NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR INTELLECTUAL SAYS ELITE KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002382

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR INTELLECTUAL SAYS ELITE KEY
TO CHANGE, EXPECTS CLOSER DPRK-CHINA TIES

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Kim Heung-kwang of North Korea Intellectuals
Solidarity, a group of predominantly elite North Korean
defectors formed in June, and North Korea Reform Radio
Representative Kim Seung-chul met with poloff on December 3
to describe plans to target elite North Koreans with messages
and information creatively packaged in a variety of media,
including DVDs, USB drives, and MP3 files. The group had yet
to identify a source of funds for this project. Holder of a
DPRK Ph.D in information technology, Kim Heung-kwang
defected to South Korea in 2004. In his view, Pyongyang had
restricted access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex to show
that it could do without economic incentives should its
demands not be met. The DPRK had no desire to reform its
planned economy system or to move toward inter-Korean
reconciliation with the South under Lee Myung-bak. Instead,
Kim said, he anticipated North Korea's ties with China to
become closer in the coming years. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Calling him the "best-educated North Korean in South
Korea," North Korea Reform Radio founder Kim Seung-chul
introduced poloff on December 3 to Kim Heung-kwang, holder of
an information technology Ph.D from Pyongyang who defected in

2004. Kim Heung-kwang serves as Chairman of North Korean
Intellectuals Solidarity, an organization established in June
that Kim said counts 39 of the approximately 200 elite North
Korean defector intellectuals in South Korea among its
membership. A professor in Hamheung before leaving the
North, Kim spoke without a hint of North Korean accent as he
explained that change in the DPRK was most likely to come
from its elites, intellectuals, and middle class. He said
North Korean Intellectuals Solidarity had the capacity to
receive information from 15 middle and elite class contacts
and relatives dispersed throughout 10 North Korean cities and
hoped to create a database with this information. The ROK
National Intelligence Service (NIS) would not fund the plan
without taking charge of it, Kim Seung-chul explained,
expressing interest in approaching the U.S. intelligence
community next.

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Anticipating Closer DPRK-China Ties
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3. (C) Assessing the poor state of inter-Korean relations,
Kim Seung-chul (who defected in the 1990s) said that he did
not believe North Korea saw any hope of reconciliation with
the South under Lee Myung-bak. Pyongyang was using the
current leaflet issue as an excuse to distance itself from
Seoul and would probably grow closer to China over the next
few years. He pointed to Kim Jong Il,s visit to the Chinese
Embassy in May as a turning point in bilateral relations.
Concurring with this view, Kim Heung-kwang added that the
DPRK would guard against undue influence by China, citing the
North's sale of exclusive rights to Najin port to both China
and Russia as an example of Pyongyang's adeptness at playing
its neighbors off each other. The Six-Party process, he
said, would ultimately serve to enhance China,s importance
to North Korea.

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Pyongyang Wants Economic Assistance, Not Reform
-------------- --


4. (C) On Kaesong, Kim Heung-kwang said DPRK restrictions of
border crossings and access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex
(KIC) were intended to show Seoul and the international
community that Pyongyang was prepared to reject economic
incentives if its demands were not met. While the North
wanted economic assistance, Kim explained, it did not want to
undertake economic reform. The DPRK saw itself as being
different from China and Vietnam and believed its planned
economy system would work with a guaranteed inflow of
resources. Securing this was North Korea,s chief objective
in negotiations with the outside world, in particular with
the U.S. and Japan.


5. (C) Kim Seung-chul added that there were not many in
South Korea who viewed North Korea's actions this way. While
the South Korean government had changed with the election of
Lee Myung-bak, he said, the bureaucracy retained much of the
character of previous Sunshine Policy administrations, even
in the NIS.

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Targeting the North Korean Elite and Middle Classes
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6. (C) In accordance with the view that the elite would play
a decisive role in the DPRK's future, Kim Seung-chul said he
began in 2007 to tailor his radio broadcasts to North Korea
to listeners among the DPRK leadership. Kim Heung-kwang,
meanwhile, described plans to send digital media, including
DVDs, USB thumb drives, and MP3 files, into North Korea.
These media would have the appearance of domestic or legally
imported products, making them relatively safe for the North
Korean user to possess. The DVDs, in fact, would contain
material routinely approved by DPRK censors such as Hong Kong
or Chinese movies, sporting event footage, and technical
training videos. However, messages and information
interspersed between or trailing movie scenes would catch
viewers off-guard and, hopefully, receptive. Being a
defector himself, Kim explained, he understood how best to
tailor messages to those in the North. Unfavorable
comparisons of North Korea and other countries, for example,
would be rejected as propaganda.


7. (C) Supplementing visual media with meaty textual media
was the best way to influence North Korea,s intellectual
classes, Kim Heung-kwang continued. This was because these
thoughtful groups craved more information than visual or
audio media alone could provide. USB thumb drives, perhaps
disguised as common objects such as lighters, could store up
to 10,000 e-books, Kim said. Though relatively few in
number, elites allowed to possess computers would be able to
view the contents of the USB drives free from scrutiny as
security services did not monitor computer activity as they
did radios and DVDs.


8. (C) Both Kim Heung-kwang and Kim Seung-chul said they
hoped to distribute the media they described through the
North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity network inside North
Korea and in markets. They planned to obtain feedback on
their distribution strategies from their North Korean network
and adapt media accordingly. Market price research would
also be needed as North Koreans would automatically be
suspicious of media priced too low or offered freely.

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Obsessive Demand for Foreign Media
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9. (C) Demand for foreign media in North Korea has become
almost obsessive, Kim Heung-kwang said, especially among the
younger generation. Even when people witness public
executions of those caught watching DVDs, they return to
watching them within a few days. While 10 years ago
offenders went to political prison camps or were executed,
illegal possession of foreign DVDs was too common for that
now. Those caught were generally interrogated and sentenced
to one month in a labor camp, Kim said. The demand was so
great that South Korean television dramas taped in China were
often available one day after the programs were aired.


10. (C) While DVDs were valued primarily as entertainment,
over time perceptions of the outside world changed, even
without viewers being aware of it. Younger North Koreans,
for example, exhibited a preference for foreign music, action
movies, and melodramas and had begun to imitate South Korean
accents, shorter shirt sleeves, and haircuts. Kim
Heung-kwang's own children wore jeans inside his house while
in North Korea, not being allowed to wear them in public.

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Comment
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11. (C) These two Kims -- and their organizations --
represent a growing activism among North Korean defectors.
Their work on promoting change in North Korea receives
material support from South Korean conservatives and
charities, but not from the ROKG.
STEPHENS