Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SAOPAULO335
2008-06-26 09:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BRAZILIAN OIL CONCESSION

Tags:  ECON ENRG EPET PGOV EINV EAGR BR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAO PAULO 000335 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC,WHA/EPSC, EEB/ESC
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSON/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR JHOEK
NSC FOR TOMASULO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PGOV EINV EAGR BR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BRAZILIAN OIL CONCESSION
MODEL WITH DELFIM NETTO

REF: A. RIO DE JANEIRO 138 B. RIO DE JANEIRO 135 C. 07 SAO PAULO 953 D. SAO PAULO 247


Classified By: Consul General Thomas White; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAO PAULO 000335

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC,WHA/EPSC, EEB/ESC
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSON/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR JHOEK
NSC FOR TOMASULO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PGOV EINV EAGR BR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BRAZILIAN OIL CONCESSION
MODEL WITH DELFIM NETTO

REF: A. RIO DE JANEIRO 138 B. RIO DE JANEIRO 135 C. 07 SAO PAULO 953 D. SAO PAULO 247


Classified By: Consul General Thomas White; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a June 13 meeting with the
Ambassador, former Minister of Finance Antonio Delfim Netto
(strictly protect),who is currently working as a political
and business consultant and widely believed to be an
unofficial advisor to President Lula, discussed his views on
Brazil's newfound oil reserves. Delfim Netto did not see any
strong desire on the part of the GOB to nationalize existing
fields or to substantially change the rules governing
concessions (Ref A). Instead, Delfim Netto indicated that
the GOB would support a continuation of the concession
framework but indicated that royalties would increase. He
stated that the GOB (through the National Energy Petroleum
Council) would maintain existing royalty agreements for all
fields currently under production, and that the National
Petroleum Agency (ANP) would open bidding for the exploration
rights on the new reserves to foreign competition. Delfim
Netto told the Ambassador that foreign investment would be
necessary to finance development of these reservoirs to
ensure near term production. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a meeting on June 13 with the Ambassador, Delfim
Netto said that the GOB and Petrobras do not share the same
goals for developing reserves from the newfound deep-water
petroleum discoveries. Many energy insiders believe
Petrobras is stalling the bidding process in order to pull
together the financial resources to win concessions for many
of the pre-salt oil blocks that had been removed from the
ninth round of oil block auctions in November 2007 (Refs B
and C). (Note: Petrobras was privatized in 1997 and 63
percent of the company is now publicly traded on the NYSE and

Bovespa. End Note.) Delfim Netto confirmed that the GOB
wanted to move forward on the exploration of these reserves
and that its goals and those of Petrobras have diverged.


3. (C) Despite the public rumors regarding changes to and
potential abolishment of the concession model, Delfim Netto
told the Ambassador that Brazil would keep the same
concession model, but could increase the percent of royalties
charged for the new reserves (Ref A); with which he agreed.
He added that he supported charging Petrobras royalties. He
told the Ambassador that he promoted the idea that Petrobras
open up the energy market and that the GOB realizes it would
be a necessary condition to finance the exploration of the
new reserves.


4. (C) Likewise, Delfim Netto acknowledged that Petrobras
was also a potential obstacle on biofuels issues. Given the
inherent conflict of interest for Petrobras to manage
bio-fuels initiatives, Delfim Netto told the Ambassador that
Petrobras should and would be "removed from the equation."
When asked if the GOB would support a spin-off of the
Biofuels Unit within Petrobras, Delfim Netto thought it was
assured.


5. (C) At the Ambassador's suggestion of high-level meetings
between the two governments, Delfim Netto said he estimated
that it would take 30 to 60 days for the GOB to solidify a
new concession and royalty framework, and that after that
point he believed USG engagement would be welcome.


6. (C) COMMENT: Delfim Netto's analysis of the divergence of
interests between Petrobras and the GOB bears watching.
Given the recent negative history of Bolivia's
privatizations, it seems unlikely that the GOB would abandon
the concession model and even more unlikely that it would
choose to change the rules on existing concessions.
Political and economic stability have been the cornerstones
of Brazil's policies and largely led to Brazil obtaining
investment grade status (Ref D). While some modification of
exploration and concession rules may take place for these new
"mega fields", it is doubtful the GOB would do anything to
undermine the overall image of Brazil as a stable country in
which to invest.


7. (C) Unlike Delfim Netto's view that the USG should hold
off on intervening to establish these new rules, Brazil's
Ministry of Mines and Energy, regulators, and US energy
companies have suggested that it could instead be within this
period for the USG to intervene. Indeed, Petrobras' interest
in consolidating deep-sea drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and
vertical integration in the US market could open an important
window of opportunity for the USG. Furthermore, ANP has
expressed interest in learning more about US small and medium
sized energy companies operating in US states to develop a
similar capacity in Brazil. They have, in fact, asked for
USG assistance to travel to the US to meet with and further
learn about this important part of the energy equation.
Clearly, Brazil's energy sector offers new partnerships,
opportunities, and increased energy security for the US. As
Brazil begins to increase exploration of its newfound
"pre-salt" reserves that many believe could be larger than
the finds in the North Sea, the US could potentially
capitalize on these new technologies to develop our own
offshore exploration efforts. Early engagement may be
crucial to ensuring that US firms will have opportunities in
this market. END COMMENT.

WHITE