Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO149
2008-01-25 16:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - THE RS AND KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE; EXPECT

Tags:  BK PGOV PREL PINR 
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VZCZCXRO1390
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0149/01 0251610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251610Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7721
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000149 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - THE RS AND KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE; EXPECT
RHETORICAL FIREWORKS (AT LEAST)

REF: A. 07 SARAJEVO 2316


B. 07 SARAJEVO 292

Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. English. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000149

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - THE RS AND KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE; EXPECT
RHETORICAL FIREWORKS (AT LEAST)

REF: A. 07 SARAJEVO 2316


B. 07 SARAJEVO 292

Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. English. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Bosnian Serbs are following developments in
Kosovo closely and see Kosovo as an integral part of both
Serbia and their own national identity. Many also believe
that if Kosovo Albanians have the right to become
independent, the Republika Srpska (RS) should also have the
same right, a sentiment that is likely to grow once Kosovo
declares its independence. The RS government has made clear
it will oppose any unilateral declaration of independence by
Kosovar Albanians and will not accept a near-term recognition
by Bosnia of an independent Kosovo. RS government leaders,
including RS PM Milorad Dodik, have told us privately they
will not tolerate unrest resulting from Kosovo independence,
and we do not expect any significant violence in the wake of
an independence declaration. Nonetheless, public rhetoric
from the RS, particularly comments by Dodik, has served to
inflame, rather than moderate RS public opinion in the past.
For more than a year, Dodik has implied direct linkages
between Kosovo independence and the status of the RS. Given
this track record, we should anticipate similar statements,
perhaps impulsive, perhaps deliberate, from Dodik after
Kosovo declares independence. These comments could fuel
Bosnian Serb sentiment for RS independence. END SUMMARY

Kosovo in the RS
--------------


2. (C) Bosnian Serbs in the RS are following events in Kosovo
closely. Media outlets feature daily reports about Kosovo,
with a particular emphasis on the alleged suffering of
Kosovar Serbs (Ref A). Although most have never been to
Kosovo, Bosnian Serbs view Kosovo as the cradle of Serb
history, culture and national identity. Many also have
highly negative views of Kosovar Albanians. There is little
consideration in RS public discourse of the historical
developments that contributed to the Kosovo status question.

Few Bosnian Serbs are willing to acknowledge the consequences
of Milosevic regime policies in Kosovo, and when they do,
they often characterize them as a legitimate response to what
they believe was Kosovo Albanian "terrorism."

Kosovo Independence As Precedent
--------------


3. (C) Still, Bosnian Serbs focus more on Kosovo's
independence as a potential precedent for the RS than they do
on independence's implications for their cultural, historic
and national identity. Most Bosnian Serbs tell us that if
Kosovar Albanians have the right to become independent from
Serbia, then the RS should be able to declare independence
from Bosnia. Political commentators critical of U.S. support
for Kosovo independence often accuse the international
community of maintaining double-standards -- allowing
independence to the Albanians but denying it to the RS. Some
political commentators have even gone so far as to publicly
claim that the RS should be allowed to proclaim independence
if Kosovo declares independence.

Dodik Burns The Kosovo Candle At Both Ends
--------------


4. (C) Though RS politicians have long condemned all calls
for an independent Kosovo, senior RS and Bosnian Serb
officials, including RS PM Dodik, Bosnian Serb member of the
Tri-Presidency Radmanovic, and Chairman of the Council of
Ministers Spiric, have privately assured us that they will
take a "constructive approach" on Kosovo. They have also
pledged to refrain from making it a domestic political issue.
Dodik told us privately on several occasions that although
he cannot support Kosovo,s independence, he will preserve
peace and stability in the RS. He has also signaled publicly
that he would not tolerate a violent response within the RS
to a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.


5. (C) Dodik's public rhetoric on Kosovo has not always
matched his private assurances to us and senior USG
officials, however (e.g., Dodik's December 4, 2007 commitment
to A/S Fried to publicly encourage Kosovar Serbs to stay in
Kosovo was followed by public comments suggesting that

SARAJEVO 00000149 002 OF 002


partition was the best solution for Kosovo). Though Dodik
has never directly linked RS independence to Kosovo
independence, for more than a year, he has regularly implied
such a connection. It required a clear, stern warning from
the U.S. for Dodik to end a spate of unconstructive comments
at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 (Ref B).
Comments by Dodik linking the RS and Kosovo resumed in August
2007, and during the height of the political crisis over the
HighRep's October 19 measures, Dodik implied several times
that it would be hard to explain why Kosovo independence was
not a precedent for the RS.

Warning: Do Not Make Us Recognize Kosovo
--------------


6. (C) Other Bosnian Serb officials, including Radmanovic and
Spiric, have been more responsible than Dodik in their public
comments about Kosovo. They and other Bosnian Serb
officials, have warned publicly and privately that the RS
would never recognize a unilateral declaration of
independence by Kosovo. They have also repeatedly urged
international community representatives not to push Bosnia to
recognize Kosovo. Our understanding is that such a decision
would have to be taken by the Tri-Presidency; something
Radmanovic would certainly oppose. If the other members of
the Presidency chose to force the issue by "outvoting" him,
Radmanovic would probably invoke RS vital national interests
and send the issue to the RS National Assembly where the
decision could be vetoed.

Violence Unlikely
--------------


7. (C) Although most Bosnian Serbs are often passionate about
Kosovo, this does not mean large numbers would mobilize to
oppose independence, either by going to Kosovo or engaging in
violent protests in the RS. The RS electorate, like much of
the Bosnian electorate, is generaly apathetic, and more
focused on issues of immediate impact to their daily lives,
such as increasing prices. Nonetheless, Kosovo's
independence will likely be accompanied by smaller scale
rallies, led by "patriotic" organizations and NGOs in the RS,
along with a media frenzy of special programs and round
tables. There will also certainly be a continuation of
ongoing humanitarian aid collections for Kosovo Serbs. Any
violence against Kosovo Serbs associated with an independence
declaration would elicit a proportionally stronger reaction
in the RS.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The scale of the public response in the RS will depend
to a large degree on Dodik. We believe he is sincere in
wishing to avoid violent reactions within the RS to Kosovo
independence, but he certainly has the power and popularity
to stoke a nationalist response for his own political
purposes. He may decide to downplay the issue rhetorically,
but we cannot be certain. Dodik is often impulsive, and even
if his aim is not to fan the flames of nationalism, his
propensity to shoot from the hip may lead to this outcome.
Dodik might also seek to deliberately ratchet up political
tensions over Kosovo in order to intimidate the HighRep and
international community into acquiescing on other elements of
his agenda. Of course, Dodik may not yet have decided how
"to play Kosovo." Dodik the tactician is fundamentally a
populist. He has a poor track record of resisting popular
demands and a well established history of stoking public
opinion, which he then uses to jusifty his own political
positions. In the context of Kosovo and in an RS where
Bosnian Serbs would prefer, if given the choice, a future
outside Bosnia, this is potentially dangerous.
ENGLISH