BOSNIA - S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S OCTOBER

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 001705

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI (WILLIAMSON/VIBUL-JOLLES),EUR
(JONES),AND EUR/SCE (FOOKS/STINCHCOMB)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER BK AG
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S OCTOBER
27-29 CONSULTATIONS ON THE ALGERIAN 6

Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson visited
Sarajevo October 27-29 to discuss the possible transfer to
Bosnia of some of the "Algerian 6" (A-6) group of Guantanamo
detainees. Williamson met with Prime Minister Nikola Spiric,
Minister of Security Tarik Sadovic, Foreign Minister Sven
Alkalaj, Minister of Justice Barisa Colak, and the Director
of the Bosnian Intelligence Service Almir Dzuvo. In all
meetings Williamson encouraged the Bosnians to evaluate each
individual case on its own merits and stressed that the USG
will provide as much information as possible to help the
Bosnian government make its decision. He expressed the hope
that the Bosnians will speed the process by evaluating
possible security guarantee measures at the same time they
deliberate on whether to take back the detainees. On the
whole, Bosnian officials appeared willing to work
constructively with the USG on this issue, but most were
hesitant to predict whether Bosnia would ultimately accept
the detainees. All interlocutors pledged to deal with the
issue discreetly, but several noted that opposition leader
Zlatko Lagumdzia had learned that discussions were taking
place on the A-6 issue and had divulged this during a
parliamentary debate on October 29. Although none of the
interlocutors openly spoke to the press about the subject of
the meeting, several newspapers have run stories claiming to
have reliable information that the resolution of the Algerian
six issue was discussed during Williamson's meetings. END
SUMMARY

Four of the A-6 Eligible for Release
--------------


2. (S/NF) Ambassador Williamson told his Bosnian
interlocutors that the Department of Defense had determined
that four of the so-called "Algerian 6" Guantanamo detainees
who were rendered from Bosnia in 2002 might soon be eligible
for transfer out of Guantanamo. This was under consideration
as part of the ongoing effort to reduce the detainee
population and was based on the continuing assessments of
threats posed by the remaining detainees. (Note: Three of
these detainees-- Muhammed Nechla, Mustafa Ait Idir and
Boudella al-Haj--currently hold Bosnian citizenship. The
fourth, Lakhdar Boumediene, lost his Bosnian citizenship as a
result of a review by a Bosnian Citizenship Review
Commission. The four also all hold Algerian citizenship.
End note.) Williamson said the USG encouraged the Bosnian
government to consider each case on its individual merits and
to deal with each detainee as appropriate. If Bosnia could
accept detainees, the USG would ask for assurances that they
would be treated humanely (Williamson noted that in light of
Bosnia's human rights record, this was not an issue of
significant concern) and that security measures would be put
in place to reduce the chances that they would commit
terrorist acts in the future. These security guarantees
would probably take the form of monitoring by security and
police services and, if permitted by Bosnian law, some
restrictions on international travel.


3. (S/NF) Williamson asked Bosnian security officials to
evaluate possible security measures at the same time as the
government deliberated on whether or not to accept detainees,
so as not to unduly prolong the transfer process. He noted
that the USG would provide all the information it could to
the Bosnians about these cases and that we could facilitate
travel of Bosnian officials if they wanted to interview
detainees before a transfer was implemented. In response to
suggestions from several Bosnian interlocutors, Williamson
said the USG would provide the request for transfer to Bosnia
in writing in the form of a letter or diplomatic note.

Algeria Only Accepts Those Who Want to Return
--------------


4. (S/NF) In response to questions from Bosnian officials as
to whether Algeria would accept any of the detainees,
Williamson noted that when he discussed Guantanamo detainees
with Algerian officials they said they would only accept
Algerian detainees who voluntarily elected to return to
Algeria. Up until now, all A-6 detainees have said they
wanted to return to Bosnia. However, Williamson said that if
Bosnia could not accept particular individuals (for example
Boumedienne because he lost his Bosnian citizenship),this
could serve as a basis for renewing discussions with Algeria.

Harder for Bosnia to Accept a Non-Citizen
--------------


5. (S/NF) All of Williamson's interlocutors said the Bosnian
government would seriously consider the possibility of
transfer, and one said that Bosnia would likely accept some
of the detainees. However, all noted that the decision would
be made by the Council of Ministers, and several alluded to
past difficulties the Council had had in agreeing on a
"roadmap" for dealing with the A-6 issue, in part because of
conflicts between Prime Minister Spiric and Security Minister
Sadovic. Several suggested that Bosnia was less likely to
accept Boumediene than the others because he has lost his
citizenship.

Previous U.S. Representations on the A-6 were Problematic
-------------- --------------


6. (S/NF) In the various meetings with Bosnian officials,
Williamson explained the ongoing court process relative to
the A-6. He indicated that, in the course of the judicial
proceedings, a number of documents which detail discussions
that took place between the U.S. and Bosnian governments in
2002 would become public, as would internal communications
within the USG regarding the A-6. Williamson stated that
certain allegations made against the A-6, and communicated to
the Bosnian government at the time, had never been adequately
substantiated. The Bosnian officials, while recognizing the
post-9/11 environment in which the discussions took place,
said that the U.S. had placed Bosnia in a difficult position
by pushing first for the transfer of these individuals and
now for their return to the country.

Lagumdzia Mentions the A-6 in Parliamentary Debate
-------------- --------------


7. (S/NF) All interlocutors pledged to deal with the issue
discreetly, but several noted that opposition leader Zlatko
Lagumdzia had learned that discussions were taking place on
the A-6 issue and had divulged this during a parliamentary
debate on October 29. Although none of the interlocutors
openly spoke to the press about the subject of the meeting,
several newspapers have run stories claiming to have reliable
information that the resolution of the Algerian six issue was
discussed during Williamson's meetings in Sarajevo.

Meeting With Prime Minister Spiric
--------------


8. (S/NF) Prime Minister Spiric was agitated at the beginning
of his meeting because he had just returned from the
parliamentary session in which opposition leader Zlatko
Lagumdzia divulged that Williamson would be discussing the
A-6 with members of the government. Spiric complained that
Lagumdzia had received this information from members of the
intelligence service (note: Williamson had met the previous
day with Intelligence Service Director Almir Dzuvo. End
note) who were not authorized to disclose this to someone
outside the government. Spiric was particularly upset that
the service had not briefed him or other members of the
government but was communicating with the opposition. Thus,
he was caught unawares in a session broadcast live on
national television.


9. (S/NF) However, Spiric's overall attitude during the
meeting was constructive. He said he was "open" on the A-6
issue, but that he needed more information. He said that
when the six were transferred out the U.S. and Bosnia had
"worked together" and that we would have to do the same now,
but he argued that whatever decision was made about the A-6
would be damaging to Bosnia. If some of the A-6 returned to
Bosnia, he said, "wild stories" would circulate about the
crimes they might have committed. If the A-6 were not
allowed to return, Bosnia would be seen as a country that
violates the rights of citizens (adding that it would be
forgotten that the A-6 might have received citizenship in a
shady way). Spiric said he would ask all ministries to take
a serious approach to this issue, and noted that he
understood the issue needed to be resolved quickly. However,
he argued that Minister of Security Sadovic frequently fails
to find common ground with other ministers and could create
problems in the discussions.

Meeting With Minister of Security Sadovic
--------------


10. (S/NF) Minister of Security Sadovic displayed a
considerable degree of bitterness during his meeting. He
argued that the Bosnian Supreme Court had acquitted the
Algerians but they were arrested anyway, and said the Bosnian
politicians who agreed to transfer the A-6 to U.S. custody

lost the following election in part because of that decision.
He added that because of U.S. pressure at the time, Bosnian
officials were forced to violate their own law in dealing
with these individuals. Sadovic said the Bosnian government
had tried to develop a "roadmap" for the return of the A-6,
but had failed because they could not convince the U.S.
government that members of this group would not pose a
threat. He noted that some members of the A-6 had lost their
citizenship while those who retained it had been determined
by the Bosnian intelligence service to be "threats to
national security." He asked rhetorically how could the USG
ask now that such people be transferred to Bosnia.


11. (S/NF) However, Sadovic became somewhat more constructive
as the meeting went on. He said the Bosnian government was
in general committed to accepting the return of nationals who
reside illegally elsewhere. In addition, if the Bosnian
intelligence service were to find that the detainees with
Bosnian citizenship no longer posed a threat to national
security this would remove a "big barrier" to their return.
He said Algerians who had lost their Bosnian citizenship
should, by the logic of the situation, apply to return to
Algeria. However, he noted that the Bosnian government would
have to check whether the Algerians who lost their
citizenship had exhausted all their appeals on this issue.
He said the Bosnian government had never discussed with
Algerian officials the possibility of the A-6 returning to
Algeria.


12. (S/NF) Regarding security measures for the Algerians if
they were to return to Bosnia, Sadovic was somewhat cynical
of U.S. motives. He said that when this issue was discussed
in the past, U.S. demands for security measures were too
onerous and were inconsistent with Bosnian law. While
continuing to express skepticism, he said that certain steps
could possibly be undertaken including surveillance by the
intelligence service or police, but these measures were
permissible only for a limited time period and with a court
order. Similarly, passports could only be taken from them to
restrict travel on the basis of a court order.

Foreign Minister Alkalaj
--------------


13. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Alkalaj told Williamson that the
Council of Ministers as a whole would make the decision on
this issue with the Foreign Ministry largely serving as a
conduit of information between the U.S. and Bosnian
governments. He said the Council would understand the
urgency of the issue and take it up quickly. He expressed
his personal view that Bosnia would likely take back some of
the Algerian detainees. "The legal status is clear," he
said, and, as a result, Croat and Serb ministers were
unlikely to raise major objections. Alkalaj added that he
had had one general conversation with the Algerian Foreign
Minister about the case in September of 2007. At that time
the Algerian Foreign Minister said that he could, in
principle, accept the possibility of some of the A-6
returning to Algeria.

Justice Minister Colak
--------------


14. (S/NF) Justice Minister Colak stressed that the Council
of Ministers as a group would make the decision on return of
detainees with PM Spiric and Minister of Security Sadovic
playing the biggest roles. Colak did not express strong
views about the case, but noted that the Council of Ministers
had been unable to agree on a "roadmap" for dealing with this
issue in the past, largely, he said, because Spiric and
Sadovic had been fighting over who would take the leading
role on the issue. Like Sadovic, Colak said that a court
would have to make a decision on whether travel restrictions
could be imposed.

OSA Director Dzuvo
--------------


15. (S/NF) The Director of the Bosnian Intelligence Service
(OSA),Almir Dzuvo, said he believed the detainees were
clearly linked to criminal (note: by which he seemed to mean
terrorist. End note) organizations, and he expressed concern
that they would "infect" the Islamic community in Bosnia and
further radicalize it if they returned. However, he pledged
full cooperation if the political decision was made by the
Council of Ministers to accept detainees. Moreover, since it
was now clear that the U.S. would like Bosnia to accept some
detainees, he conveyed a certain sense of inevitability that


it would happen. Dzuvo said the intelligence service would
do what it could to monitor the detainees if they returned.
However, he said it would be difficult to restrict them from
traveling. Dzuvo said he hoped to talk to his counterpart in
the Algerian intelligence service about these cases, but he
expressed skepticism that the Algerians would be willing to
accept any of the A-6 detainees.

Comment
--------------


16. (S/NF) On the whole, Bosnian officials appeared willing
to work with the USG to resolve this issue. This may be in
part because they do not see other alternatives, at least for
those detainees who have Bosnian citizenship. However, the
Council of Ministers was unable to achieve consensus in the
past on how to deal with the detainees, and this issue may
become politicized. Despite Sadovic's embittered questions
directed at the USG during the meeting, he may well become an
advocate for accepting the detainees. He is a strongly
nationalist Bosniak, and has resisted deporting radical
members of the Islamist community here when the security
services have sought to do so. Spiric's ultimate attitude is
harder to predict. Although his attitude in the meeting was
reasonably constructive, he may come under pressure from
fellow Serbs in his party to resist accepting the detainees
in order to paint the Bosniaks as the politicians who are
overly willing to allow the return of "terrorists." In any
case, the issue is unlikely to be resolved quietly-it will
almost certainly attract huge media attention and generate
some bitter political controversies.
ENGLISH