PRESIDENT-ELECT LEE MEETS FORMER USG OFFICIALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000037

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2017
TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT-ELECT LEE MEETS FORMER USG OFFICIALS
ABOUT NORTH KOREA AND ALLIANCE

Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: During a January 4 meeting with former
Secretary of Defense William Perry and other former senior

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USG officials, President-elect Lee Myung-bak said that:

-- The DPRK government was feeling "tremendous uncertainty"
after Lee's election and consequently had a wait-and-see
attitude on the nuclear issue, on relations with the ROK, and
on relations with the U.S.

-- The risk, which the ROK, U.S. and Japan should work
together to avoid, was that the DPRK would pull back from
engaging what it saw as a more hardline ROKG and a late-term
Bush administration.

-- The key to resolving the nuclear issue was to have Kim
Jong-il gain confidence that he could retain power after
denuclearization, "but he still doesn't feel confident
enough," and relations with the U.S. were crucial to that end.

-- While information on the inner workings of the DPRK was
deficient, Kim Jong-il appeared to have a close, mutually
beneficial relationship with the military.

End Summary.

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FOCUS ON NORTH KOREA
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2. (U) President-elect Lee Myung-bak and key advisors
including Rep. Chung Mong-joon and foreign policy advisor
Rep. Park Jin met with a delegation of former senior USG
officials led by former SecDef William Perry on January 4.
Others participating on the U.S. side were former Ambassador
to the UN Kenneth Adelman, former Ambassador to Croatia Peter
Galbraith, Dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign
Service Robert Gallucci, University of California Professor
emeritus Robert Scalapino, former Congressman Steven Solarz,
and former EAP Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The Ambassador also

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participated and Poloff attended as notetaker.


3. (C) The bulk of the discussion was on North Korea, with
Lee responding to the delegation's comments and suggestions.
Former SecDef Perry led off by stressing that an integrated
ROK-U.S.-Japanese approach to the DPRK nuclear issue had been
key to progress in the 1990s, suggesting that Lee revive such
close cooperation to counter the DPRK's penchant to delay and
seek to renegotiate. He recalled the effectiveness of senior
Presidential envoys in the late 1990s as an idea to be
considered again in dealing with the DPRK.

-- DPRK's wait-and-see attitude


4. (C) Lee responded that he agreed with Perry's points,
adding that "strong ROK-U.S. relations based on mutual trust
and cooperation" were essential. He noted that it was
unfortunate that the DPRK had missed the December 31 deadline
for submitting its nuclear declaration. The DPRK had yet to
make an official statement about Lee's election, which led
him to believe that the DPRK had adopted a "wait-and-see
attitude" about the incoming ROK government's approach to the
DPRK and its relations with the U.S. The risk was that the
DPRK would decide to delay because of what it saw as a
hardline ROK administration, with close relations to the U.S.
The DPRK could also take a wait-and-see attitude toward the
U.S., expecting a better offer from a new U.S.
administration. Therefore, Lee said, it was important for
both Democratic and Republican candidates to make clear that
the DPRK had no alternative to denuclearization; he
reiterated this point later in the discussion. Wolfowitz
responded that a firm ROKG position toward the DPRK would
gain immediate respect from both U.S. parties.


5. (C) Scalapino said that key issues for denuclearization
were verification of the DPRK's (prospective)
denuclearization actions and synchronizing those actions with
responses from the Five Parties. Since the DPRK's only
bargaining chip was its nuclear weapons, it was very
sensitive, and inflexible, about receiving corresponding
rewards for each step toward denuclearization. In addition,

the lack of reliable information about the DPRK system in
general and Kim Jong-il (KJI) in particular was a serious
problem for policymakers. Scalapino asked Lee for his
assessment of KJI's relationship with the DPRK military.
Adelman later suggested that Lee emphasize
professionalization of the ROK's National Intelligence
Service (NIS) to address the information gap.

-- Need for Regime Security


6. (C) Lee noted the lack of reliable information on the
DPRK. He said he surmised that the "military was in the
center of decision-making," as evidenced by KJI's title as
Chairman of the National Defense Commission. It was in the
military's interest to have KJI continue in power, looking
out for the military's interests, and also in KJI's interest
to have the military "prop up" his regime. If KJI had
confidence that he could remain in power after
denuclearization, that would help, "but he still doesn't feel
confident enough." Lee said he was not sure how to resolve
this difficulty, but that the U.S. relationship with the DPRK
was key. He suggested that, along with continuing the
Six-Party Talks, perhaps the U.S., ROK and DPRK "can engage
in talks to give (the DPRK) a security guarantee," He later
agreed with Adelman's and the Ambassador's point that the
U.S. could not guarantee the survival of the regime, which
ultimately depended on KJI undertaking reforms.


7. (C) Returning to the issue of the DPRK's uncertain
attitude, Lee said that the DPRK saw the incoming ROK
government as "not so friendly," and was concerned that the
Lee administration would have stronger relations with the
U.S., which made the DPRK "uneasy." Lee said that he hoped
the USG would keep these circumstances in mind as it
formulated policy. He later mentioned drawing on Libya's
experience with giving up its nuclear programs as a possible
model for the DPRK, saying it was a better example than that
of the Ukraine.


8. (C) Gallucci said that in addition to the DPRK needing
confidence that its regime would survive, another issue was
how far the U.S. and others were willing to go to provide
rewards for denuclearization. The U.S. and others needed to
be clear that they were providing everything promised to the
DPRK "plus a little more." On the other hand, South-North
cooperation had to proceed in step with progress on
denuclearization or else the DPRK would get the wrong signal.
He added that normalizing relations between the U.S. and the
DPRK, if denuclearization proceeded, would require political,
economic and human rights progress in the DPRK.

-- Message to DPRK


9. (C) Lee said that his message to the DPRK was that if it
would fully dismantle its nuclear weapons, which would need
to be verified, then the ROK, U.S., Japan and China would
provide any needed assistance. The ROK in particular would
work to raise DPRK per capita GDP to USD 3000 per year (from
about USD 800 now, according to the OECD) within a decade.
The USD 3000 figure was important, he said, because at that
point North Koreans would "open their eyes" to human rights
issues and political freedom. (Note: Lee has elsewhere noted
that the ROK's democratic development surged when the ROK
reached annual USD 3000 per capita income in the 1980s. End
Note.) He added that a denuclearized DPRK would have no
choice but "openness, change and reform." China and the ROK
would be its economic models.

-- Importance of Human Rights


10. (C) Former Congressman Steven Solarz focused on human
rights issues in the DPRK, suggesting four policy steps:
providing the ROK's humanitarian assistance through the World
Food Program or insisting on more effective monitoring of its
disposition; require that ROK companies at the Kaesong
Industrial Complex pay their DPRK workers directly (rather
than the present payment to DPRK authorities); linking
increased tourism to increased DPRK forthcomingness on South
Korean and Japanese abductees; pressing the Chinese
government to cease repatriating defectors to the DPRK; and
voting in favor of UN resolutions about DPRK human rights
issues. Wolfowitz added that the U.S. and ROK should
announce a readiness to resettle about 5000 North Korean

defectors per year, putting pressure on China to improve its
treatment of them.


11. (C) While not replying to Solarz's suggestions directly,
Lee said that he knew that the U.S. was already resettling
some defectors and agreed with Wolfowitz's point that more
such resettlement would put pressure on the Chinese -- and
the DPRK -- governments. Lee said that his human rights
policy toward the DPRK would be based on the fact that such
rights are universal values that must be upheld, rather than
as a political tactic directed at criticizing the DPRK.

-- Importance of Alliance


12. (C) At several points during the meeting, Lee emphasized
the importance of close working relations between the U.S.
and ROK, including with the former officials at this meeting,
to work through the issues raised. He said that it was
important to "realign" U.S.-ROK relations based on the same
national interests. The ROK-U.S. alliance should focus not
only on the nuclear issue but also on "Northeast Asia peace
and stability, global terrorism, proliferation (of WMD),and
drug trafficking," which were all global issues.


13. (SBU) At the outset of the meeting, Lee greeted each
participant warmly with a handshake. He appeared relaxed
when he spoke, taking notes in pencil when others were
speaking. He seemed to understand much of the commentary in
English, although he relied on an interpreter.
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