Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO244
2008-02-07 17:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - RADMANOVIC DISCUSSES DEFENSE PROPERTY,

Tags:  PREL PGOV BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #0244/01 0381717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071717Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7781
INFO RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0211
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000244 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM; DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - RADMANOVIC DISCUSSES DEFENSE PROPERTY,
POLITICAL SITUATION, SNSD CONCLUSIONS

REF: A. A) SARAJEVO 226

B. B) SARAJEVO 149

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000244

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM; DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - RADMANOVIC DISCUSSES DEFENSE PROPERTY,
POLITICAL SITUATION, SNSD CONCLUSIONS

REF: A. A) SARAJEVO 226

B. B) SARAJEVO 149

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On February 6, the Ambassador met with Bosnian Serb
member of the Tri-Presidency Nebojsa Radmanovic over lunch
for a wide-ranging discussion on current political
developments. The Ambassador and Radmanovic had detailed
discussions on defense reform, and Radmanovic again signaled
his support for the draft transfer agreement on movable
defense property. He also pledged to continue to advocate
for it with senior Republika Srpska (RS) leadership. (Note.
Despite Radmanovic's assurances, the RS government
subsequently, on February 7, declined to approve the
agreement. End Note.) Radmanovic expressed concern over Party
for Democratic Action (SDA) President Tihic's recent moves to
block further progress in police reform and sought the
Ambassador's assistance to get Tihic back on board. The
Ambassador took the opportunity to relay serious USG concerns
over recent conclusions from Radmanovic's Party of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) main board that
explicitly referred to RS rights to "self-determination" and
challenged the authority of the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) and the use of the Bonn Powers.
Radmanovic told the Ambassador that there existed no
separatist "sentiment" in the RS, and the conclusions were
consistent with long-standing SNSD policy and should be
viewed as a reaction to equally extreme positions from Party
for BiH (SBiH) President Haris Silajdzic. Radmanovic also
sought the Ambassador's assistance in securing increased US
investment in the RS. End Summary.

RADMANOVIC PREMATURE OPTIMISM ON DEFENSE PROPERTY
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On February 6, the Ambassador met with Bosnian Serb
member of the Tri-Presidency Nebojsa Radmanovic over lunch
for a wide-ranging discussion on current political
developments. The Ambassador again stressed the importance
of resolving the movable defense property issues in the near

term and encouraged Radmanovic to use his influence to secure
RS approval of the proposed draft transfer agreement.
Radmanovic stressed that it was in the interest of all
Bosnian leaders to do things that would speed the NATO
accession process, and defense property issues should be
concluded quickly. Radmanovic told the Ambassador that he
had personally engaged with Dodik and RSNA Speaker Igor
Radojicic on movable defense property, and he believed they
supported the proposed agreement. (Note. Radmanovic's
assurances on defense property proved premature. Later on
February 6 and on February 7, Dodik's government backed way
from commitments to approve the agreement. End Note.)

TIHIC MAIN ROADBLOCK TO SAA
--------------


3. (C) Commenting on recent developments on police reform,
Radmanovic noted that the political situation in Bosnia was
"not good." Radmanovic said that if everything he had "heard
was true," the actions of SDA President Sulejman Tihic at the
Siroki Brijeg meeting of political party leaders threatened
to derail Bosnia's movement towards the EU. Radmanovic asked
the Ambassador to reach out to Tihic and urge him to stick to
prior commitments on police reform, so Bosnia could sign its
Stabilization and Association Agreement. Radmanovic,
referring to the self-imposed February 15 deadline for
completing police reform, noted that time was short. If
Tihic did not honor his commitments Bosnia would "stand
before Brussels without an agenda."

SNSD MAIN BOARD CONCLUSIONS CHALLENGE DAYTON
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador pressed Radmanovic, who also serves as
the Chairman of the SNSD Executive Board, to encourage SNSD
to renounce the provocative conclusions from its January 26
Main Board meeting. The Ambassador told Radmanovic that the
conclusions were anti-Dayton and called into question the

party's commitment to the Bosnian state. Assertions that the
RS had the right to "self-determination" under the Dayton
Accords, calls for already transferred state competencies to
be returned to the entities, and an explicit rejection of
High Representative's authority, including threats to defy
him, were particularly troubling to the USG. The Ambassador
told Radmanovic that SNSD seemed to hide behind rhetoric of
"supporting Dayton" but continuously took steps to undermine
state-level institutions and structures. The Ambassador
stressed thatWashington had become very concerned with the
SND conclusions, which seemed to signal a unilateral ush to
alter the constitutional order in Bosnia.

RADMANOVIC: NO SEPARATIST AGENDA, CONCLUSIONS ARE REACTION
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Radmanovic said he would speak "frankly" and
maintained a strong, though non-confrontational, line in
regards to the SNSD conclusions. He prefaced his comments
with the statement, "there is no separatist agenda in Banja
Luka, and the conclusions should not concern the
international community," adding "the Dayton accords were the
greatest diplomatic success in Europe since World War II."
Radmanovic said that the SNSD conclusions were consistent
with previous party platforms and communiques and should not
have been surprising. Radmanovic told the Ambassador that
SNSD had released a similar document before the April 2006
constitutional reform talks, but had proven itself capable of
negotiating to secure a better future for both Bosnia and the
RS (implying that it, therefore, did not need to act on
them). Radmanovic stressed that "aside from a few NGOs and
other groups," no one in the RS questioned that everything
must be done to get Bosnia into NATO and the EU. In that
light, Radmanovic argued that the EU had mismanaged its
Western Balkans policy and should have permitted all
countries in the region to sign a Stabilization and
Association Agreement long ago. Within that framework,
Radmanovic said, Kosovo "would not be a problem," and Bosnia
could "more easily solve its internal issues."


6. (C) Radmanovic argued that the SNSD conclusions were "in
defense of Dayton." He repeatedly stressed SNSD was only
reacting to the behavior of Party for BiH (SBiH) President
Haris Silajdzic and "certain OHR measures that did not
benefit Bosnian citizens." Radmanovic claimed that any talk
of "self-determination or secession" must be considered in
light of Silajdzic's constant assertions that the RS should
be abolished. The international community should expect SNSD
to protect the rights of RS citizens if Silajdzic or other
Federation politicians sought to illegally ignore their
interests, Radmanovic asserted. Regarding OHR, Radmanovic
noted that SNSD had long supported its closure and believed
that "30 percent of the 800 plus imposed measures" were not
in accordance with Dayton. While SNSD would not seek
extra-legal means to return competencies to the entity level,
Radmanovic argued, all parties should seek to examine the
state and entities in terms of their relative capacity to
undertake certain functions. If a certain transferred
competency could be better handled by the entities, it should
be returned, Radmanovic suggested. Radmanovic said that OHR
and the High Representative maintained incoherently that the
Bonn Powers should remain until an undefined point in the
future, but they have failed to explain why OHR and the Bonn
Powers remain necessary. Radmanovic told the Ambassador that
"years" of poor OHR leadership have failed to build trust
among Bosnian parties, impeded democratic development, and
proven unable to create the preconditions for a stable state.
Radmanovic made clear that SNSD had no intention of
renouncing its conclusions.

BRING IN US INVESTMENT
--------------


7. (C) Radmanovic closed the discussion by asking the
Ambassador for assistance in securing US investment in the
RS. Radmanovic told the Ambassador that the only significant
foreign investment in the RS came from Russia, and this
created the misperception that Russia was securing undue
influence in Banja Luka. Radmanovic noted that maintaining
"balance" in foreign investment was critical and increasing
the American business presence would send a message to "the
general public and political leadership" that the US sought

to maintain ties and influence in the region.

COMMENT: A WARNING SIGN
--------------


8. (C) Radmanovic is the more moderate and polished face of
SNSD. He is often prepared to criticize Dodik privately and
stake out a different position when he believes Dodik has
gone too far, as he has on moveable defense property.
Therefore, it is disturbing that Radmanovic so vigorously,
albeit calmly, defended the SNSD Main Board's January 26
conclusions. As we reported previously, the conclusions
amount to a manifesto that, for all intents and purposes,
outlines a plan that would, at best, deeply compromise and
could destroy the Bosnian state (Ref A). Radmanovic's
justifications for SNSD's conclusions are disingenuous at
best. Though Silajdzic has certainly called for the
abolition of the RS, he has not done so publicly for months.
In other words, there has been no immediate Bosniak
provocation. Though Radmanovic is correct that the state
often lacks the capacity to fulfill its obligations, this is
in large part because of constant Bosnian Serb obstruction of
state-level institutions and more recently, what appears to
us like a concerted campaign by Dodik and his SNSD allies to
undermine the state. Finally, Radmanovic's "reassurances"
that there are only a "few NGOs" with a separatist agenda in
the RS is only partially true. As we have reported
previously, and no doubt Radmanovic knows, separatist
sentiment is much more common among Bosnian Serbs, and many
of Dodik's public statements over the last year have tacitly
encouraged it (Ref B).
ENGLISH