A/S HILL'S JANUARY 9 MEETING WITH GNP'S PARK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PROG PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: A/S HILL'S JANUARY 9 MEETING WITH GNP'S PARK
GEUN-HYE

Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an upbeat January 9 lunch, former GNP
Chairperson Park Geun-hye and EAP A/S Hill discussed the
latest developments in North Korea and prospects for the
future of U.S.-ROK relations. EAP A/S Hill said he hoped
that North Korea would make a complete and correct
declaration of its nuclear programs and conclude Phase II of
the denuclearization process soon. Park said she expected a
Lee Myung-bak presidency would mean better cooperation
between the U.S. and the ROK and therefore promote progress
in solving the DPRK nuclear problem. Park said she would
continue to work from her seat in the National Assembly --
rather than from within the Lee administration, where she is
not expected to take a post -- to ensure that relations with
the U.S. deepened and that the KORUS FTA passed so that our
two countries could build on our strong friendship and
alliance. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Bright Future
--------------


2. (C) Former GNP Chairperson Park Geun-hye predicted that
with the impending change in government, U.S.-ROK relations
would improve. Park said she would work to deepen trust
between the U.S. and Korea and build on common values by
supporting ratification of the KORUS FTA and the universal
values of democracy and human rights. A/S Hill said the DPRK
had learned that the U.S. and ROK could not be split. Park
agreed that the DPRK had tried hard to drive a wedge between
the U.S. and the ROK but had failed. If South Korea handled
its foreign policy well and on the basis of a trusting
U.S.-ROK relationship, more collaboration on shared strategic
principles would be possible. Many issues -- including the
DPRK nuclear issue -- could be solved.

--------------
North Korea
--------------


3. (C) A/S Hill said that the U.S. had worked well with
Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and the professionals at
MOFAT, adding that it had often been difficult to coordinate
the Six-Party process with the Ministry of Unification's
efforts on the North-South relationship. In the future, it
was important to better calibrate North-South exchanges with
progress in the Six-Party Talks. Park agreed that when
dealing with North Korea, it was important to have aid and
economic cooperation as a bargaining chip. If too much was
given through the North-South channel, the Six-Party process
could become more difficult. This would not be a problem in
the Lee Myung-bak administration, Park said.


4. (C) Representative Chin Young clarified that humanitarian
aid would continue, but that any economic cooperation would
be connected to the DPRK's progress toward denuclearization.
A/S Hill said that the U.S. had recently held unsuccessful
discussions with the DPRK about delivering 500,000 tons of
USG food aid to North Korea. The DPRK refused to allow the
food to be delivered through the World Food Program (WFP).
Park noted that this reflected the sad fact that the regime
was willing to withhold food from its own people for
political and bureaucratic reasons.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Park what President-elect Lee
Myung-bak's policy would be toward North Korea. Park said
that Lee would adhere to the GNP's following clear
principles: nuclear weapons were unacceptable; international
cooperation was needed for the DPRK to denuclearize; and both
carrots and sticks should be used in negotiations with North
Korea. Representative Chin said that the basic policy goals
include "denuclearization, opening, USD 3,000 GDP per capita
in 10 years." But denuclearization is a prerequisite for
proceeding with the other two, Chin said.

--------------
Travel to North Korea
--------------


6. (C) A/S Hill said he was shocked by what he saw during
his two trips to North Korea in June and December 2007. Park
said she went to North Korea in 2002 and advised the DPRK
that, given the U.S. population's role in selecting the
country's leaders, it is important to take positive steps to
influence U.S. public opinion. Doing so would reduce the
political risks for a president wanting to productively
engage with North Korea. This was perhaps a new message for
the DPRK, Park said. Ambassador Vershbow observed that

unfortunately the message had not sunk in as the DPRK tended
to do the opposite of what would engender good will on the
part of the American people.

--------------
Declaration State of Play
--------------


7. (C) Park asked for an update on the status on North
Korea's commitment to provide a complete and correct
declaration of its nuclear programs. A/S Hill stressed that
for the declaration to be complete and correct (and therefore
acceptable to the other five parties),it must address
uranium enrichment programs as well as North Korea's past
nuclear cooperation with other countries. Once North Korea
submits a complete and correct declaration and completes
disablement, the Six Parties could move to the third phase of
denuclearization.

--------------
Human Rights
--------------


8. (C) A/S Hill noted that in the ROK, the progressives did
not want to mention North Korean human rights, whereas in the
U.S. both liberals and conservatives were equally vocal about
the issue. Park agreed, lamenting that the left in South
Korea talked about human rights issues only in South Korea
but not in North Korea. Hill said it was ironic since the
progressives had benefited so much from international
pressure to improve human rights conditions in South Korea.
Park said that the basic goal was to have the North Korean
people enjoy the same freedoms that South Koreans do and, of
course, to establish peace on a reunified Peninsula. Park
reasoned, however, that North Korea's leaders were likely
afraid of too much openness because they feared their regime
could not survive an onslaught of outside influences.

--------------
Domestic Politics
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked if there would be a peaceful
solution of the internal GNP struggle over the selection of
candidates for the April 9 National Assembly elections. Park
said that it all depended on the President-elect. The GNP
had made many reforms during her tenure as GNP Chairperson
from 2004 to 2006; the party had established a more
transparent nomination system, and she had given up much of
the power that former party Chairmen enjoyed. Therefore, the
most important thing was that Lee not reverse the progress
the party had made in recent years, because those reforms,
after the party had almost disappeared in 2004, had
contributed to his electoral victory.
STANTON