Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SECTION01OF02CHISINAU976
2008-10-01 13:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

A LONG-TIME OBSERVER'S IEWS ON TRANSNISTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Tags:  PREL PBS PINR RS MD 
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VZCZCXRO6069
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0976/01 2751329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011329Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7138
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01OF 02 CHISINAU 000976 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PBS PINR RS MD
SUBJECT: A LONG-TIME OBSERVER'S IEWS ON TRANSNISTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Classified B: Charge d'Affaires Kelly Keiderling for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01OF 02 CHISINAU 000976

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PBS PINR RS MD
SUBJECT: A LONG-TIME OBSERVER'S IEWS ON TRANSNISTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Classified B: Charge d'Affaires Kelly Keiderling for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a September 27 meeting former OSCE Ambassador to
Moldova William Hill told Ambassador Chaudhry that he thought it
unlikely that the planned 5-plus-2 meeting in October would gather
all participants. Hill blamed Transnistrian President Igor Smirnov
for avoiding a meeting with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin prior
to the 5-plus-2 meeting. He said Russian Special Envoy Valery
Nesterushkin had claimed that the Russians had no new Kozak-2 plan.
Meanwhile, Voronin may have given up on achieving a settlement with
Transnistria before he leaves office next year. End Summary.

5-plus-2 Meeting Unlikely
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador met with former OSCE Ambassador to Moldova, William
Hill, on September 27 to hear Hill's readout on his meetings over the
previous two days with Russian Special Envoy Valery Nesterushkin and
Transnistrian "President" Smirnov. Hill noted that Nesterushkin had
signed onto a 5-plus-2 meeting in Vienna in October, but now seemed
to doubt that it would take place. In his discussions with OSCE
Mission to Moldova Ambassador Philip Remler, Hill had concluded that
the Transnistrians wanted Smirnov and Voronin to participate in a
2-plus-1 meeting with Russian President Medvedev first. During his
meeting with Smirnov, Remler had asked that Smirnov agree to send
Transnistrian Acting "Foreign Minister" Vladimir Yastrebchak to the
5-plus-2 meeting in Vienna.

Smirnov Continues to Stall
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Hill stated that, although prior to his arrival in
Moldova Smirnov had not agreed to see him, Smirnov suddenly agreed to
meet on Saturday, September 27. Local Transnistrian TV had reported
on Ambassador Hill's presence in Moldova on Friday night, September

26. Smirnov wanted to do a joint TV appearance with Ambassador Hill
on Saturday but Hill politely declined. Hill reported that Smirnov
was likely interested in appearing to promote negotiations in public
while avoiding any serious discussion on substantive issues in
private. Ambassador Hill said that in his meetings with Smirnov over

the years, the Transnistrian leader had generally preferred to level
attacks on U.S. policy in order to avoid discussing Transnistria and
Moldova.


4. (C) Ambassador Hill suggested that the Russians had forced Smirnov
to agree to meet with Voronin prior to a 5-plus-2 meeting. Smirnov
could not defy Russia, but was using any means available to avoid a
meeting. Ambassador Hill noted that Russian Ambassador to Moldova
Valeri Kouzmin had said that Smirnov was very talented at resisting
change. Smirnov was actively working both to avoid a possible
meeting with Voronin and to dodge a trip to Vienna for a 5-plus-2
meeting by taking part in Abkhazia "independence" celebrations.

What do the Russians Want?
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Hill stated that Nesterushkin had come to Moldova
to push the negotiation process. In their meeting, Ambassador Hill
sought to determine whether the Russians had a new proposal to unveil
in a 2-plus-1 meeting. Hill asked what kind of proposal the Russians
had and Nesterushkin responded that Russia had nothing. Ambassador
Hill nonetheless believed that the Russians probably had some type of
plan, perhaps a Kozak-2. Hill speculated that if the Russians were
able to get some kind of Voronin-Smirnov declaration out of a meeting
with Medvedev, it would be good public relations. This would allow
the Russians to promote their image as a peacemaker and counter the
international focus on their aggressive actions in Georgia.


6. (C) Ambassador Hill suggested that although Ambassadors Kouzmin
and Nesterushkin might not necessarily be singing from the same sheet
of music, they were quite close in position. Ambassador Kouzmin had
advised Hill that he felt Chisinau did not have the political will to
solve the conflict. Similarly, Nesterushkin had complained to Hill
that Moldova was not willing to make any compromises. In particular,
the Moldovans did not want to share power. Ambassador Hill
speculated that the Russians might be trying to get Moldova to agree
to permit a unilateral troop presence. However, he suggested that
GOM capitulation to stationing Russian troops in Transnistria could
cause protest demonstrations in Chisinau.

Voronin has Shifted his Timetable
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Hill thought that perhaps Voronin was taking a
tactical approach by not rushing into a 2-plus-1 meeting, thereby
trying to see if he could get the Russians to offer more. At the
same time, Ambassador Hill noted that over the years Voronin had not
been patient. If something did not work, Voronin would move on to
something else. Although many had originally thought and still
thought that Voronin had been pushing hard for a settlement believing

CHISINAU 00000976 002 OF 002


it would help his party in the elections next spring, Ambassador Hill
now disagreed. Hill stressed that a bad settlement could cause much
more discontent. It was possible that Voronin had concluded the
same, believing that the Russians would not concede anything further.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Given Smirnov's primary goal of preserving his own power, it
is easy to understand his motivation for stalling any movement
towards a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. However, if
Russian will and pressure are strong enough, it is not likely that
Smirnov would be able to stall for much longer. Although Voronin had
been pushing hard for progress before the elections next year, lately
we have heard a new message from the GOM. Chisinau has come to
realize that a bad agreement reached in haste could be worse for
Moldova than no agreement at all. Hence, the GOM appears to be
shifting its timetable.

KEIDERLING