BOSNIA - QUINT DISCUSSES SHORT-TERM (TIHIC) AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000226

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARL),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EU BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - QUINT DISCUSSES SHORT-TERM (TIHIC) AND
LONG-TERM (DODIK) CHALLENGES

REF: A. SARAJEVO 204

B. SARAJEVO 149

C. SARAJEVO 95

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: High Representative Lajcak met with Quint
Ambassador on February 5 to discuss two political challenges.
The first was February 2 decision by Sulejman Tihic,
President of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA),to
apparently repudiate the Mostar Agreement on police reform.
Tihic's decision puts Bosnia's near-term prospects for
signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with
the EU at risk. The second was the adoption by Milorad
Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) of a
party manifesto that, for all intents and purposes, outlines
a plan that would, at best, deeply compromise and could
destroy the Bosnian state. Among its most alarming language
is a claim that the Republika Srpska enjoys the right to
"self-determination." Quint Ambassadors agreed that Dodik
presents the more serious long-term challenge. Nonetheless,
they concluded that OHR had few weapons in its arsenal it
could deploy to challenge him over the SNSD conclusions
without potentially provoking a major political crisis just
as we enter the Kosovo end game. Tihic's about face on
police reform has more immediate consequence for Bosnia and
for the international community's strategy of getting the
country onto a self-sustaining path towards Euro-Atlantic
integration. With this in mind, our view is that the Quint
must focus is energies on Tihic. Nonetheless, we cautioned
against giving Dodik, who understands he enjoys a long
rhetorical leash at the moment, a free hand to translate his
rhetoric into concrete action. If that were to happen, we
would have to be prepared to act. END SUMMARY

Tihic Grabs the Headlines, but Dodik is the Threat
-------------- --------------


2. (C) HighRep Lajcak met with Quint Ambassadors on February
5 to discuss the twin political challenges posed by 1) the
SDA's decision to oppose draft police reform legislation, the
adoption of which would allow Bosnia to sign a Stabilization
and Association Agreement (SAA),and 2) the SNSD Main Board's
decision to adopt a set of conclusions on a range of issues,
which all together presents a manifesto to seek the
dissolution of Bosnia (Ref A). (Note: The SNSD conclusions
were signed by all Main Board members, including RS PM Dodik,
Serb Member of the Tri-Presidency Radmanovic, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers Spiric, Minister for Civil Affairs
Novic, and RS National Assembly Speaker Radojcic. End Note)
Lajcak provided the Quint with an OHR's analysis of the SNSD
conclusions (e-mailed to EUR/SCE) and characterized SNSD's
action as the more serious of the two challenges.
Ironically, Dodik's provocations were overshadowed by the
press attention given to Tihic's public comments after the
February 2 Siroki Brijeg meeting, Lajcak said. Tihic
continued to publicly attack the police reform process and
the HighRep today, ridiculing Lajcak as someone who "only
respects rude people" -- a not so thinly veiled reference to
perceptions that Lajcak is prone to, as Tihic put it after
Siroki Brijeg, "cave in" to Dodik's often obstreperous
demands.

Tihic is "Right on Substance," but Wrong on Strategy
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Lajcak and the European Quint Ambassadors conceded at
the beginning of the discussion that Tihic's criticisms of
the proposed police reform legislation (i.e., that it is
"hollow" and that the EU is "essentially giving in to Dodik")
were accurate. Nonetheless, Lajcak argued Tihic had signed
up to the Mostar Declaration, Sarajevo Action Plan and
Laktasi Agreement, stressing that Tihic knew he was trading
"robust police reform" for an "early signing of an SAA." The
French and Italian Ambassadors agreed, underscoring that
"Tihic had given his word to (EU Enlargement Commissioner)
Rehn" to support this approach. The Italian accused Tihic of
"playing a cynical game" by risking Bosnia's European future
in order to score political points with Bosniak voters at the
expense of Haris Silajdzic and his Party for BiH (SBiH). EU
Ambassadors also asserted that it was impossible for the EU
to lower the police reform bar any further; either Tihic

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reversed course, or the SAA would be delayed indefinitely.


4. (C) There was consensus that the Quint need to reach out
to Tihic, explain the stakes (i.e., the SAA),but also
concern that Tihic might respond angrily to "pressure,"
particularly if it appeared that he and the SDA were being
singled out as the source of Bosnia's problems. It was also
noted that Tihic had secured support from the SDA Main Board
for his position before Siroki Brijeg, which meant the Quint
would need to speak with other key SDA figures, such Bakir
Izetbegovic, and Tihic confidant, Mirsad Kebo. The UK
representative proposed that Rehn and Solana send a letter to
all six coalition party leaders encouraging them to finalize
all outstanding SAA-related issues, but noting concern about
"recent political signals." She argued that this might
soften the blow on Tihic. Lajcak agreed to pursue this as
well as "a quiet call from Rehn." (Note: The Ambassador spoke
with Kebo the evening of February 5 and is seeking a meeting
with Tihic, who is currently in Slovenia for his cancer
treatment. End Note).

Dodik's Virtual Immunity
--------------


5. (C) Turning to Dodik and the SNSD Main Board's January 26
conclusions, Lajcak highlighted several points in OHR's
analysis of the document:

-- It claims that the Republika Srpska (RS) has the right to
self-determination.
-- Its constitutional reform proposals were designed to
weaken the state and roll back reforms, specifically
requiring a return to the entities of competencies previously
transferred to the state.
-- It represented a direct written challenge to Annex 10 of
Dayton by stating flatly that SNSD will refuse to abide by
any international community measures interfering with Bosnian
legislative and executive bodies (i.e., the Bonn Powers).
-- Its proposal for electoral reform would reduce non-Serb
representation in the RS.

Quint Ambassador's agreed with Lajcak's that SNSD's
conclusions marked a significant new development in Dodik's
efforts to undermine Bosnian state-level institutions, noting
this was the first time SNSD had put forward its views in a
coherent manner and in an official document.


6. (C) After making his presentation, the HighRep argued he
could not act against the RS, SNSD or Dodik without full
backing from the Quint. In a striking moment of candor, the
HighRep observed that OHR was so weak that "I am not a
HighRep anymore, just an EUSR." The German Ambassador argued
that OHR and the Quint "did not have any real instruments to
bring to bear on Dodik." He explained that Dodik "knew we
will not remove him" and noted that "capitals remain
reluctant to confront Dodik during the Kosovo end game."
With this in mind, he and the Italian Ambassador questioned
the wisdom of reacting to SNSD's conclusions at all. Public
criticism would "only provoke a new debate at the end of
which there was nothing the international community could
do," the German Ambassador said. Lajcak added that the
Russian Ambassador had already told him that his government
would oppose any PIC or SBA statement about the SNSD
conclusions.

Long-Term Consequences
--------------


7. (C) Lajcak agreed that the options for dealing with Dodik,
at least in the short-term, were limited, but cautioned that
Bosniaks might force the international community's hands by
provoking a crisis over Dodik's campaign against the state.
Lajcak reported that the Reis had contacted him over the
weekend to report that "Bosniaks were increasingly anxious
about events in the RS." Bakir Izetbegovic had told OHR on
February 4, "If the international community's policy was to
let the RS carry on in line with Dodik's approach, it should
tell SDA and the Bosniaks. Bosniaks could then draw their
own conclusions from this."


8. (C) Lajcak also stressed that left unaddressed Dodik's
rhetoric and actions would eventually "dissolve the Bosnian

SARAJEVO 00000226 003 OF 003


state." Dodik's rhetorical campaign dates back to 2006,
Lajcak observed, adding, over time comments about the
"artificiality of Bosnia" and "the RS's right to secede" will
have consequences. (Note: A November 2007 IRI poll found that
69 percent of Bosnian Serbs believe maintaining the
sovereignty of the RS is more important than achieving
prosperity and stability within Bosnia. Only 26 percent of
Bosnian Serbs considered prosperity within Bosnia more
important than preserving RS sovereignty. End Note) Lajcak
concluded by noting that Dodik and his SNSD allies have been
more proactive in the last eight months in undermining the
state and preventing it from functioning.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) We share Lajcak's assessment that Dodik's rhetoric and
actions present an increasingly serious challenge to the
Bosnian state, but our Quint colleagues are also right that
there is little, at least in the short-term, we can do about
it. OHR's credibility is almost non-existent. In addition,
as we witnessed in October 2007, Dodik would likely use any
international community action against him or the RS to
provoke a serious political crisis - something everyone
wishes to avoid as we enter the Kosovo end game. Dodik knows
this, and we should expect him to exploit it by continuing to
test the limits of the international community's patience.
An open confrontation right now would also jeopardize our
efforts to resolve defense property issues, which could bear
fruit in the next couple weeks, and complicate efforts to
conclude the SAA quickly. That said, we cannot give Dodik a
free hand between now and Kosovo independence. If he and
other senior RS officially unilaterally "reclaimed"
competencies, withdrew from all state-level institutions and
collapsed the state, or actively encouraged a referendum on
RS independence or RS secession, we would have to be prepared
to act.


10. (C) Tihic's actions have more immediate consequences for
Bosnia - they put the SAA at risk. This would be serious
setback to our strategy of trying to mute Bosnia's
potentially explosive ethnic divisions by submerging them in
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Our European colleagues (except
the German) sometimes have too much faith that signing an SAA
will transform Bosnian politics. It will not. We will
confront the same underlying problems the morning after
signature, and American engagement will remain critical to
moving Bosnia forward. Properly exploited, an SAA could
potentially alter the terms of political debate in Bosnia,
since, as a formal, contractual relationship with the EU, it
would offer the concrete prospect of membership in a club all
Bosnians claim they want to join. Politicians would find it
difficult to walk away from that. All this should make
corralling Tihic our immediate priority.
ENGLISH