five other parties
in the talks have chosen to use positive language rather than
criticize the North for the missed deadline. Kwon said he
had personally encouraged President Lee to issue the
statement that South Korea "regretted that North Korea missed
the deadline," and he hoped that other parties would also be
more vocal in encouraging North Korea to fulfill their
obligations. As President Lee makes the rounds to hold
summits with the other members of the Six-Party Talks, it
will be a good opportunity to discuss the issue in more
detail and show a "united front" to North Korea and encourage
them to fulfill their obligations. Participants of the
Six-party Talks had delivered approximately 30 percent of
their portion of HFO and equivalent materials; but Kwon
questioned whether North Korea had shown the same level of
commitment in its disablement and declaration efforts. The
key is to manage the process and prevent it from becoming a
crisis.


7. (C) Responding to the first such request from the North
under Foreign Minister's Yu's tenure, Kwon said the ROK has
agreed to meet with the North during the week of March 23
under the auspices of the Energy and Economic Cooperation
Working Group (EECWG) of the Six-party Talks. Kwon
characterized the meetings as part of the EECWG but only the
ROK and DPRK will be in attendance at the meetings scheduled
to be held in the DMZ. The last meeting between the two
sides was held in Beijing in January before the new ROK
administration was ushered in.

--------------
ROK DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIAN AID
--------------


8. (C) Kwon told the Ambassador that the ROK had not received
any official requests from the DPRK for food or fertilizer
aid as of yet. As President Lee had said throughout his
campaign, the ROK would define humanitarian aid differently
from the previous administration. As previewed in Washington
DC by visiting NSA Kim Byung-kook, the ROK will consider
humanitarian aid for seasonal or temporary emergency
situations such as flooding or drought. But ongoing aid
necessitated by chronic food shortages that were the result
of systemic problems within the DPRK was not likely to be
considered humanitarian assistance, according to Kwon. Kwon
was quick to clarify that this new approach did not mean that
the ROK would not give some aid in the absence of a natural
disaster, but rather the aid would not be automatic as it had
been in the past. "If a request is received, we will study
it," Kwon explained. In light of recent reports about ROK
food aid being diverted into the mouths of the DPRK military,
the ROK would insist on better access to monitor the aid.

--------------
ROK VIEWS ON KOSOVO
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador inquired as to when the ROK planned to
make a formal decision on recognizing Kosovo as an
independent state. Kwon replied that, as a matter of
principle, the ROK supported Kosovo's independence but it was
an issue of timing as to when they could make this comment
publicly. The ROK has been looking to other countries in
Asia, especially Japan, as a guide for their thinking. The
ROK will make a decision sooner than later and will let the
U.S. know when they have decided to make their public
announcement. The Ambassador added his encouragement that it
would be better for the ROK to announce their support before
Foreign Minister Yu goes to Washington during the week of
March 23.


10. (C) COMMENT: A career diplomat who joined Lee
Myung-bak's campaign late last year, Kwon will be an active
vice minister, a departure from his predecessor, Cho
Joon-pyo, who played only a minor role in policymaking. Kwon
also has substantial experience in U.S. issues due to his
service in the ROK Embassy in Washington and the North
America Bureau.
VERSHBOW