Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO204
2008-02-04 19:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - TIHIC BLOCKS POLICE REFORM; DODIK

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #0204/01 0351939
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041939Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7758
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000204 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - TIHIC BLOCKS POLICE REFORM; DODIK
ADVOCATES SELF-DETERMINATION; LAJCAK SEES ELEMENTS OF A NEW
CRISIS

Classified By: Michael J. Murphy. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000204

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - TIHIC BLOCKS POLICE REFORM; DODIK
ADVOCATES SELF-DETERMINATION; LAJCAK SEES ELEMENTS OF A NEW
CRISIS

Classified By: Michael J. Murphy. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Talks between the six major coalition parties
took place in Siroki Brijeg on February 2. High
Representative Lajcak also took part in the meetings. The
talks were intended to consolidate political support for the
work of the police reform working group currently drafting
legislation to implement the Mostar Agreement and allow for
the signing of an SAA this spring. At a contentious press
conference following the talks, Party for Democratic Action
(SDA) President Sulejman Tihic announced that his party could
not support legislation that merely created seven new
state-level police institutions, which lacked authority over
entity police. Alliance of Independent Social Democrat
(SNSD) leader Milorad Dodik accused Tihic of playing politics
with police reform. HighRep Lajcak accused Tihic of
"blackmailing Bosnia" and warned of unspecified consequences.
On February 3, OHR staff told us that Lajcak was "shaken" by
Tihic's position, which Lajcak believes amounts to
repudiation of the Mostar Agreement and could derail the
near-term prospects for a Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA). We were told that Lajcak is also concerned
about conclusions adopted by SNSD at the party's January 26
Main Board meeting. The conclusions (recently translated)
imply that Republika Srpska has the right to
"self-determination," call for the return of several
state-level competencies to the RS, and suggest that the RS
should reconstitute its intelligence service. According to
OHR staff, Lajcak believes that the two events - Tihic's
rejection of the Mostar Declaration and SNSD's decision to
catalogue much of Dodik's more extreme rhetoric in an
official party document - could provide the basis for
another political crisis in Bosnia. He has called for a
meeting of Quint Ambassadors on February 5 to discuss these
issues. END SUMMARY

Siroki Brijeg: All Does Not End Well
--------------


2. (C) On Saturday, February 2, HDZ-1990 President Bozo
Ljubic hosted a meeting of five coalition political parties

(SBiH, SNSD, SDA, HDZ-BiH, HDZ-1990; PDP did not attend),
along with High Representative Lajcak, in Siroki Brijeg to
discuss implementation of the Mostar Agreement and the
possibility of resuming constitutional reform talks.
According to OHR, Ljubic, who along with HDZ-BiH President
Dragan Covic, wanted the discussion to focus mainly on
constitutional reform, tabled a paper on "principles for a
process on constitutional reform," but other party leaders
quickly rejected it, stressing that the time was not right
for a discussion of the issue. Lajcak reportedly
characterized the Ljubic paper as "well meaning" but did not
press the point. One OHR staffer speculated to us that
Lajcak may have seen Ljubic's paper before it was tabled,
noting that the HighRep had worked with Covic and Ljubic on
the Mostar Agreement before the two men presented it as the
"Croat proposal" for resolving police reform. Regardless,
the parties agreed they would not take up constitutional
reform until after an SAA is signed.


3. (SBU) Instead, the six leaders devoted the bulk of their
time in Siroki Brijeg to an unfruitful discussion of police
reform, particularly the legislation being drafted by the
police reform working group that would implement the terms of
the Mostar Agreement. The press conference immediately
following the meeting quickly deteriorated into a public
argument, dramatically underscoring that the meeting had
failed to produce a political consensus on draft legislation.
While the host, Bozo Ljubic, attempted to read a joint
statement, he was interrupted by SDA president Sulejman Tihic
who announced that his party would not support a police
reform model that preserved the existing police structures.
Tihic also derided the creation of state-level police
institutions that have no authority over local police
authorities. Party for BiH President Haris Silajdzic then
attacked Tihic for a lack of commitment to police reform.
Tihic responded angrily stating that by signing the SAA,
Silajdzic will legalize the RS police.


4. (SBU) Dodik initially watched the exchange with silent
amusement but eventually joined the scrum, accusing Tihic of
trying to destroy the Mostar Declaration. He added that
Tihic's opposition was motivated solely by his rivalry with
Silajdzic. Dodik also claimed that Tihic was fabricating a
political crisis in order to achieve extension of OHR's


mandate. Dodik concluded by arguing that police reform
legislation, despite SDA opposition, could be adopted in
parliament with the support of five political parties.

Lajcak Shaken by Tihic's Obstructionism
--------------


5. (U) In subsequent comments to the press, Lajcak asserted
that Tihic was motivated by Bosniak politics and is
blackmailing Bosnia for the sake of parochial interests.
Tihic's refusal to implement the Mostar Agreement placed
party politics is above the interests of the state and would
have consequences, Lajcak added. Lajcak als said that by
claiming the Mostar Agreement was inadequate to qualify
Bosnia for an SAA, Tihic was calling EU Enlargement
Commissioner Olli Rehn a liar and implying that "the EU does
not know what it wants" police reform. Tihic later responded
to Lajcak's comments by asserting that the High
Representative is intimidated by "Dodik and his war against
BiH," adding the HighRep "always caves in" to whatever Dodik
demands.


6. (C) Lajcak's angry public response to Tihic's apparent
repudiation of the Mostar Declaration was a genuine
reflection of his feelings, according to OHR staff. Lajcak
told OHR staff on February 4 that Tihic had "betrayed" his
earlier police reform commitments and had "effectively
derailed the SAA." Lajcak also predicted that it would
require "a lot of pressure" from the international community
to persuade Tihic to alter his now public position rejecting
any police reform legislation that did not provide for new
state-level police structures with authority over entity
police forces. Lajcak said his assessment was based on a
conversation he had in Siroki Brijeg with HDZ-BiH President
Dragan Covic. Covic claimed that Tihic had said that he
(Tihic) "would not allow Dodik to walk away with another
concession" on police reform, claiming, "this is personal."
Lajcak also speculated with his staff that Head of the
European Police Mission General Coppola might be tacitly
encouraging Tihic. At a minimum, Lajcak believes that Tihic
had seen or been given several letters Coppola had sent to EU
officials labeling the Mostar Declaration a "hollow reform."
According to his staff, Lajcak also believes that one of
Tihic's aims may be to block the signing of an SAA prior to
the February PIC, so the PIC would decide to keep OHR open
beyond June 2008.

SNSD's Constitutional Proposal: Just What Is Dodik Up To
-------------- --------------


7. (C) According to OHR staff, Lajcak is also very concerned
about the conclusions reached at the January 26 meeting of
the SNSD Main Board, which OHR had just recently received and
translated. The conclusions spell out the party's platform
on a range of issues, including European integration,
constitutional and police reform. OHR staff characterized the
conclusions as codifying much of Dodik's more extreme
rhetoric over the last several months as official SNSD
policy. For example, in addition to advocating an
"asymmetric federation" and Bosnia's "demilitarization," the
SNSD Main Board suggests that several competencies previously
transferred to the state should be returned to the RS,
including those associated with the High Judicial and
Prosecutorial Council and the Indirect Taxation Authority.
Most disturbingly, in OHR's assessment, is that the
conclusions suggest the RS certainly should have the right to
self-determination. The language on self-determination is
carefully worded, but it could be read as implying the RS
already has the right to self-determination, one OHR staffer
suggested. Finally, SNSD asserts that the RS should have an
internal intelligence service "to protect (its)
constitutional arrangement." One OHR staffer told us that
Dodik's rhetoric and actions (i.e., challenging the
legitimacy of the state, preventing it from functioning)
reminded him of events in Montenegro prior to its bid for
independence. Dodik's aim was to demonstrate that Bosnia
"did not work" and "then seek a divorce" he concluded.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Lajak is reportedly concerned about the confluence of
Tihic's obstructionism on police reform and SNSDs decision
to transform some of Dodik's most exteme rhetoric into
official policy. He has called a meeting of Quint


Ambassadors to discus how OHR, and by implication, the Quint
should respond. We anticipate that he will ask the Quint to
a) put pressure on Tihic to honor his previous commitments on
police reform and support legislation implementing the Mostar
Declaration, and b) support a strong statement from OHR
criticizing SNSD for adopting policies that the HighRep, and
many others at OHR, see as anti-Dayton. According to OHR
staff, Lajcak wants Quint support in advance of doing/saying
anything because he feels that the Quint failed to support
him sufficiently during the end game of the 2007 crisis over
his October 19 measures.
ENGLISH