Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL488
2008-03-12 09:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

NSA KIM FORECASTS PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT, ADVOCATES

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0488/01 0720909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 120909Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8877
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3951
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8569
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4093
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000488 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: NSA KIM FORECASTS PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT, ADVOCATES
SHORT STATEMENT


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000488

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: NSA KIM FORECASTS PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT, ADVOCATES
SHORT STATEMENT


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Over a cordial lunch with the Ambassador on
March 12, National Security Adviser Kim Byung-kook said that
he was sure President Bush and ROK President Lee Myung-bak
would get along well in their April summit meeting. Kim is
planning a trip to the U.S. March 17-19 to meet with senior
U.S. officials regarding the agenda and deliverables for the
summit. Kim said that he advised Lee to be patient and aim
for a short joint statement, focusing on broad goals and
principles with only a few concrete initiatives. He cited
three signals that would publicly demonstrate closer U.S.-ROK
cooperation: Lee addressing a Joint Session of Congress
during his April trip, a joint statement, and progress on the
Visa Waiver Program. Kim was reluctant to talk about the
beef issue, and the Ambassador cautioned that Kim may face
questions in Washington. End Summary.


2. (C) Kim said that he was sure Presidents Bush and Lee
would get along well. He cited their common business
background, friendly dispositions, religious beliefs, and
deep commitment to democratic values.

--------------
Core Beliefs
--------------


3. (C) Kim said that, despite the public attention to Lee's
pragmatic foreign policy approach, the president has some
core, fixed beliefs. He noted that the first decision Lee
had made as president was to make the March 3 announcement to
the UN High Human Rights Council about the importance of
addressing the North Korean human rights situation. Kim said
this is an issue about which Lee feels very strongly. The
Ambassador noted that President Bush also feels very strongly
about these issues as does Congress, suggesting that perhaps
human rights and the treatment of North Korean refugees could
be a summit agenda item. The Ambassador said that the U.S.
and the ROK might want to think about working together to
secure greater Chinese cooperation on North Korean refugee
issues.


4. (C) Lee's concern with reinforcing the U.S.-ROK alliance
is another of these beliefs, according to Kim, who described

the alliance as "frayed" -- a word which he took great care
in selecting. Kim said the ROKG has focused mostly on
working with the Department of Defense and the Department of
State, but now Korea needed to concentrate on building better
ties to Congress. The Ambassador urged Kim to set aside time
for President Lee to meet with senior Congressional leaders
individually, noting that these meetings could ultimately
have more impact than group meetings or addressing a Joint
Session.

--------------
Three Signals
--------------


5. (C) Kim agreed on the importance of individual meetings
but named the realization of Lee speaking to a Joint Session
of Congress as the primary public signal of Korean and U.S.
intentions to improve alliance relations. He said he
appreciated State's support in this effort and knew the ROK
Embassy in Washington was working hard on the issue. The
primary issue was de-conflicting Lee's schedule with the
Pope's.


6. (C) The second signal, Kim said, would be the joint
statement from the April summit. Kim said he told President
Lee not to get overly ambitious in either the joint statement
or in deliverables; Lee had five years in office and there
would be future meetings. Kim later admitted that in
providing this advice to his president, he had not thought
about President Bush's time constraints. Still he was
adamant about keeping the joint statement short, focusing on
broad goals and principles with only a few concrete
initiatives.


7. (C) The third signal would be progress on the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP). Kim noted that this is an exceptionally
important issue to Koreans. Kim also responded positively to
the Ambassador's suggestions about expanding the Fulbright

teaching assistants program and looking into some sort of
working holiday agreement for students, like the pilot
program the U.S. has with Australia and New Zealand.

--------------
Middle East
--------------


8. (C) Kim said the ROKG is working very hard to resolve the
North Korean refugee issue in Yemen, but they were also being
very careful to keep it out of the media to avoid putting too
much pressure on the Yemeni government.


9. (C) Kim said that the ROKG would welcome more
coordination with the U.S. on Korean equities in the Middle
East, especially on the issue of energy. Kim cited the
potential Korean investment in the Kurdish region as an
example. He said Lee is working very hard on this with the
oil interests, but that the situation is very complex. In
evaluating the project, Kim said there was a need to consider
local and central government relations, the stability of the
Kurdish government, and the protection of the investment.

--------------
Climate Change
--------------


10. (C) Kim suggested another area for potential U.S.-ROK
cooperation is on climate change. He noted that the Koreans
are working on an agreement with Japan for Lee's visit there.
Kim admitted he did not know what kind of an agreement the
U.S. and Korean governments could put together, but they were
interested in discussing it. The Ambassador noted that the
U.S. and ROK approaches to climate change were very similar
and thought this could be highlighted at the summit.

--------------
Beef
--------------


11. (C) Kim was reluctant to discuss the beef issue. The
Ambassador told Kim that he should probably be prepared for
questions on resolution of the beef issue during Kim's trip
to Washington. Kim said it was unnecessary to discuss the
issue because, "you know what I think, and I know what you
think." Nevertheless, the Ambassador underscored, Kim should
be prepared to articulate the ROKG position to senior U.S.
officials who will not be content to take vague assurances
that a solution is imminent. The Ambassador also cautioned
that it would be a disappointment if the current government
allowed political considerations to walk back former
president Roh Moo-hyun's public pledges to resolve the beef
issue based solely on science.
VERSHBOW