BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL FIZTGERALD'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001417

NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION

NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL FITZGERALD, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN, MCLANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL FIZTGERALD'S
SEPTEMBER 10-11 VISIT TO SARAJEVO

REF: A. SARAJEVO 479

B. SARAJEVO 569

Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Despite Bosnia's having achieved formal
progress in its path toward candidacy for the EU and NATO,
the political situation in Bosnia has not improved, and in
some ways it has continued to deteriorate since your January
visit. Political leaders continue to engage in a
destabilizing dialogue among themselves and focus their time
and energy on the issues that divide the country rather than
on those that could bring it together and move it forward.
Defense reform remains a bright spot, however, but much of
the progress we have achieved over the last several months
(i.e., moveable defense property agreement; a smooth general
officer rotation) has required robust U.S. and NATO
engagement. While you will want to compliment leaders on the
success of defense reform so far, you also want to stress
that much more needs to be done, particularly reaching
agreement on immoveable defense property. You will also want
to caution that Bosnia is only at the beginning of the road
to NATO membership, a membership that must be earned by
implementing the reforms necessary to ensure Bosnia is a
productive member of the Alliance. Your trip comes in the
wake of the decision to replace the U.S. General at NATO HQ
with a European. With this in mind, you will want to
reassure anxious interlocutors of the continuing U.S.
commitment to Bosnia's security. Finally, you should thank
senior officials for Bosnia's decision to expand its modest
deployment to Iraq.

Political Climate Continues to Deteriorate
--------------


2. (C) Since your January visit, the political climate in
Bosnia has continued to deteriorate. Bosnia's June 16
signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the
EU provided only a brief respite from nationalist
name-calling among Bosniak, Serb, and Croat politicians.
Politicians could have seized upon the July 21 arrest of
Radovan Karadzic to advance reconciliation here, but instead
sought to exploit it to advance their narrow, nationalist
political agendas. (Perhaps the best example is the
glass-empty complaint by Bosniak Tri-Presidency member
Silajdzic that, though Karadzic under arrest and Milosevic
dead, their "genocide-based project" -- the Republika Srpska
-- remains.) With the approach of the October municipal
elections Bosnia's political leaders have further ratcheted
up their nationalist rhetoric: the Serbs speculating about
Republika Srpska (RS) independence; the Croats openly calling
for creation of a third entity; and the Bosniaks advocating
constitutional reforms that would abolish the RS. Not
surprisingly, in this environment there is little scope for
politicians to reach meaningful agreements that would advance
Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. As a consequence, the
reform process, including on immoveable defense property, has
stalled.

Defense Reform: Impressive Progress, But Much More Work
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Defense reform remains one of the biggest success
stories in Bosnia since Dayton. Since abolishing the two
entity-level militaries and ministries of defense and
creating a single state institution in their place in 2005,
Bosnia has taken the first steps to create a unified,
effective military. The government has developed a clear and
direct command and control structure, and with active U.S.
support and engagement, a legally consistent and transparent
way to manage the transition of the Joint Chief of Staff (Ref
A). The new state-level institutions met the conditions for
PfP membership in 2006 and for an Intensified Dialogue in
April 2008. Bosnia,s intra-governmental NATO Commission
will have just finished its Intensified Dialogue "kick-off"
meeting with officials in Brussels the day you arrive in
Sarajevo. Nonetheless, there remains much work to be done --
a point you will want to stress with your Bosnian
interlocutors.

Property Issues Remain Critical
--------------


4. (C) Among other things, the Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces must still implement the political agreement on
moveable defense property reached in February -- again only
after robust U.S. and NATO engagement -- by selling, donating
or destroying excess weapons and ammunition (Ref B). Despite
the agreement and clear practical advantages, brigade
commanders are reluctant to consolidate stored weapons or
ammunition -- instead, excess munitions have remained where
they had lain as property of the entity armies. An agreement
on immoveable property is also necessary to allow the Armed
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) to sell excess real
estate and free its forces from the taxing burden of guarding
excess sites. It is also, at U.S. insistence, one of the
five objectives set by the Peace Implementation Council as a
pre-condition for closing the Office of the High
Representative.


5. (C) Although a political agreement was made among entity
and state prime ministers in July,2007 which aimed to reolve
the immoveable defense property issue, the issue has not been
resolved. Unfortunately, the immovable defense property issue
has become a proxy for an existential debate about the nature
of the Bosnian state between Serbs and Bosniaks. The Serbs,
led by RS PM Dodik, who is loathe to accept a state presence
in the RS, insist that all immoveable property belongs to the
entities, though he claims he is prepared to allow the state
usage rights. The Bosniaks, led by Bosniak member of the
Tri-Presidency Silajdzic, who is loathe to acknowledge the
very existence of the RS, insist that all property already
belongs to the state. During your meetings with the senior
Bosnian leaders, you will want to stress the importance to
Bosnia,s NATO aspirations of approving a transfer agreement
on immoveable property by state and entity governments that
meets the needs the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces.

NATO Aspirations: Substance Matters
--------------


6. (C) Most Bosnians believe NATO membership is absolutely
necessary for their country's long-term peace and prosperity,
and many believe it within reach. The government's stated
objective is a Membership Action Plan (MAP) by NATO's next
summit, and some are hoping for an invitation to join by that
time. This overly optimistic prognosis is indicative of a
broad lack of understanding of the implications and
requirements of NATO membership. As a result, we are
confronted with the delicate task of keeping the Bosnians
motivated, while simultaneously injecting a dose of realism
into the discussions. There has been little public
discussion about what the path forward entails, particularly
the necessity of reform across the board, including in
civilian institutions. Some, including several (mainly
Bosniak) politicians, believe Bosnia is owed NATO membership
because of what they perceive as the international
community's failure to prevent the tragedies of the 1992-1995
war. You will want to underscore to your interlocutors that
NATO membership is earned, not gifted, and that this requires
a sustained commitment to reforms across the board.

America's Commitment to Bosnia
--------------


7. (C/NF) Despite the signing of the SAA, many Bosnians
remain skeptical about Europe's commitment to the country.
This anxiety reflects Europe's record during the 1992-1995
war, notably its association with UNPROFOR, erratic European
leadership in other areas (e.g., police reform),and
widespread perceptions that EUFOR is a weak reed. As a
consequence, Bosnians, particularly on defense and security
issues, look to the U.S. for leadership and worry that the
U.S. will disengage. Though the Bosnian government has not
yet been officially informed of the decision to replace
General Wightman as the Commander of NATO HQ with a European,
most of your interlocutors are aware of it, and several may
raise their concerns about it with you. With this in mind,
you will want to emphasize that the U.S. commitment to
Bosnia's security is enduring. You can also underscore that
we plan to remain engaged and visible even as our permanent
foot-print shrinks. You might cite the September 16-18 visit
of U.S.S. Roosevelt to Neum and the September 2009 NATO PfP
Exercise Combined Endeavor in Banja Luka as examples.

Bosnia and Iraq
--------------


8. (C) Our bilateral security relationship with Bosnia is
strong. Bosnia has deployed eight platoon rotations of an
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) unit to Iraq since 2005,
and just deployed a new multi-ethnic platoon-plus of 49
infantry soldiers to Iraq in mid-August. We have successfully
pressed the Bosnians to ensure that all overseas deployments
be multi-ethnic, and thus serve as a positive model for the
future of the AFBiH-- a small, niche capable, NATO
inter-operable and completely integrated force focused on
providing support for international missions. Political
support for the Iraq deployment has solidified, particularly
after all three members of the Presidency visited the troops
in May 2007, and we expect authorization for continued
deployment of the EOD to remain routine. Looking forward, we
will push for BiH to deploy a multi-ethnic company to Iraq or
Afghanistan, which, because of the need to train a reserve
and a follow-up company, would effectively create an
integrated battalion in the BiH Armed Forces.
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