BOSNIA - PIC MEETS AMID BREWING POLITICAL CRISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000348

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHCOMB);
NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PNIR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - PIC MEETS AMID BREWING POLITICAL CRISES
IN BOSNIA AND FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES TO DAYTON

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Political
Directors will meet in Brussels on February 26-27 as Bosnia
enters yet another in a long series of political crises,
which stretch back to May 2006. Bosnia's continued political
deterioration has shaped an emerging consensus among PIC
members (excluding Russia) that OHR must remain open beyond
June 2008. There is also broader support among the Quint for
the HighRep's "objectives-based" approach to OHR's closure,
but we will need to defend this position against Russian
demands for a clear end date and/or a watered down set of
benchmarks. OHR's future is the main topic on the PIC
agenda, but Republika Srpska's (RS) response to Kosovo
independence, particularly assertions by RS PM Milorad Dodik
and other senior RS officials that the RS enjoys the right to
self-determination, is the more pressing issue confronting
the PIC. These claims, coupled with rhetoric and actions
from the RS over the last 20 months, appear to be elements of
a calculated strategy to eventually achieve an independent
RS. We must use the PIC to begin a serious discussion about
steps we and the Europeans could take after the PIC to
counter it. At the same time, we should anticipate trouble
after the PIC from Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris
Silajdzic. Silajdzic, who assumes the Chairmanship of the
Tri-Presidency on March 6, has already signaled his intention
to revive controversy over Srebrenica and the International
Court of Justice's (ICJ) February 2007 verdict that genocide
occurred in and around the municipality in July 1995.
Silajdzic's agenda will further radicalize Bosniak politics,
which will provide Dodik and the Bosnian Serbs with
ready-made excuses to press their own anti-Dayton agenda.
END SUMMARY

The PIC in Context: Bosnia
--------------


2. (C) The political situation in Bosnia has worsened since
the October PIC. Fueled by near constant rhetorical sparring
about future constitutional arrangements and the competencies
of the state, ethnic tensions have increased. Bosnian Serb
leaders, particularly RS PM Dodik, have regularly attacked
the legitimacy of the Bosnian state and undermined
state-level institutions by preventing them from functioning.
The Bosniak political leaders' tendency to take an all or
nothing approach on issues and to seek political advantage at
their rivals' expense have undermined the reform process,
particularly efforts to pass critical police reform
legislation. Croats, emboldened by the rhetoric from
Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, reiterated calls for changes to
Dayton that amount to plans for a third (Croat) entity. As a
consequence of all this (and the structural weaknesses of
Dayton governance structures),the Bosnian state continued to
struggle to perform the functions necessary to sustain itself
and reforms required for Euro-Atlantic integration have
stalled. Dodik's obstruction of an agreement on movable
defense property threatens to derail Bosnia's aspirations for
Intensified Dialogue at the Bucharest Summit. The Party for
Democratic Action's (SDA) backing out of the Mostar/Sarajevo
agreements on police reform is blocking signature of an EU
SAA.

OHR's Future
--------------


3. (C) We cannot consider dismantling the Dayton-established
OHR framework while the state's sustainability remains an
open question. There is consensus among most PIC countries
that OHR must remain open beyond June 2008. There is also
broad support for the HighRep's proposal to tie OHR closure
to specific, "critical" objectives, whose implementation OHR
assesses as essential to the creation of a peaceful, viable
Bosnian state and would allow the transition from OHR to EUSR
to go ahead. We have successfully pressed the HighRep to
include Washington's-proposed rule of law objectives among
those he will present to the PIC. We have not received any
signals from Quint partners that these objectives are
problematic. Our proposal for adoption of a framework on the
implementation of the Constitutional Court's constituent
people's decision, however, raised eyebrows among Quint
members and was rejected by the Russian Ambassador. The
Russians have also objected to elements of the HighRep's

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approach and to our emphasis on rule of law. Their
preference remains for OHR to close as soon as possible, and
this could translate into an effort to minimize the number of
objectives the PIC sets for transition to EUSR and/or an
insistence on setting a new target date for closure. We
should be prepared to defend our position on the importance
of all of the Quint-agreed objectives and reject any Russian
demands for setting an OHR end date at the Contact Group
meeting prior to the PIC, and at the PIC itself.


4. (C) The reality is that Bosnia's problems go much deeper
than the "objectives" exercise the HighRep has embarked on.
We should be under no illusions that they will be sufficient
to ensure Bosnia's sustainability, especially if current
political trends continue. Robust international engagement
will be required to reverse those trends and to accomplish
even the limited objectives set by the PIC. We will have to
argue forcefully, over Russian objections, that a stable
security and political situation in Bosnia is the sine qua
non for OHR's closure. We recognize that OHR's capacity and
credibility are limited, and that they have continued to
decline under Lajcak. Lajcak's management of the crisis over
his October 19 measures is partially to blame for this.
Nonetheless, our interests would not be served by allowing
OHR's authority to wither further. Doing so would kill the
objectives exercise before it even started. In that context,
the PIC must provide clear political support to OHR,
including a signal that it would support use of the Bonn
Powers to accomplish the PIC endorsed objectives.

The PIC in Context: Kosovo
--------------


5. (C) Though OHR's future is the major item on the PIC's
agenda, discussion of Lajcak's proposed objectives is likely
to be overshadowed by discussion of the growing crisis over
the RS response to Kosovo's independence. Since May 2006,
Dodik and senior RS officials have sought to push the
boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and actions. Attacks on
the state, demands for the return to the RS of competencies
transferred to the state, and threats of a referendum have
become so commonplace by Dodik and Bosnian Serb officials
that they no longer raise eyebrows. However, Dodik and his
SNSD allies managed to shock the international community
again on January 31 when SNSD asserted that the RS already
had the right to self-determination. RS officials, including
Dodik, are now using Kosovo's declaration of independence to
cement their rhetorical claims about an RS right to
self-determination. These assertions constitute a
fundamental challenge to Dayton.

Republika Srpska's Future
--------------


6. (C) It is unlikely that Dodik will seek to exercise the
self-proclaimed right to RS self-determination in the near
term. Nonetheless, Dodik's rhetoric and actions over the
last 20 months, particularly since August 2007, coupled with
the newly asserted right to RS self-determination appear to
be elements of a calculated strategy to eventually achieve an
independent RS. Key components of Dodik's strategy involve
attacking the state's legitimacy; preventing the state from
functioning; arguing the state's poor performance is "holding
back the RS;" reviving war time claims about Bosniak
victimization of Bosnian Serbs; characterizing reforms as
attacks on the RS; and finally, when it is judged to be the
right moment, rolling it all up into a tidy justification for
the RS to exercise its right of self-determination. HighRep
Lajcak sees the danger, but not all the Europeans do, or care
to. (Note: In the current regional climate, we doubt the
Russians care. End Note) We must use the PIC to shake the
Europeans out of their stupor and begin a serious discussion
about steps we and they could take after the PIC to counter
Dodik.

Silajdzic is Waiting in the Wings
--------------


7. (C) Dodik is not the only challenge we face. The PIC will
meet on the one-year anniversary of the ICJ's verdict that
genocide was committed in and around Srebrenica in July 1995.
Silajdzic assumes chairmanship of the Presidency shortly

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after the PIC on March 6, and he has already signaled that he
plans to once again make Srebrenica a political issue. We
are hearing rumblings about plans to revive 2007's campaign
for secession of Srebrenica from the RS. Once the dust on
Kosovo settles, Silajdzic plans to reopen the constitutional
reform debate and to press his case for a "Bosnia of regions"
(read: abolishing the RS). All of this suggests we can
anticipate a further radicalization of Bosniak politics in
the months ahead. The destructive force of Bosniak
nationalism has already claimed the U.S.-brokered package of
constitutional amendments as a victim. It may yet derail the
Mostar Declaration and Sarajevo Action Plan on police reform
and further delay Bosnia's signature of its Stabilization and
Association Agreement with the EU. In other words, even if
Dodik decides that he has a tactical interest in keeping
quiet after the PIC, Silajdzic's agenda will ensure that
Bosnia's cycle of political crises will continue.
Ultimately, Dodik will use Silajdzic's rhetoric and actions
to justify a return his own anti-Dayton agenda. Breaking
this vicious spiral will be critically important to acheiving
the progress needed to ensure that OHR's mandate can credibly
be ended.
ENGLISH