Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO1476
2008-09-16 15:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN WAR CRIMES

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS KCRM BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4044
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1476/01 2601538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161538Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8943
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO BK PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001476 

SIPDIS

EUR (JONES),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),S/WCI
(WILLIAMSON, VIBUL-JOLLES),INR (MORIN),NSC (BRAUN); OSD
(BEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS KCRM BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN WAR CRIMES
PROSECUTION

REF: A) SARAJEVO 1221 B) SARAJEVO 1087 C) 07 SARAJEVO
2073 D) 07 SARAJEVO 2555 E) SARAJEVO 1993

Classified By: Michael J. Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001476

SIPDIS

EUR (JONES),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),S/WCI
(WILLIAMSON, VIBUL-JOLLES),INR (MORIN),NSC (BRAUN); OSD
(BEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS KCRM BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN WAR CRIMES
PROSECUTION

REF: A) SARAJEVO 1221 B) SARAJEVO 1087 C) 07 SARAJEVO
2073 D) 07 SARAJEVO 2555 E) SARAJEVO 1993

Classified By: Michael J. Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Earlier this month, the State Prosecutor's
Office publicly debuted its demographic analysis and new case
selection criteria for war crimes cases. The demographic
analysis identifies the timeframes and places in which
significant numbers of people were killed during the
1992-1995 war, while the new case selection criteria ensure
that the office's limited resources will be focused on the
most egregious war crimes cases. This new approach was
something that we and others in the international community
had been pressing for and which Ambassador Williamson praised
in a September 15 editorial that was published in several
local papers. Unfortunately, victim groups -- both Bosniak
and Serb -- reacted negatively to the case selection criteria
publicly despite signaling private approval earlier.
Separately, the State Prosecutor's Office also completed a
partial draft of a National War Crimes Strategy -- something
that a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) insisted must be
adopted by the Bosnian government. Not surprisingly, the
Republika Srpska (RS) Ministry of Justice rejected the
partial draft's recommendation to extend the international
presence at the State Prosecutor's Office and the State Court
beyond 2009. Other stakeholders, including some within the
international community, were critical of the partial draft
as well. The problems associated with the draft suggest that
it, like state property and Brcko, could be a difficult PIC
objective to meet, increasing pressure from some quarters to
accept a lowest common denominator product rather than a
strategy that advances our war crimes agenda here. END
SUMMARY

State Prosecutor's Office Unveils New Approach to War Crimes

-------------- --------------


2. (U) During early September, the State Prosecutor's
Office held presentations in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar,
Tuzla, and Brcko in which it publicly unveiled its
demographic analysis of war crimes committed in Bosnia during
the 1992-1995 war. The analysis identifies the timeframes
and places in which large numbers of people were killed both
in absolute terms and as a proportion of local populations.
The office also provided general information about its case
selection criteria -- standards that local judicial officials
and the international community had been pressing the office
to develop for more than two years -- which are largely based
on the demographic analysis. Acting Chief Prosecutor Milorad
Barasin and David Schwendiman, the head of the Special
Department for War Crimes, said that their office is using
the new case selection criteria to ensure that it is giving
priority to the most egregious war crimes cases.

Victim Groups Blast the New Approach
--------------


3. (U) The new approach to war crimes prosecution was
praised by prosecutors nation-wide, but was criticized by
victims groups. The Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,
the most high-profile victims group, walked out of the State
Prosecutor's Office's September 5 press conference in
Sarajevo. They accused the State Prosecutor's Office of
trying to ensure that an equal number of Bosniaks, Croats,
and Serbs are tried by the State Court, despite the fact that
the overwhelming majority of victims were Bosniak (and by
implication that the overwhelming majority of perpetrators
were Serbs). The Mothers also accused the State Prosecutor's
Office of putting aside more than 800 cases that were
returned to Bosnia by the ICTY. Victims groups from the
Republika Srpska charged that, in unveiling its new approach,
the State Prosecutor's Office was essentially admitting that
it had failed to prosecute cases involving Serb victims.

Reactions of the Prosecutor's Office
--------------


4. (C) Contacts at the State Prosecutor's Office told us
privately that they were surprised at the reactions of the
victims groups, particularly the Mothers of Srebrenica, who
they said allegedly had "staged" the September 5 press

SARAJEVO 00001476 002 OF 003


conference walkout. Our contacts maintained that the group's
leadership had been fully briefed on the new approach to war
crimes prosecution and had privately expressed their support
before the official roll out. The State Prosecutor's Office
responded by issuing a press release on September 11, stating
that the ethnicity of the alleged perpetrator has no bearing
in its decisions to investigate and prosecute war crimes
cases. In an interview the same day, Schwendiman elaborated
that his office was pursuing a victim-based approach, and was
investigating and prosecuting the most egregious war crimes
committed against all ethnicities. He also explained that
there had been some work done on the cases returned to Bosnia
by the ICTY, but, that many of these cases were not ready for
prosecution. On September 15, Adil Osamovic, RS Vice
President and member of the Bosniak Party for Democratic
Action (SDA),accused the State Prosecutor's Office of
adopting the new approach in response to RS pressure to
investigate and prosecute more cases involving Serb victims.

The National War Crimes Strategy: Growing Problems
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Meanwhile, the State Prosecutor's Office is also
continuing its work on a draft National War Crimes Strategy,
one of three milestones in the broader rule of law objective
set by the PIC in February for OHR's closure. To date, the
office has completed six out of thirteen planned chapters of
a strategy that is focused on prosecution efforts. The
partial draft has been circulated to members of a working
group chaired by Barasin and to other stakeholders for
comment. The working group is supposed to revise the first
half of the draft while the State Prosecutor's Office works
on the second half. Contacts at the State Prosecutor's
Office have told us they are being pressured by OHR and
others to finish the job quickly. We have continued to
underscore the message delivered to the HighRep by Ambassador
Williamson during their July 11 exchange in Sarajevo: the
U.S. wants meaningful implementation of the PIC rule of law
objective and the international community should not
sacrifice substance for speed on the war crimes strategy.


6. (C) Preliminary reactions to the draft suggest that a
number of stakeholders -- including OHR, OSCE, the BiH
Ministry of Justice, the RS Ministry of Justice, and the
State Court -- find the partial draft problematic. Chief
among the complaints are the lack of information about the
processing of war crimes cases in the entities and the
omission of costs associated with war crimes prosecution, the
number of war crimes cases, a description of timeframes and
resources needed to process them, and a listing of actors and
responsibilities. OHR and OSCE also questioned whether it
was appropriate to include extending the presence of
international secondees past 2009 in the strategy. Notably,
opposition to extending the secondees was one of a few
substantive comments submitted by the RS Ministry of Justice.
The Ministry argued that the departure of the internationals
by 2009 would allow nationals to prove their expertise in
handling difficult cases and to establish trust among all
peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some members of the
working group have anonymously leaked their concerns about
the draft. The September 8 edition of Dnevni Avaz carried a
quote from a working group member, that the draft was a
"disastrous document, which does not resolve anything."
State Court President Meddzida Kreso went a step further and
unhelpfully submitted a competing draft national war crimes
strategy to the working group. (Note: Some OHR staffers
believe that Kreso's is a better document. End Note)

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The State Prosecutor's Office's new case selection
criteria are a welcome milestone for war crimes prosecution
in Bosnia. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, the
reactions of victims groups have marred what should have been
a good news story for the State Prosecutor's Office. The
State Prosecutor's Office may have inadvertently hurt its own
cause by designing a roll out strategy that underestimated
the degree to which victims groups were prepared to play
politics in an election year with the issue, despite
expressing support in private. Official RS opposition to
extending the secondees is another unfortunate, but not

SARAJEVO 00001476 003 OF 003


unexpected, development -- though the RS Ministry of Justice
position runs counter to private comments Dodik made to the
Ambassador in which he said that he would support extending
the presence of secondees working on war crimes. The RS
position underscores the uphill battle we face in securing an
extension for the secondees. Finally, the apparent problems
with the National War Crimes Strategy suggest that state
property and Brcko may not be the only PIC objectives whose
resolution could be complicated. Our challenge will be
two-fold: getting the HighRep to focus on the issue, while at
the same time, ensuring that he resists the temptation to
accept a lowest common denominator outcome that undermines
our war crimes agenda in Bosnia.
ENGLISH