NEW MOU MINISTER KIM HA-JOONG: OLD MOFAT HAND,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000454

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: KS KN PROG PREL PINR
SUBJECT: NEW MOU MINISTER KIM HA-JOONG: OLD MOFAT HAND,
NORTHEAST ASIA SPECIALIST


Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Kim Ha-joong, the current ROK Ambassador to China and
a career diplomat, has been named Lee Myung-bak's first
Unification Minister. Resistance to his nomination from the
opposition United Democratic Party is unlikely to be strong;
he was one of the architects of the Sunshine Policy when he
served as Kim Dae-jung's Senior Secretary for National
Security. His nomination surprised many conservatives,
including some who question his conservative bona fides with
regard to the DPRK. Kim brings significant DPRK, Northeast
Asia, and diplomatic experience into the position; he will be
comfortable in this policymaking role. The fortunes of the
Ministry, however, remain unclear, except that it will be
reduced in manpower and interagency authority. END SUMMARY.

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What Kim Brings To The Job: DPRK Experience...
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2. (C) Kim brings experience working on engagement strategies
with the DPRK, having served as Senior Secretary for National
Security during the Kim Dae-jung administration (2000-2001).
Media reports state that he was one of the guiding hands
behind the Sunshine Policy, and has met high-level North
Korean visitors to Seoul. Kim was considered as a possible
MOU Minister during Roh Moo-hyun's administration, but was
ultimately passed over for Lee Jae-joung, who stepped down as
MOU Minister this week.


3. (C) Kim's nomination marks the second time that a former
Korean Ambassador to China has been nominated as MOU
Minister. Kim has served as Ambassador to China since 2001
and is expected to be well-versed in issues related to the
Six Party Talks and DPRK defectors; his background also gives
him significant experience on trade issues, which could have
an impact on how he views inter-Korean economic cooperation.


4. (C) Some MOFAT colleagues note, however, that while Kim
was briefed while in Beijing on the state of play in the Six
Party Talks, he was not intimately involved in the Six Party
Talks. His forte, rather, was in PRC-ROK bilateral issues,
including trade and DPRK refugees.

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...NE Asia Expertise...
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5. (C) Kim's MOFAT career also reflects a heavy focus on
Northeast Asia, which could bode well for the Lee Myung-bak
administration's efforts to build regional cooperation. In
addition to his seven-year tour as Ambassador to the PRC, he
has served as Director-General for Asian Pacific Affairs,
Minister at Embassy Beijing, and Counsellor at Embassy Tokyo.
Kim majored in Chinese Literature during undergraduate
studies at Seoul National University and speaks fluent
Mandarin Chinese.

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...Policymaking Experience...
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6. (C) As previously mentioned, Kim has had two assignments
in the Blue House, both during the Kim Dae-jung
administration. Kim has also served three tours in Foreign
Minister's office, each time under a different minister.

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...And MOFAT's Work Culture.
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7. (C) MOFAT colleagues and media reports have characterized
Kim as a tough, hard-working boss who often kept his
employees at Embassy Beijing working until late at night.
His work ethic should fit in well with an administration that
has staffed its senior foreign policy positions with former
or current MOFAT personnel, and with a president who has
already indicated that he expects his senior staff to put in
long hours. Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan was in the same
MOFAT entering class as Kim, which could help the two to

frankly exchange views and coordinate on relevant issues.

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The Mood at MOU
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8. (C) Kim is going into a ministry that was almost
eliminated entirely. Now, the administration has announced
large-scale layoffs and a wholesale restructuring of the
Ministry. In short, he will face morale issues. He will
certainly be pressed by conservative hardliners to take a
stronger line vis-a-vis the DPRK on inter-Korean economic
cooperation. Working-level MOU contacts are taking a
"wait-and-see" approach to the new Minister, and remain
hopeful that he will have no choice but to continue
inter-Korean economic projects such as the Kaesong Industrial
Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourism site. Our
understanding is that these two main inter-Korean projects
will continue but not expand further.

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What His Appointment Suggests
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9. (SBU) All indications are that Kim,s appointment is
another sign that the new administration's North Korea
policies will be viewed through a diplomatic rather than a
domestic lens. That is, the new ROK government will view
North Korea as a security issue to be resolved through
diplomatic initiatives, rather than a problem that is shared
by Koreans, as characterized by the Roh administration. This
will have policy implications ranging from economic
assistance to human rights to denuclearization efforts.


10. (SBU) Another policy issue that could be affected by
Kim's appointment is the new administration,s emphasis on
the issue of DPRK refugees in China. Blue House spokesperson
Lee Dong-kwan, in his March 2 announcement of Kim,s
appointment, mentioned that Kim,s past role in handling the
refugee issue with China was recognized as a valuable asset
for the Unification Minister job. In an interview with the
JoongAng Ilbo on March 3, Kim Ha-joong noted that he had
handled around 430 refugee cases during his ambassadorship in
China.


11. (SBU) Some editorials and news articles have suggested
that the appointment of a China expert to the Unification
Minister post reflects the new government,s effort to ease
Chinese anxiety over signs that the ROK is moving closer to
the United States and Japan, as demonstrated by the recent
appointments of Kim Byung-kook (an old U.S. hand) as Foreign
Affairs Advisor and Yu Myung-hwan (former Ambassador to
Japan) as Foreign Minister.


12. (C) Since his nomination, Kim has stuck to the party
line; in a March 3 interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, Kim said
that the new administration,s NK policy will be to "build a
Global Korea, promote pragmatism, and bring about North
Korean reforms and openness." Faced with an uncertain
mandate about inter-Korean engagement, an MOU that looks to
lose significant interagency clout, low staff morale, and a
North Korea that is increasingly unhappy with the direction
of inter-Korean relations, Kim faces a long walk across a
tight-rope.
VERSHBOW