BOSNIA - MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE DOWNWARD POLITICAL TRAJECTORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001593

SIPDIS

EUR/SCE (HYLAND, FOOKS),NSC FOR HELGERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PHUM, KDEM, BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS UNLIKELY TO
CHANGE DOWNWARD POLITICAL TRAJECTORY

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1423 B. SARAJEVO 1518 C. SARAJEVO
1575 D. SARAJEVO 1585

Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. English. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Bosnians in all 141 municipalities and Brcko
District headed to the polls on October 5 to elect their
mayors and municipal councils. The major nationalist parties
-- the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA),the Croat
Democratic Union (HDZ-BiH),and the Serb Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) -- emerged victorious.
Among Bosniaks, Haris Silajdzic, who smashed his SDA rival
Sulejman Tihic in the Presidential race in 2006, suffered a
stinging rebuke in 2008. With SDA's big win, Tihic is now
poised to resume his pre-2006 position as the "big man" in
Bosniak politics, though he will still have to contend with
SDA's restive nationalist wing. Milorad Dodik and his SNSD
now control more than half of the mayoralties in the
Republika Srpska (RS) and have no viable opponents in the RS.
Dodik's post-election rhetoric as well as statements from
other senior SNSD officials suggest that SNSD is not inclined
to alter the course it has been on over the last two years
(i.e., undermining the state) in order to work with a more
moderate Bosniak leadership. Among Croats, Dragan Covic's
win was big enough to severely cripple his more nationalist
HDZ-1990 rivals, but not to kill HDZ-1990 off altogether.
The battle between SDA and HDZ-BiH for the mayoralty of
Mostar may provide an opportunity for HDZ-1990 to revive its
political fortunes. END SUMMARY.

Results Tap Tihic, Covic, and Dodik as Victors
-------------- -

2. (SBU) Bosnian voters headed to the polls on October 5 in
all 79 municipalities in the Federation, all 62 in the
Republika Srpska (RS),and Brcko District. Each municipality
elected a mayor and the delegates to its municipal council,
except Mostar and Brcko, which elected councils whose ruling
coalitions will choose their mayors. Election results are
still preliminary, as absentee ballots -- which were due on
October 5 -- have not yet been counted. However, with the
exception of Srebrenica and possibly Bratunac, where the
as-yet uncounted votes from the Federation and the Diaspora
could secure Bosniak victories (more on the elections in
Srebrenica will be reported septel),we do not expect the
results to shift significantly while the remaining votes are
tallied.

3. (SBU) Voter turnout reached 1,635,000 (roughly 55%),up
from 1,420,000 in the general elections in 2006 (48%).
Preliminary party results are as follows (Note: A two-thirds
majority vote is required to form a government in a
municipality -- a threshold that was not crossed by any party
anywhere. End Note):

a) Party of Democratic Action (SDA):
-- 237,000 votes, no change from 2006
-- 35 mayoralties, up from 33
-- 38 municipal council majorities, down from 46
-- Plurality in Mostar City Assembly

b) Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH):
-- 74,000 votes, down from 215,000 in 2006
-- 4 mayoralties in Federation, up from 2
-- 1 municipal council majority, down from 2

c) Social Democratic Party (SDP):
-- 190,000 votes, up from 143,000 in 2006
-- 10 mayoralties in Federation, down from 11
-- 1 mayoralty in RS, up from 0
-- 11 municipal council majorities, up from 2
-- Plurality in Brcko District Assembly

d) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)-BiH:
-- 90,000 votes, up from 66,000 in 2006
-- 16 mayoralties in Federation, down from 20
-- 15 municipal council majorities, up from 21

e) HDZ-1990:
-- 43,000 votes, down from 49,000 in 2006
-- 4 mayoralties in Federation, up from 2
-- 3 municipal council majorities, up from 0


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d) Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD):
-- 200,000 votes, down from 270,000 in 2006
-- 3 mayoralties in Federation, up from 1
-- 41 mayoralties in RS, up from 17
-- 45 municipal council majorities, up from 14

f) Serb Democratic Party (SDS):
-- 123,000 votes, up from 108,000 in 2006
-- 0 mayoralties in Federation, down from 1
-- 16 mayoralties in RS, down from 32
-- 15 municipal council majorities, down from 35

Bosniaks: Two Thumbs Up for Tradition
--------------

4. (C) Sulejman Tihic's SDA was the clear winner in the
Federation, capturing more than three times the votes of
Haris Silajdzic's SBiH. SDA's triumph resulted in part from
a poorly-constructed and lackluster SBiH campaign (ref A) and
disgruntlement with SBiH's leadership in the municipalities.
Silajdzic's waning popularity over the past two years,
culminating in this election defeat, suggests that voters are
disenchanted with his leadership and do not see him as a
politician who can deliver on his promises. Indeed, SDA
officials are interpreting their party's triumph as heralding
the demise of Haris Silajdzic and SBiH, asserting that the
results show Bosniak voters moving in a progressive,
"non-nationalist" direction. SDA did not run a traditionally
nationalist campaign at the municipal level, but this does
not mean nationalism did not drive SDA voters. As one SDA MP
put, "The most important outside reason (sic) for SDA's
victory was Milorad Dodik." Bosniaks are increasingly
worried about Dodik's intentions, and may have judged that
their wartime "protector" would be better able than Silajdzic
and SBiH to protect their interests.

SDA Victory Cracks Open a Window for Moderation
-------------- --

5. (C) Coupled with post-election backing from the Islamic
community and the popular Bosniak daily Dnevni Avaz, SDA's
victory -- at least initially -- will embolden Tihic to
challenge Silajdzic. Party Vice-President Mirsad Kebo told
us that Tihic is planning to attend the RS National Assembly
(RSNA) session on October 13 and extend an olive branch to
the Serbs, stressing that the RS is an integral part of
Bosnia and that Silajdzic's statements to the UNGA and
Council of Europe (refs B and C) hold no merit. Despite his
good intentions, though, Tihic has demonstrated over the last
two years that he is risk-averse and does not have the full
support of his party. The right wing of SDA, particularly
supporters of Bakir Izetbegovic, will likely continue to
limit Tihic's room for maneuver, and Silajdzic will certainly
accuse Tihic of "accepting less than the Council of Europe
report" (ref C) and cooperating with "those responsible for
genocide," if he tries to steer Bosniak politics back to the
center. Radical messages are likely to continue to resonate
with a Bosniak populace already anxious by Serb anti-Bosniak
diatribes. Once the euphoria of the elections subsides,
then, any enthusiasm Tihic has for bold steps may subside.

Dodik and SNSD Unlikely to Change Course
--------------

6. (C) Even if Tihic overcame opposition from within his
party and weathered the predictable Silajdzic diatribes, its
remains unclear whether Dodik would accept a Tihic peace
offering or reciprocate by moderating his own statements and
actions. In the months prior to the elections, Dodik stopped
making distinctions between Silajdzic and other Bosniak
political leaders. In his September 18 Radio Free Europe
(RFE) interview, Dodik claimed that there were no reasonable
Bosniak interlocutors for him or his party. This rhetoric
did not stop after the elections. Dodik has already
dismissed the idea of cooperating with Tihic, telling
Belgrade media that SDA is a "completely uninteresting party
located in the other part of Bosnia. To me that other part
of Bosnia feels like a foreign country." SNSD Secretary
General Rajko Vasic also underscored in an October 8
commentary that SNSD's post-election agenda would mirror its
pre-election attacks on the state (Ref D).

7. (C) SNSD's election victory effectively crippled its two

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main opponents, quashing any hope that an effective
opposition to Dodik will emerge in the near-term. Although
SNSD did not, as it had hoped, capture the mayoralties in
Bijeljina and Doboj and has only a simple majority in the
municipal councils it won, SNSD more than tripled its
mayoralties and cut the SDS mayoral map in half. In the
areas where he needs it, Dodik can most likely count on
continued support from coalition partner PDP, because --
despite an exchange of threats between Dodik and senior PDP
officials about breaking their coalition in Banja Luka -- PDP
leader Mladen Ivanic is unlikely to challenge Dodik, since he
sees Dodik as someone who can protect him from corruption
charges. SDS is in disarray due in part to widespread
dissatisfaction with Mladen Bosic's leadership, and there is
some quiet talk that his days as party leader are numbered.
Bosic's ouster could portend the resurgence of radical
leadership in the party, to which Dodik would likely respond
by making even stronger appeals to Serb nationalism.

Among Croats, the "New HDZ" Falls Short
--------------

8. (C) Although their mayoral numbers increased from two to
four (including a joint candidate in Ravno with HDZ-BiH),the
elections came as a big shock to HDZ-1990, which had expected
to win at least seven municipalities. The defeat effectively
dashed the party's hopes of emerging in the 2010 general
election as a strong alternative to HDZ-BiH in Croat majority
areas. HDZ-1990 suffered from poorly established party
infrastructure and weak leadership in the cantonal
governments. Its campaign centered on nationalist themes,
particularly calls for a third entity, and on slandering
HDZ-BiH. The party had lost the confidence of voters by
performing poorly in office at the canton level after having
promised in 2006 to "do better" than HDZ-BiH. Finally,
HDZ-1990 lacked the support it enjoyed in 2006 from the
Catholic Church and Croatian PM Ivo Sanader. HDZ-1990's
Central Board plans to convene within 20 days and discuss
Bozo Ljubic's rumored resignation. His solid support base
within the party probably precludes his ouster, but Ljubic
may resign as Minister of Traffic and Communications in order
to focus exclusively on the 2010 elections.

HDZ-BiH Recaptures Croat Hearts
--------------

9. (C) HDZ-BiH secured the largest number of mayoralties and
councils among Croat parties but fell short of recapturing
the dominance it enjoyed prior to HDZ-1990's 2006 split.
Political wrangling between the HDZs cost the Croats three
municipalities in central Bosnia with majority Croat
populations -- Busovaca, Jajce, and Novi Travnik -- where SDA
captured the mayoralties. HDZ-BiH's campaign focused almost
exclusively on the accomplishments of the local governments
and scarcely touched on broader issues such as the "third
entity" idea that Ljubic embraced. Covic, one of the
country's savviest politicians, told the Ambassador on
October 9 that his party's defeat of HDZ-1990 and SDA's
triumph over SBiH might make it possible to form a new
government in the Federation, which excludes both losing
parties and brings in the SDP. Covic the next day publicly
alluded to a Federation government shake up, but there are
difficult obstacles to overcome. Though HDZ-BiH, SDA, and
SDP have the required majorities in both houses of the
Federation to bring down the current government, a new
government would have to be appointed by the Federation
President "in agreement with both Vice Presidents." One of
the current VPs is from SBiH.

Love Could Dim Amid Mostar Loss
--------------

10. (C) Mostar politics could also dim the prospects for a
revival of the pre-2006 partnership between HDZ-BiH and SDA.
The elections in Mostar, the "Croat capital," dealt a major
blow to HDZ-BiH. SDA captured the majority of the City
Assembly positions, with the relatively unknown National
Party of Work for Progress (NSRzB) taking second place, and
HDZ-BiH falling to third, cutting its Assembly representation
in half. If the Assembly elects a Bosniak mayor, as SDA has
argued it should, given the party's Assembly majority,
HDZ-BiH would be seen by many Croats of having "lost the
Croat capital" to the Bosniaks. Such an outcome would

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significantly undermine the party's credibility and hand
HDZ-1990 a desperately needed nationalist issue with which it
could seek to revive its political fortunes. Tihic will
likely be under similar pressure from his right wing to form
a coalition with NSRzB to secure Mostar for the Bosniaks.
Allegations -- and formal appeals to the Central Election
Commission -- that NSRzB paid voters each 100 KM (roughly 71
USD) for their votes probably likely means that the City
Assembly will not move quickly to elect a new mayor. How
Tihic and Covic chose to manage this sticky political issue
could have political implications well beyond Mostar.

SDP Fails to Save the Country from Nationalist Chaos
-------------- --------------

11. (C) Although its turnout increased over the 2006
elections -- and its leaders cast its results as a win for
the party -- SDP fell short of its expected mayoral and
council gains. SDP campaigned heavily on local issues and
hoped to ride the popularity and successful track records of
their mayors to a broader victory, but these factors did not
help them break SDA's stronghold within the Federation. SDP
competed in past years for funding for election projects from
the European Socialist Party and Labor Party, but the Central
Election Commission forbade these links this year, leaving
SDP with far fewer funds than other parties. And "Our Party"
(Nasa Stranka, NS) -- which also bills itself as a
progressive, pro-European, multiethnic party -- almost
certainly ate into the SDP vote. Most importantly, SDP
continue to suffer from stale leadership in Zlatko
Lagumdzija, which has sparked rifts and disenchantment within
both the party and populace. These trends bode ill for SDP's
re-emergence in the coming years as a powerful moderate,
multiethnic alternative to nationalist leaders.

Comment
--------------

12. (C) The outcome of the municipal elections is unlikely to
change the tone of Bosnia's politics or the country's
downward trajectory. The strengthening of Tihic and Covic
and weakening of Silajdzic and Ljubic may open a window of
cooperation for SDA and HDZ-BiH (something we have already
encouraged privately). It may even open a narrow window for
cooperation between those two parties and SNSD. However, an
emboldened Dodik -- who, even after the elections, continues
to spout unnecessary invective at the Bosniaks -- may decide
to close that window. There is no sign that Dodik plans to
end his two-year long campaign against the state and
state-level institutions. In fact, SNSD officials' public
and private comments suggest just the opposite. This will
provide ample fodder for Silajdzic to continue with his
destructive rhetoric and to undermine any attempt by Tihic,
assuming Tihic makes one, to move Bosniak politics back to
the center.
ENGLISH