LEVERAGING LEBANON,S DIASPORA FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SAO PAULO 000542

SIPDIS

NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE, ELLIOT ABRAMS, NIC RAMCHAND, MEAGHEN
MCDERMOTT, GREG GATJANIS
STATE S/P FOR DAVID GORDON
STATE NEA FOR DAVID WELCH, JEFF FELTMAN
EMBASSY BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR SISAN, DCM GRANT
LEBANON DESK FOR CHRISTINE LAWSON, MATT IRWIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2023
TAGS: PGOV PHALANAGE PARTY PINR PREL KISL LE BR
SUBJECT: LEVERAGING LEBANON,S DIASPORA FOR
DEMOCRACY/DEEPENING LOCAL CONTACTS

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Classified By: Classified by Econpol Chief James B. Story for Reasons 1
.4 B,C


1. (C) This message contains an Action Request. See
Paragraph 12.

Summary:


2. (C) Brazil's extensive Lebanese Diaspora, the largest
such community in the world, contains important, influential
people who want to work with the USG to help the cause of
democracy in Lebanon, a position made evident during the
9/24-26 visit of Jared Cohen (S/P) and Janine Keil (INR) to
Sao Paulo. The visit also made clear that an appreciation of
the local Lebanese Brazilians' ties to their ancestral
homeland strongly enhances our outreach to this influential
local ethnic and economic group. Brazil's Lebanese community
offers the possibility for a powerful "two-fer," a local
group that can reinforce Middle Eastern democracy and that is
influential, in its own right, in Brazil. Brazil could
become a model for Diaspora-mobilization for democracy in the
Middle East and Muslim outreach in WHA, adding important
transnational aspects to our efforts at Transformational
Diplomacy. End Summary.

Cohen and Keil Visit Sao Paulo


3. (C) Jared Cohen (S/P) and Janine Keil (INR) visited Sao
Paulo, Brazil September 24-26. They met with a variety of
representatives -- Christian, Jewish and Muslim -- of
Brazil's ethnic Lebanese community. Among the Lebanese
Brazilians who met Cohen and Keil were: Joseph Sayah,
Lebanon's Consul General; Sheik Jihade Hamade of the World
Assembly of Islamic Youth (WAMY, Sunni); Berty Tawil and
Ernesto Chayo (Banco Safra); Alfred Cotait (Secretary of
International Relations for Sao Paulo City Hall); Guilherme
Mattar (Cotait's Chief of Staff); Suheil Yammout (Head of the
Lebanese March 14 Movement and representative of Saad Hariri
in Brazil); Mohammed Zoghby (President of the Muslim
Federation of Brazil); Fouad Naime (journalist, editor of the
magazine "Carta do Libano," representative of Phalangist and
Lebanese Forces); Salim Schahin (businessman and banker,
participant in the Abraham Path Project); and Naji Nahas
(businessman). The flagship event of the trip was a cocktail
organized by the Lebanese Consul
General (CG) at his residence on 9/25, where he invited a
variety of Lebanese-Brazilian interlocutors to meet with
Cohen and Keil. This was supplemented by a visit to a local
mosque as well as a series of private meetings with Banco
Safra Officials, leaders of the Future Movement, and
Lebanese-Brazilian businessman and billionaire Naji Nahas at
the latter's residence.

The Community: Broad, Deep, Diverse, and Selectively Engaged


4. (C) Brazil's Lebanese Diaspora reflects the diversity of
its country of origin. As a rough guide, Brazil's ten
million persons of Lebanese descent (many of them second and
third generation) are 90 percent Christian. The remaining
ten percent is 9-to-1 Sunni/Shia. According to those
interviewed, Brazil's ethnic Lebanese are divided along both
generational and religious lines into three general groups:

--The Shia (approximately 160,000 according to the Lebanese
CG). The Lebanese-Brazilians interviewed (none of whom were

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Shia) said that the Shia in Brazil are usually
first-generation immigrants not well-integrated into
Brazilian society. They generally speak little Portuguese
and sympathize with Hezbollah, likely even those who do not
publicly voice their support for the group. The Shia
maintain a close partisan identification with Lebanese
politics and many intend to return. There are anecdotal
reports, (which have not been verified-NFI),that they
receive financial help from the Iranian Embassy in Brazil,
including funds distributed to young Shia to start businesses.

--The second, third, and fourth generation immigrants,
majority March 14-oriented Christians, but also a significant
number of Sunni Muslims. (Note: The March 14 Movement or
March 14 Alliance refers to Lebanon's 2005 Cedar Revolution,
when Lebanese citizens opposed to Syria's occupation of their
country rose up in protest against the occupiers following
the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri on 2/14/05. End Note.) This group makes up the vast
majority of the Diaspora. Beyond a shared hope for a
peaceful and unified Lebanon, they are not deeply involved in
the particulars of Lebanese politics. Those interviewed
stressed the Diaspora's spirit of integration, insisting the
Lebanese conflict's ethnic divisions for the most part do not
exist among Lebanese-Brazilians. Their presence in Brazil's
business and political life is extensive. Some of Brazil's
most successful business and banking leaders hail from the
Lebanese community (Safra Bank) as well as the country's
political lead
ers (Sao Paulo Mayor Gilberto Kasssab is Lebanese; there are
35 members of the Brazil-Lebanon Parliamentary Friendship
Group). Interlocutors told us that "there is not a province
in Brazil" that does not have an ethnic Lebanese elected to
some office. This group, which includes descendants of
original Lebanese immigrants, may number into the millions
and is the largest Lebanese community in the world.

--The third group is a subset -- really a leadership set --
of the broader Lebanese community described above. It
consists of very successful and well-connected business
persons who are intimately familiar with Lebanese politics.
They are often emotionally stricken by the turmoil they see
in their ancestral homeland, but have trouble identifying
worthy projects to support Lebanese democracy. Members of
this leadership group reject Hezbollah's extremism and Syrian
and Iranian interference in Lebanon, but are also
disappointed in the corruption that they say permeates all
sides of Lebanese politics. They also fear that the U.S.
will give up all hope for Lebanese democracy and "abandon"
the country. This last group proved most responsive to the
Cohen/Keil visit and expressed keen interest in learning more
about U.S. initiatives to support Lebanese democracy and in
how they could support such efforts.

Engagement Not Across-the-Board, But Intense


5. (C) While most Lebanese Brazilians keep Lebanon's
divisions at arms-length, the leaders described above can be
intensively engaged in the country. Several of our
interlocutors communicate with Lebanese political leaders
regularly. President Suheil Yamout of the Future Institute
provided perhaps the most concrete example of intense
selective engagement when he described his organizations "get
out the vote" drive for Lebanon's March parliamentary
elections to Cohen and Keil. The Future Institute aims to
fly some ten thousand Brazilian citizens who also hold
Lebanese passports back to Lebanon to vote this March,

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providing up to USD 10,000 in financial support to each one
to make the trip. The Future Institute also mentioned that a
likely 50,000 Lebanese will self-finance trips back to
Lebanon in the spring to participate in the March elections.
They are coordinating with Saad Hariri (son of the Prime
Minister assassinated in 2005, leader of the Lebanese Future
Movement) to ensure that they maximize thes
e votes in the right districts. Meeting participants
estimated that there are up to one half-million Lebanese in
Brazil who are eligible to hold Lebanese passports and who
could conceivably vote in that country's elections. When
asked, Lebanese stakeholders explained that the vast majority
of these are March 14 supporters.

Pre-Polarization Lebanon Meets Brazil


6. (C) The bulk of the Lebanese community in Brazil
contrasts with Lebanon itself in the critical area of
polarization. Where Lebanon has become a synonym for
religious/ethnic division and state breakdown, the older,
second/third/fourth generation Lebanese Brazilians are a
community noted for their openness, internal diversity, and
tolerance. (The more recently-arrived Shia do not fall under
this umbrella.) This became evident throughout a series of
meetings that featured local Lebanese Christians, Jews and
Sunni Muslims all conversing easily in fluent Lebanese
Arabic. Interlocutors attributed this to several factors:
the basic tolerance that older Lebanese, products of the
pre-1970s Beirut, have for one another; the "melting pot"
quality of Brazilian culture, which emphasizes mixing and
moderation, the reality that they all want to do business
with one another; and finally the conscious desire of the
Lebanese Brazilian community not to import Lebanon's troubles
into their community. Participants in our
meetings were eager to tell the story of the successful
Lebanese Brazilian "melting pot" back in the Middle East and
particularly in Lebanon. The Diaspora may have lessons for
the homeland when it comes to teamwork and tolerance.

Response Highly Positive, But....


7. (C) The majority of Lebanese Brazilian interlocutors
eagerly embraced the idea of coordinating engagement with
Lebanon with USG efforts. The community manages large
financial resources and appears more than willing to engage.
That said, conversations revealed two intriguing elements
that indicated frustration with the U.S. and a possible need
for more Muslim outreach here in Brazil.

-At the 9/25 cocktail, Lebanese Brazilian interlocutors
worriedly asked Cohen whether or not the U.S. had "given up"
on Lebanese democracy? Would the country be abandoned?
Cohen replied emphatically that this was not the case, that
the President and the Secretary remained firmly engaged.
Nonetheless, the participants' disquiet was evident along
with their enthusiasm for engagement.

-Our 9/25 visit to a local mosque was highly cordial. Sheik
Jihad Hassan presented his group as non-political and eager
for outreach. Nonetheless, during the visit, Cohen noted
that the mosque uses the Salafist (or more radical) of two
translations of the Koran available. In addition, when asked
about outside support for the mosque, the Sheik said that all
financial help came "from the community," an answer that
appeared to point to the local communitym, but that seemed
ambiguous in the face of the mosque's ample resources for
teaching and outreach.

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What Is To Be Done?


8. (C) Cohen discussed several concrete project ideas for
Lebanon with our interlocutors, who responded
enthusiastically. Among the ideas put forward:

-Filming a documentary about teamwork and tolerance among
Christians, Muslims and Jews in Brazil's Lebanese community
as a tolerance model that could be broadcast in Lebanon and
in the Middle East, possibly by Al-Jazeera Network.

-Creating a Brazilian-Lebanese Business Council that could
undertake high profile efforts to provide youth employment
and internships back in Lebanon. Cohen specifically
mentioned the "Teach for Lebanon" initiative as an example
that could maybe benefit from this.

-Developing a version of the "Birthright" Program (under a
different name) that reinforces the connections American Jews
feel for Israel by funding travel to Israel. Lebanese youth
overseas could be encouraged to travel and even work in
Lebanon.

-Translating interviews with USG Officials on Lebanon into
Portuguese for the Brazilian Lebanese community. Likewise,
USG officials who work on Lebanon could give interviews in
Brazilian media.

-Arranging for the Lebanon-Brazil Parliamentary Friendship
Group to visit Washington DC and meet U.S. officials
overseeing our policy toward Lebanon.

-Setting up meetings for the Lebanese CG in Sao Paulo, Joseph
Sayah, to discuss our policies with Washington officials when
he next travels to the United States.

-The vast majority of interlocutors suggested that Cohen make
a follow up visit to Brazil at some point in the near future.

Comment: The Multiple Benefits in Diaspora-Engagement


9. (C) The most important opportunity to emerge from
Cohen/Keil's visit was the possibility that Brazil's Lebanese
community could support USG efforts to build a democratic and
independent Lebanon. Community members expressed enthusiasm
for a range of cultural and economic initiatives and appeared
ready to self-finance efforts which would work in
coordination with the USG.


10. (C) As potentially important as the Lebanese Diaspora
might be for Lebanon, its members remain a strong and
influential group here in Brazil. Engaging them,
particularly some of their most influential leaders, on an
ancestral homeland issue near and dear to their hearts only
deepened our already good contacts with this critically
important local group and some of its most prominent members.


11. (C) The Lebanese Diaspora provides a bridge to more
moderate Muslim groups that would be excellent targets for
outreach.


12. (C) Lastly, Brazil's diversity and the strong
home-country connections of some of its Lebanese Diaspora
could make it a testing ground for both Diaspora-engagement
strategies and Muslim outreach in Latin America.


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Action Request:


13. (C) As a point of departure for efforts to engage Middle
Eastern communities in Brazil, Post would be interested in
models that other posts -- particularly the UK, France,
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, and Germany -- have employed
successfully for Muslim outreach. These would be good points
of departure for our own efforts to engage Middle Eastern
communities in Brazil.


14. (C) This message was coordinated with and cleared by the
U.S. Embassy, Brasilia.
WHITE