ROK PLANS AID TO AFGHANISTAN DESPITE MEDIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002431

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: ROK PLANS AID TO AFGHANISTAN DESPITE MEDIA
COMPLICATIONS

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. In a December 18 meeting with A/DCM, MOFAT
Director-General Chang Ho-jin requested that Washington and
Seoul avoid public discussions of possible additional aid for
Afghanistan. The ROK is considering a number of options,
including deployment of military personnel and assets.
However, to do this, the ROKG must carefully walk back from
the previous Korean public understanding that the USG was not
requesting "combat" assistance. Chang said that Washington
had the misperception that the ROKG was putting off the
decision. Not true, the ROKG is planning to deliver
non-military aid soon, including USD 5 million in
transportation equipment, and very senior ROKG officials were
discussing possible military assistance. End Summary.

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Media (Mis)Perception Matters
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2. (C) A/DCM met with Chang Ho-jin, Director-General of the
North American Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) on December 18 to discuss ROK aid
plans for Afghanistan. Chang said that the ROKG does have
plans for additional aid to Afghanistan, but the ROKG does
not want to have the discussion about those plans in the
media. DG Chang said that a Department of Defense (DOD)
press briefing in Washington after the recent SPI sparked ROK
media interest because Korean correspondents interpreted the
DOD as being disappointed with the ROKG on assistance to
Afghanistan. It was also seen as USG pressure to get the
ROKG to act. The potential negative political ramifications
of being perceived as caving in to USG pressure are enormous.
When ROKG officials claim not to know what the USG is
seeking for Afghanistan, their intention is not to ignore the
USG's request, but rather to deflect discussion of the issue
in the press.


3. (C) The best way to package additional ROKG aid for
Afghanistan, Chang said, is for the public to view the aid as
necessary because the ROKG cares about the people and
situation in Afghanistan, as opposed to coming from political
pressure in Washington. From this perspective, the ROKG
desires to funnel aid, whenever possible, through the Korea
International Overseas Cooperation Agency (KOICA).

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ROK Public is not Expecting Military Deployment
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4. (C) Chang said the ROKG is also considering military
assistance. However, the ROKG must act with extreme caution
because the clear message from the August summit was that the
USG was not asking for "combat" personnel or assets. The
ROKG must, therefore, carefully walk back from this position.
If the ROKG were to deploy military assets and personnel,
such as ISR assets (mid-altitude UAVs),the National Assembly
must approve. Right now, the Defense Minister and other
"higher level" persons are reviewing these options. Chang
denied that the public backlash from the death of two Korean
missionaries held hostage by the Taliban in July 2007 was an
important factor influencing ROKG's decisions.

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But the ROK Will Send Aid Shortly
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5. (C) Chang confirmed that the ROKG will provide
additional aid to Afghanistan shortly. Once the parties
determined the appropriate specs for the USD 5 million in
transportation aid (motorcycles),Chang expected that the aid
would be delivered "as soon as possible." Chang also
confirmed that any civilian aid package funded from the
current approved budget would not need National Assembly
approval. However, both unfunded civilian aid packages and
the deployment of military assets need National Assembly
ratification.
STEPHENS