Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL2388
2008-12-12 08:03:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN FIRM

Tags:  MTCRE PARM PREL PK KS 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2388 3470803
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 120803Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2609
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0689
S E C R E T SEOUL 002388 

SIPDIS

STATE TO ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2033
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL PK KS
SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN FIRM
AND ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

REF: SECSTATE 123791

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B),(C),and (D).

S E C R E T SEOUL 002388

SIPDIS

STATE TO ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2033
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL PK KS
SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN FIRM
AND ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

REF: SECSTATE 123791

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B),(C),and (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 5.


2. (U) Poloff met Young-kul Koh of the Disarmament and
Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MOFAT) on December 10 regarding reftel. While Koh
understood our concerns, he said that the ROKG did not
uncover evidence supporting USG claims. Therefore, the USG
would need to provide concrete evidence warranting ROKG
action.


3. (S) After poloffs communicated USG concerns about United
Engineering in March 2008, MOFAT instructed its Embassy in
Pakistan to investigate the firm and the end-use declaration
filed by Sambu Korea Tek Co, LTD for the previous items it
sold to United Engineering. Koh permitted poloff to review
the Embassy report, which it submitted in August 2008. The
investigation included a site inspection, interviews with
management and employees, and photographic analysis. United
Engineering's owner denied any linkage with Pakistan's
Project Management Organization (PMO),which is involved in
the development and deployment of Pakistan's HATF-III
missile, which is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Category I system. Employees denied or did not know if
United Engineering had any relationship to Pakistan's PMO.
In addition, the previously purchased items, (the exported
items were positively identified),were installed in the
location and in accordance with the information in the
end-use declaration. Finally, United Engineering prepared a
physical site for newly ordered items (possibly lathes) in
accordance with their proper installation and operation.


4. (S) While the report noted that it could not exclude
with 100% certainty that United Engineering was not a
supplier to Pakistan's PMO, it was "highly likely that the
imported items are used in accordance with the end-use
declaration." Given its investigation, Koh conceded that
United Engineering may be using Intralink Incorporated as an
intermediary to acquire the lathes. However, neither has the
ROK uncovered nor the USG presented concrete evidence on
Intralink's relationship to United Engineering, United
Engineering's improper use of the acquired machinery, or
United Engineering's relationship with Pakistan's PMO.


5. (S) Consequently, the ROKG requests the following:

-- Concrete evidence that the exported items would be used
in ways contrary to the end use declaration or MCTR, since
the items are not controlled by any of the multilateral
control regimes.

-- Concrete evidence that Intralink is an intermediary for
United Engineering.

-- Concrete evidence on the type and nature of relationship
between United Engineering and Pakistan's PMO.
STEPHENS