Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO150
2008-01-25 16:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA- AMBASSADOR AND NATO HQ ENGAGE SILAJDZIC

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1397
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0150/01 0251612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251612Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7723
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0207
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000150 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR FATA AND BEIN
NSC FOR BRAUN
USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA- AMBASSADOR AND NATO HQ ENGAGE SILAJDZIC
AND KOMSIC ON DEFENSE PROPERTY

REF: A. SARAJEVO 129


B. 07 SARAJEVO 2632

C. 07 SARAJEVO 2586

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000150

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR FATA AND BEIN
NSC FOR BRAUN
USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA- AMBASSADOR AND NATO HQ ENGAGE SILAJDZIC
AND KOMSIC ON DEFENSE PROPERTY

REF: A. SARAJEVO 129


B. 07 SARAJEVO 2632

C. 07 SARAJEVO 2586

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On January 24, the Ambassador, NATO HQ Commander US MG
Wightman and NATO POLAD met separately with Presidents Haris
Silajdzic and Zeljko Komsic to continue their outreach with
senior leaders on movable defense property issues. The
delegation urged the Presidents to support the new Ministry
of Defense (MOD) draft transfer agreement on movable property
that would ensure state ownership of all arms and ammunition.
President Komsic indicated his firm support for the measure
and raised concerns about the motivations behind Republika
Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik's efforts to
obstruct the agreement. For his part, Silajdzic noted his
support for the principle of state ownership but questioned
the legality of the agreement and processes used to conclude
it. His position on the issue could present a problem in
resolving the movable defense property concerns before NATO's
Bucharest Summit. End Summary.

ENLISTING SILAJDZIC'S AND KOMSIC'S FOR THE AGREEMENT
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On January 24, the Ambassador, NATO HQ Commander US MG
Wightman and NATO POLAD met separately with Presidents Haris
Silajdzic and Zeljko Komsic to continue their outreach with
senior leaders on movable defense property issues. The
Ambassador presented similar points to those he made at his
January 23 meetings with President Radmanovic and Prime
Minister Spiric. He stressed the importance of resolving the
issue, with all arms and ammunition transferred to state
ownership, well in advance of NATO's Bucharest Summit (Ref
A). The NATO HQ presented both Silajdzic and Komsic the new
MOD-proposed draft transfer agreement for their review and
requested the Presidents' support for the measure.


SILAJDZIC EMERGES AS NEW OBSTACLE
--------------


3. (C) While stating that securing NATO membership was his
highest priority, Silajdzic asserted that the issue of
movable defense property touched on other important
"principles that had to be reconciled." Silajdzic told the
Ambassador and NATO officials that the July 2007 political
agreement was not made "in accordance with the law," and he
suggested that certain provisions of the Law of Defense also
were "illegal." Silajdzic deferred to his Chief of Staff,
Nura Pinjo- Zimic, to explain his concerns. Pinjo-Zimic told
the delegation that the State Succession Agreement of the
Former Yugoslavia should govern the defense property
transfer. That agreement, which Bosnia had ratified, stated
that all property of the former Yugoslavia belonged to the
state of Bosnia's he said. In this context, Pinjo-Zimic
explained, defense property should already be considered
under full state ownership, which meant that the state and
entity Prime Ministers had no legal standing to develop a
separate political or technical agreement arranging an
ownership transfer.


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the State Succession
Agreement did not stipulate how successor states to
Yugoslavia divided up property among their own internal
administrative organizations. The Ambassador again
emphasized that both the July political agreement and
proposed MOD movable property transfer plan were entirely
consistent with provisions of the Law on Defense, and
stressed that in practical and political terms the proposed
agreement gave Silajdzic exactly what he claimed to want:
state ownership of movable defense property. Silajdzic
responded that his objections really were "not about guns but

SARAJEVO 00000150 002 OF 002


the principle of state preservation." He said he found it
difficult to support any agreement that seemed to recognize
that legal authorities and competencies of the state and
entities "were at the same level" and by extension codified
the existence of the RS. The Ambassador responded that this
seemed an illogical assumption with regard to defense
property, as no state role existed for defense prior to the
US- brokered defense reform and corresponding constitutional
amendments in 2005, and that the entities indisputably were
responsible for this competency before then. Silajdzic
seemed unmoved by the logic of this argument, but nonetheless
undertook to review the MOD draft agreement and be "flexible
in finding a practical solution that does not break the law."

KOMSIC: BEHIND THE DEAL; WORRIED ABOUT DODIK
--------------


5. (C) Komsic stated that he fully supports the MOD proposal
and welcomed US leadership to move it forward. Komsic said
that, above all, Bosnia needed to do everything possible to
secure a future as part of NATO and continued delays in
resolving the movable property issues were a roadblock in
this process. Komsic said that, initially, he had
reservations about the legitimacy of the July political
agreement and about allowing the entities to share revenues
for future arms sales, but he now supported both as the only
means to resolve the issue. Komsic said he had also decided
against filing criminal charges against the three Prime
Ministers for "stealing state resources" and would not engage
in public sparring with Dodik, Silajdzic or anyone else on
the issue. (Note. In a previous meeting with Komsic on
January 18, we urged him to refrain from both of these
counterproductive actions. End Note.) Komsic also raised
Dodik's motivations in blocking a deal. Coupled with the RS
Prime Minister's recent hostile remarks about the Armed
Forces, Komsic said he believed Dodik was actively trying to
undermine state defense institutions in advance of Kosovo
independence. Komsic suggested that Dodik would continue to
call into question the competency and authority of the state
after Kosovo as well.

COMMENT: SILAJDZIC TO NEEDLESSLY OBSTRUCT?
--------------


6. (C) Siljadzic's legal objections are without merit. The
State Succession Agreement has little legal bearing on
movable defense property, and the process for resolving this
issue advanced by NATO HQ, the MOD and the entity leadership
is fully consistent with the Law on Defense. As the
Ambassador pointed out, the MOD draft proposal meets all of
Silajdzic's stated goals and any efforts to block the deal
would constitute obstructionism. We plan to press ahead with
our strategy to gain state and entity support for the
agreement and have it submitted to the state and entity
parliaments for approval in the following weeks. We will
also work to keep Silajdzic from further politicizing the
issue on "ideological grounds" (i.e. his unwillingness to
reach any compromise that explicitly or implicitly
acknowledges the RS),but, as with police reform, there is no
guarantee Silajdzic will put aside his rejectionist politics
to embrace a practical outcome that advances his broader
agenda. End Comment.
ENGLISH