Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL1113
2008-06-02 06:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

CANADIAN READOUT ON MAY 7-9 PYONGYANG MEETINGS

Tags:  KN KS PGOV CN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0246
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4368
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8762
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4505
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001113 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: KN KS PGOV CN
SUBJECT: CANADIAN READOUT ON MAY 7-9 PYONGYANG MEETINGS

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001113

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: KN KS PGOV CN
SUBJECT: CANADIAN READOUT ON MAY 7-9 PYONGYANG MEETINGS

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun told a
Canadian delegation on May 8 that the DPRK was expecting to
move forward on denuclearization if the USG took appropriate
actions and that relations with South Korea were "alarmingly
strained," according to an official at the Canadian Embassy
in Seoul who accompanied the Canadian Foreign Ministry's
Director General for East Asia Gordon Houlden on his trip to
Pyongyang. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Director General Houlden, the most senior Canadian
official to visit Pyongyang, requested a meeting with the
appropriate vice foreign minister, but was pleased to be
offered a 40-minute meeting Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun on
May 8 instead; Pak was accompanied by Vice Foreign Minister
of the Sixth Department Kim Hyong-joon but not Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Gye-gwan, with whom the Canadians had also
requested a meeting. A Canadian Embassy Seoul officer
provided a readout, using his notes from the meeting.

--------------
DENUCLEARIZATION
--------------


3. (C) On denuclearization, Pak asked that Houlden tell ROKG
interlocutors that its nuclear weapons program was not
directed at the ROK but was instead a deterrent, and that he
tell USG interlocutors that the USG should "fully implement"
agreements with the DPRK in order for the denuclearization
process to move forward. Pak also said (in answer to a
question) that allegations of DPRK involvement with Syria
were "ridiculous"; that the DPRK was ready to submit the
nuclear declaration to the Chinese Government "today" if the
USG would take appropriate actions; stressed that full
denuclearization would require adequate compensation; and
complained that only one-fourth of promised energy and
energy-related assistance for Phase II had been provided so
far.


4. (C) Pak said the April meeting between A/S Hill and VFM
Kim Gye-gwan in Singapore had resulted in an agreement under
which the DPRK would submit its declaration, and the USG
"would lift its two sanctions." On USG denuclearization
policy, Pak said that the earlier USG insistence that the
DPRK move first had been changed, replaced by the current
action-for-action approach, and that President Bush's support

for humanitarian aid to the DPRK was a significant step. As
part of a question, Houlden asked for Pak's views on the
Northeast Peace and Security Mechanism but got no reply on
that issue.

--------------
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
--------------


5. (C) Pak said that relations between the DPRK and ROK were
"alarmingly strained" because (President) Lee Myung-bak had
reversed the last 10 years of inter-Korean relations by
"rejecting" the June 2000 and October 2007 Summit statements;
he said the ROK should respect these internationally
recognized declarations. As a result of the strained
relations, discussions about sending a joint cheering squad
to the Beijing Olympics had ceased. Pak said that Lee's
approach was comparable to President Bush's overturning of
the nuclear negotiations that preceded him. Pak also
criticized Lee's decision to allow imports of U.S. beef,
which had raised a "hue and cry" among the people.


6. (C) Returning to the subject of inter-Korean relations
later, Pak said that the DPRK remained committed to the goal
of reunification of the two Koreas, but that this had to be
done in a way that respected different ideologies and did not
impose one system or another. "Great strides" in this area
had been made in the last 10 years, but now the effort faced
"real challenges." Pak said his expectation was that the ROK
would not continue on its current path, but that if it did,
the DPRK would have to revise its view of North-South
relations.

--------------
HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------


7. (C) Pak rejected Houlden's criticism of the DPRK's human
rights policy, saying that Canada and the U.S. had a double
standard; for example, U.S. human rights abuses during the
war in Iraq are not mentioned. Pak also said that the UN
Special Rapporteur on DPRK Human Rights (Vitit Muntarbhorn)
was a "running dog of the U.S." and that he and others sought
to overthrow the DPRK government by raising human rights.
That was why the DPRK refused to allow him to visit.

--------------
OTHER MEETINGS
--------------


8. (C) Foreign Ministry Director General Ho Yong-bok told
Houlden that the nuclear issue could be resolved in one to
two years, depending the USG's willingness to "terminate its
hostile policy" toward the DPRK. The DPRK sought conditions
under which the DPRK and U.S. could "coexist."


9. (C) Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Xiaoming told
Houlden that the DPRK leadership was still arriving at a
decision about complete denuclearization, and that the DPRK
would increase its cooperation on denuclearization if it were
removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. The DPRK
government had deliberately decided to show restraint and
remain engaged after the public allegations of its
involvement with Syria's nuclear program were made, showing
resolve not to walk away from the negotiating table. He said
that North Korea was upset at only receiving a limited amount
of the energy and non-energy assistance promised under Phase
II. The Chinese government was trying to work quietly to
persuade the DPRK to accept international standards. The
Ambassador said that he was the first foreign diplomat to
hold a press conference in Pyongyang. DPRK press personnel
had attended and watched while foreign reporters asked
questions.


10. (C) World Food Programme Country Director for North Korea
Jean-Pierre DeMargerie told Houlden that his organization saw
signs of food insecurity and even food crisis in some areas,
with particular concern about inequalities in food
distribution. People in some areas were eating only two
meals a day, and the average household was spending 70
percent of its income on food. There had been three
consecutive years of bad harvests, so the food situation was
likely to get worse. But DeMargerie cautioned that no
international organization had direct access to data about
food and nutrition status across the DPRK.
VERSHBOW