Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL2409
2008-12-16 06:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROKG TO MAINTAIN FIRM STANCE TOWARDS DPRK

Tags:  PGOV PREL KN KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2409/01 3510631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 160631Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2652
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5079
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5186
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEHUL/USDAO SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002409 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KN KS
SUBJECT: ROKG TO MAINTAIN FIRM STANCE TOWARDS DPRK

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002409

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KN KS
SUBJECT: ROKG TO MAINTAIN FIRM STANCE TOWARDS DPRK

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. During a December 15 luncheon meeting with
the DCM, Dr. Kim Tae-hyo, a principal advisor to ROK
President Lee Myung-bak, indicated that President Lee would
maintain his firm policy stance toward the DPRK despite
internal politics. The DPRK is finding fewer friendly media
outlets to influence ROK public opinion in its favor. Kim
wanted more U.S. concessions in the U.S.-ROK bilateral
relationship. Dr. Chang-hee Nam, who hosted the lunch,
invited U.S. and Japanese participation in a ROKG-funded
trilateral study. End Summary.

--------------
President Lee to Maintain Firm Stance Toward the DPRK
--------------


2. (C) Dr. Kim Tae-hyo, Secretary to the President for
National Security Strategy, told the DCM over lunch on
December 15 that President Lee Myung-bak (LMB) planned to
stay the course in his firm approach toward the DPRK despite
criticism. Kim, a principal advisor to President Lee on
North Korea, confided that critics within the GNP, as well as
the usual opposition critics, would not alter Lee,s current
policy. Kim said that critics within the GNP were either
"liberals" who did not support the President just as there
had always been conservatives in the Roh Moo-hyun government,
or supporters of LMB's rival and former chair of the GNP,
Park Geun-hye, or other younger politicians such as
Representative Hong Jung-wook, who did not understand Lee,s
policies. In response to the last group's concerns, the Blue
House was regularly reaching out with information and
updates.


3. (C) Kim noted that LMB planned to maintain his stance
toward the DPRK during the transition to the new U.S.
administration. Kim said he thought that the DPRK over the
next few months would be cautious about taking any overly
provocative or irreversible steps in its nuclear program in
order not to alienate the Obama Administration. Kim
expected that the DPRK would also return to talks with the
ROK in 3-4 months under some face-saving cover when it
realized that the ROK would not change its North Korea policy
despite a new U.S. administration. In order to make future
progress on denuclearization, however, Kim recommended that

the new administration should draw up a "comprehensive list
of sticks" to use against North Korea since positive
inducements would never be enough to change the DPRK,s
behavior. Kim assessed that the biggest challenge in dealing
with the DPRK was China because China would always increase
its food, fuel, and monetary support for the DPRK if support
from the ROK or the U.S. diminished. Kim said that China
prized stability in the DPRK to the point that it was willing
to supply whatever was needed to stabilize the North Korean
regime.

--------------
DPRK Finds Fewer Friendly Media Outlets
--------------


4. (C) When asked whether popular support for LMB's policy
toward North Korea was eroding in response to the DPRK's
tough rhetoric and actions, Kim said that North Korea
depended on its communication channels to the South Korean
people in order to win them over but these were gradually
being restricted. ROKG support for some was drying up,
while other voices in the South sympathetic to the North were
being isolated, and still others were being presented with
the ROKG,s explanations of its policies. As a result, even
after ten years of sympathetic reporting about the North,
attitudes were changing in the South. While some channels
sympathetic to the North like MBC (broadcasting) and
Hankyoreh (newspaper) remained, there were only two or three
left.

--------------
ROKG Seeks U.S. Concessions
--------------


5. (C) Commenting on U.S.-ROK relations, Kim hoped the new
U.S. administration would be more responsive to the ROKG,s
needs. Kim claimed that the U.S. was always pressing the
ROKG hard on issues like Afghanistan, burden sharing, base
relocation, and Global Hawk; and the ROK tried to be
responsive. In contrast, Kim claimed, the USG had not been
nearly so forthcoming on FTA ratification, maintaining force
levels and capability of USFK, the timing of OPCON transfer,
increased intelligence sharing, and the speed with which we
relocated our bases. From the ROK perspective, the ROK
always seemed to move first. Kim wanted the USG not only to
be more willing to proactively make concessions, but also to
frankly discuss these issues.

--------------
ROK Professor Proposes Trilateral Study
--------------


6. (C) The December 15 lunch which Dr. Kim, the DCM, and
the Japanese DCM attended was hosted by Dr. Chang-hee Nam, a
professor at Inha University, who has been given an
ROKG-subsidized grant to do a research project on how to
increase trilateral security cooperation among the ROK, U.S.,
and Japan. Nam proposed four more meetings with him and his
two research assistants, attended by the U.S. and Japanese
political-military officers, defense attaches and possibly
the DCMs, with the first meeting to be held in March 2009.
The resulting report would be an unpublished confidential
assessment presented to the ROK,s national security
advisors. Nam believed that the meetings could foster
discussions on a range of issues, including improving
interoperability of ballistic missile defense, DPRK
contingency planning, and counter-proliferation mechanisms.
Both DCMs indicated that the study appeared useful and
pledged to consider the proposal further.


7. (C) Comment. Kim, who sought to communicate Lee,s
resolve in maintaining his DPRK policy, appeared to close the
door to using various political events as opportunities to
refine or modulate his DPRK policy. His request for U.S.
concessions as a way to improve the U.S.-ROK bilateral
relationship is consistent with similar requests from various
ROK officials.
STEPHENS