Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL2340
2008-12-08 07:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT LEE UNPOPULAR, OPPOSITION EVEN MORE SO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KN KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2340/01 3430728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080728Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2541
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5036
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9112
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5143
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2875
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002340 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LEE UNPOPULAR, OPPOSITION EVEN MORE SO

Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002340

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LEE UNPOPULAR, OPPOSITION EVEN MORE SO

Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: President Lee Myung-bak is suffering from
entrenched low popularity that is affecting his ability to
govern effectively. Even some Blue House insiders worry that
if he does not turn things around in 2009, he could spend the
remainder of his term powerless, overshadowed by jockeying
for the local elections in 2010 and the National Assembly
elections in 2012. A possible fix is an alliance with Park
Geun-hye, but most observers believe this is unlikely given
Lee's unwillingness to help Park in any way. More likely is
a cabinet reshuffle to try to boost his sagging popularity,
stuck at historically low levels for a president in his first
year. Lee's low ratings are eclipsed only by the even more
negative ratings of the opposition Democratic Party, leaving
him some room to hope that people may support him again if
they continue to feel there is no other option. End Summary

--------------
Polling - GNP More Popular than MB
--------------


2. (C) A KSOI poll on November 26 pegged President Lee's
approval rating at 23.7 percent, 8.6 percent lower than that
for the ruling GNP (32.2 percent). Both Lee and the GNP's
popularity dipped during the May and June anti-U.S. beef
demonstrations but the GNP has recovered most of its support
while Lee has not. Most attribute the GNP's recovery to the
surging popularity of Park Geun-hye, head of a large faction
of GNP lawmakers and a likely candidate for president in

2012. It is also clear that President Lee's continued
refusal to work with Park Geun-hye has damaged him, because
the public largely blames the Blue House for the economic
crisis and other policy failures. For example, the South
Korean media has had a field day contrasting the Lee-Park
standoff with President-elect Obama's nomination of Senator
Clinton to be the next Secretary of State.


3. (C) Less than a year after taking office, Lee Myung-bak
faces an entrenched disenchantment among the Korean public,
with his support hovering around 25 percent in all polls
throughout the fall. He will, therefore, find it difficult
to obtain needed popular support for initiatives promised

during the campaign. Even the conservative Chosun Ilbo's
most influential columnist railed against the incompetence of
the president and his advisors in a December 1 column. Some
from Lee's core ideological support group, the New Right,
composed of former activists who played a key role in forming
Lee's centrist Grand National Party (GNP) platform in 2007,
also appear to be distancing themselves from him. At a
recent seminar held by a prominent New Right think tank, the
main speaker exhorted those who had supported Lee during the
campaign not to be "yes men" just because they entered the
National Assembly or the Blue House but to continue to push
new policies to help Korea overcome the financial crisis.

--------------
Budget Fights Now
--------------


4. (C) The National Assembly is currently dominated by
budget deliberations, which, according to the Constitution,
should be passed by December 2 to allow 30 days for monies to
be allocated accordingly. This year marks the sixth straight
year the constitutionally mandated deadline has been ignored.
Due to pressure from the public, sources report that the
budget should pass sometime this week. Once the budget
fights are over, a special session is likely to be opened
that would last until January 10 to discuss outstanding bills
such as the FTA and several economic measures to mollify
those who have criticized the National Assembly for not
working to help Korea deal with the current economic crisis.

--------------
Cabinet Shuffle Later?
--------------


5. (C) Our National Assembly contacts report that because
they will be preoccupied with the budget in December -- and
the Assembly could be out of session much of January -- the
most likely time for a cabinet reshuffle is February. At
that time, President Lee could claim that he was changing the
cabinet after one year in office, which is close to the
average length of tenure for ROK ministers, and not due to
his low popularity. Confirmation hearings are required so it
would be easier to hold these in February or March. Our
contacts speculate that Lee will try to bring in some of his
campaign aides who are now in the Assembly, which could be
quite controversial.


6. (C) Cabinet posts most likely to be changed are
Unification, Culture, Finance, and the NIS. There are also
rumors that FM Yu Myung-hwan could be on his way out with GNP
Rep. Park Jin the most often named possible successor.
Outside the cabinet, our Blue House sources note that a
shake-up in their organization is also likely. Many pundits
think that the Blue House should be strengthened with a more
powerful Chief of Staff than the incumbent Jung Jung-gil, who
is said to manage with a "shadow" style, always on the edge
of action, listening but not dominating meetings. One
candidate for this job is Kwon Hyun-chul, the current
Ambassador to Japan. There is also speculation that
Ambassador Lee Tae-sik could be replaced with VFM Kwon
Jong-rak, former NSA Kim Byung-kook or Korea Foundation head
Yim Sung-joon.

--------------
Opposition Democratic Party Still Adrift
--------------


7. (C) Korean politics is not a zero-sum game, because the
opposition Democratic Party is doing even worse than
President Lee and the GNP. According to a recent poll by
Joongang Ilbo to explain why the DP was so unpopular, 29.5
percent of respondents attributed their dissatisfaction to
the party's blind opposition to President Lee and his
initiatives. 24.9 percent said they thought the DP lacked
leadership and 12.1 percent cited the lack of "star
politicians" in the party. Other pundits note that hugely
unpopular former President Roh Moo-hyun's frequent
appearances in the press strengthens the image that the DP is
still Roh's party. Facing these negatives, our contacts note
that it could take years for the DP to remake its image and
to receive anything more than the current dismal 15 percent
support rating.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Presidency has always been a strong leadership
institution in Korea, much more powerful than the National
Assembly. Right now, with a comfortable majority in the
Assembly, Lee Myung-bak should be able to exercise
considerable authority. He should be able to rally his
political forces to push through key conservative agenda,
which include the reform of the media, privatization of
public companies, deregulations of factories in the capital
area, and other conservative legislation. However, this is
not the case. Instead, Lee is caught in the web of dismal
polls, blamed for poor appointments, worsening economic
conditions, deteriorating North-South relations, and, above
all, for lack of leadership.


9. (C) What can Lee do to improve his domestic position?
Practically, he has to forge an alliance or at least an
understanding with Park Geun-hye, his 2007 GNP rival for the
presidency. An alliance with Park, for example, by making
her prime minister, will energize the Administration, but,
more important, show the public that Lee is capable of
burying to past to provide the necessary leadership.
However, this is unlikely because President Lee's dislike of
Park is such that he simply cannot forget the past. A more
likely course of action is some changes to his cabinet to
give a sense of a fresh start, which should go some ways in
mollifying that public, because some, like Finance Minister
Kang Man-soo, are even more unpopular than President Lee.
STEPHENS