Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SANTODOMINGO387
2008-03-17 19:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Santo Domingo
Cable title:  

ONDCP DIRECTOR, DEA ADMINISTRATOR CALL ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR MARR DR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #0387/01 0771924
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171924Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0351
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0890
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/CUSTOMS CARIBBEAN ATTACHE MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HQS DHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0024
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 000387 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR DEPIRRO AND WARD,
INL/LP RHAWKINS
DEA FOR MBRAUN, TPIERCE
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS ONDCP FOR BHITTLE AND CFIGUEROA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLEASE PASS OSDP, SOUTHCOM-JIATF
SOUTH AND FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR MARR DR
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR, DEA ADMINISTRATOR CALL ON
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT AND SENIOR OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador P. Robert Fannin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 000387

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR DEPIRRO AND WARD,
INL/LP RHAWKINS
DEA FOR MBRAUN, TPIERCE
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS ONDCP FOR BHITTLE AND CFIGUEROA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLEASE PASS OSDP, SOUTHCOM-JIATF
SOUTH AND FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR MARR DR
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR, DEA ADMINISTRATOR CALL ON
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT AND SENIOR OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador P. Robert Fannin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On February 25, White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director John Walters,
accompanied by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Acting
Administrator Michele Leonhart, U.S. Ambassador P. Robert
Fannin, ONDCP and DEA Chiefs of Staff, and poloff called on
Dominican President Leonel Fernandez to discuss factors
influencing the fight against illegal narcotics trafficking
into the Dominican Republic. While the U.S. delegation
emphasized the role of Venezuela in shipping narcotics
through the Caribbean corridor, President Fernandez focused
on the perceived reduction of U.S. assistance to the region
and called for the transfer of high-technology items to fight
a second "front on the war against terrorism." In subsequent
discussions on February 26 between members of the U.S.
delegation and the Dominican Attorney General, the head of
the DEA-equivalent National Directorate for Drug Control
(DNCD),the President of the ONDCP-equivalent National
Council on Drugs (CND),the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief
of the National Police, and the Director of Customs, detailed
not only their anti-narcotics planning, but also the need for
increased resources to effectively perform counternarcotics
duties. End Summary.

--------------
President Fernandez
--------------

-- Partnership and the Price Thereof


2. (C) The meeting opened with Director Walters' suggestion
of a possible joint U.S. - Dominican response to the regional
narcotics threat given the significant expansion of both
cocaine trafficking and money laundering in the region, as
well as an increase in both demand and drug-fueled
criminality in the Dominican Republic.


Walters held out the joint U.S. - Mexican response as an
example of success, but noted that it is proving a
double-edged sword for the Caribbean; the Mexican Attorney
General has stated privately, "we're winning here, it's going
to the Caribbean." Walters thought the shift of trafficking
from Mexico to the Caribbean "a frightening trend" and
committed to working with the Dominican government "sooner
rather than later."

Fernandez, in turn, welcomed "partnership" with the United
States ("you can count on us as a partner") and promptly
called for the provision of "more equipment, better training,
and more collaboration." He went on to suggest that a
current lack of U.S. assistance, especially in regard to
surveillance platforms, was likely attributable to the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He suggested that
the proper approach for the United States would be to look at
the Dominican Republic as a "potential beachhead for
terrorism" and drug trafficking as "another front on the war
against terror."

Fernandez described the Dominican government's pending
purchase of Brazilian-manufactured SuperTucanos as a
"surveillance solution," and noted that "another solution for
the United States to help 'monitor' Dominican airspace would
be welcome." (Note: The SuperTucano is a turboprop light
ground attack/aerial interception platform that has been
publicly associated with building a Dominican "shoot down"
capability against trespassing civil aircraft. Fernandez has
privately asserted that he does not approve of shooting down
trespassing civil aircraft. End note.)

Considering the relative success of the Mexican government,
Fernandez also suggested a possible Dominican-Mexican
arrangement to explore best practices, identify specific bad
actors, and identify trends.


-- Effective tools: The DNCD, Wiretapping, and Extraditions

In giving kudos to the DNCD's vetted unit, Administrator
Leonhart mentioned another type of surveillance -- wire
intercepts, which she categorized as critical in penetrating
the upper echelons of narcotics organizations. In response,
Fernandez noted that he "had to make some changes" in this
regard, as the military had been illegally wiretapping
government officials and passing the information to
opposition political parties. ("We had some Watergate
business here.") Leonhart went on to pledge 60,000 USD in new
equipment and training to further the vetted unit's
capabilities and Fernandez agreed that the DNCD's head, Major
General Rafael Radhames Ramirez Ferreira, was totally
dedicated, always motivated, honest, and "doing a tremendous
job."

Walters thanked the Dominican government for allowing the
extradition of Dominican nationals, something that is "always
hard," but is also "an incredibly powerful tool that helps
reestablish the rule of law" (as seen in both Mexico and
Colombia).

-- Reduction in U.S. Demand

Noting that "it is best when supply and demand are tackled
together," Walters discussed the reduction in youth drug use,
as well as an overall decline in cocaine use, in the United
States. Walters stated that the United States "obviously
still had a problem," but that the United States is working
toward an increasingly rapid decline in consumption. ("We
are not trying to fight this on just one side.")

-- Specific requests for Equipment

In response to an open-ended inquiry ("How can we help?"),
Fernandez asked specifically for a ground-based radar system,
"technology" to enhance detection (air, land, and sea),
increased information sharing, and additional "go fast"
boats. Walters noted an overall "strain on resources," but
committed to raising these requests with U.S. Southern
Command's Admiral Stavridis in the context of support to the
general region.

-- Venezuela: Interdiction Coordination and Presidential
Summit Attendance

The issue of Venezuelan drug flights was raised by both
Leonhart and Walters, with Walters stressing that the United
States has repeatedly attempted to work together with
Venezuela on interdiction, but that investigation
demonstrates significant corruption among some Venezuelan
officials and that "many of the aircraft are coming from
controlled airfields." According to Walters, it is the
Venezuelan government's unwillingness to "take the necessary
steps" and its derogation of its international
responsibilities that has caused the increase in trafficking
throughout the region. Walters posited that this could be
suggestive of President Chavez having "lost control." He
then asked if Fernandez had any advice in dealing with the
Venezuelan government.

In response, Fernandez cautioned against making this into an
"ideological" issue and suggested that "we need Venezuela to
coordinate regional interdiction" and that Venezuela might
yet "collaborate with all of us." He suggested that he would
try to raise this issue with Chavez at the Rio Summit (Santo
Domingo, March 4-7, 2008) or, if not then, at a 2008
follow-on to last year's regional drug summit, hosted in
Santo Domingo.

Fernandez also stressed the importance of the presence of a
"high-ranking" U.S. official at this follow-on summit as a

signal of U.S. commitment to and interest in the region.

-- Fernandez Reiterates Message on U.S. Policy and Suggests
Sociological Underpinnings of Narcotrafficking

In closing, Fernandez again claimed that the United States
has decreased attention to the region and asserted that U.S.
consistency in word and deed is key to obtaining U.S. policy
goals. Walters and Fernandez agreed that Free Trade
Agreements are not a panacea and that countries must continue
to look at transnational threats.

Fernandez noted a study of internal migration and
urbanization is also in order, suggesting that the new urban
poor provide a recruiting ground for "soldiers" for drug
trafficking organizations, as well as a breeding ground for
drug users. In an acknowledgment of the growing
sophistication and power of locally-based drug kingpins, he
further exclaimed that the "modern drug trafficker is well
dressed - even asking for a meeting with the President."

--------------
CND President Mabel Feliz Baez
--------------

-- From Transit to Consumer


3. (C) In the first of the day-2 meetings, CND President
Feliz confirmed that the Dominican Republic in no longer
purely a transit country, rather it is both a transit country
and a consumer of illegal narcotics, largely as a result of
trafficking organizations' payment for transshipment with a
portion of the narcotics load; but one sign of the permeation
of drugs into society is that roughly 80 percent of the
nation's prisoners are incarcerated for drug-related crimes.
Another troubling sign is increased drug use among the
nation's youth.

-- Reaction and Future Plans

Feliz noted that neighborhood-intensive community policing
("Barrio Seguro") is effective in reducing drug-related crime
in specific areas; drugs nevertheless enter the Dominican
Republic with ease by land, air, and sea. The CND plans to
respond later this year to the narcotics problem with a
coordinated interdiction and prevention program that tackles
both supply and demand. One of the key facets of this plan,
which was developed with the assistance of the Organization
of American States' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission, is the involvement of other government
institutions as well as civil society. (A copy of the draft
plan has been pouched to ONDCP Figueroa and INL Hawkins.)
Walters suggested that, given Mexico's success in
interdicting illegal drugs (and the subsequent movement of
those drugs through the Caribbean corridor),such a
coordinated plan would be necessary.

-- Local Difficulties

Feliz complained of poor coordination among the various
agencies that participate in the money laundering committee
headed by the CND. Four separate agencies conduct
investigations -- the CND's Financial Analysis Unit (UAF),
the Attorney General's Office, the National Police, and the
DNCD -- but little information-sharing exists. Yet another
problem deals with asset forfeiture: assets seized under
criminal forfeiture laws are frozen until the final
disposition of the case in question, something that can take
several years. During the long wait funds and property can,
and have, disappeared and, of course, they remain unavailable
for law enforcement use.

-- Request for Assistance

Referencing last year's regional drug summit, Feliz
recognized that "the Dominican Republic can learn from other
countries." She then closed with a request for both training
and material support for the UAF. In response, Walters noted
that the ONDCP would be happy to assist the CND with planning
prevention programs and other alternatives. Leonhart, in
turn, offered to arrange technical assistance for the UAF in
terms of recruiting, vetting, and training members. (Note:
Given Feliz' accurate description of difficulties facing the
money laundering committee, Embassy strongly supports the
provision of assistance as requested. End note.)

--------------
DNCD President Ferreira
--------------


4. (C) In the following meeting, DNCD President Ferreira
reiterated the negative relationship between an "open border"
and narcotrafficking, suggesting that the DNCD has both "will
and personnel," but lacks the equipment necessary to track
down the drugs "gram by gram, distribution center by
distribution center" once they cross the frontier.

Ferreira lamented that, in the face of an "attack" by
Venezuela, the DNCD has to fight with the Dominican Armed
Forces for the use of an occasional borrowed military
helicopter. Moreover, Dominican helicopters are not
night-vision capable, so that the DNCD does not possess the
ability to rapidly respond to airdrops during nighttime
hours. Still, considering all these difficulties, DNCD drug
seizures in the last 18 months amounted to 30 percent of
total drug seizures during the previous 8 years.

Ferreira indicated that he was happy with the DEA's level of
cooperation and noted "we are paying the consequences of a
Venezuelan policy," but still blamed the United States' "lack
of attention" to the Caribbean and Latin America, as well as
an overly-politicized policy toward Venezuela, for
contributing to the current narcotics situation. For
Ferreira, this lack of attention would be at least partially
rectified through the increased use of Puerto Rican-based
Customs and Border Protection Blackhawk helicopters, as well
as an increase in the number of U.S. Coast Guard and DEA
exercises in both the Dominican Republic and the general
region.

Walters responded by recognizing the "acute" threat suffered
by the Dominican Republic and the need to more closely
partner with the GODR, especially considering that Venezuela
has persistently rebuffed the USG's repeated overtures to
coordinate on counternarcotics. Leonhart highlighted USG
support for the Dominican Republic via DEA's work in helping
form tactical operations teams, as well as an
counternarcotics operations center. Leonhart suggested that
the upcoming (June 2008) deployment of a U.S. ground-based
radar system may further improve the situation.

-------------- --------------
DR Navy Chief, Vice-Admiral Julio Cesar Ventura Bayonet
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In a brief meeting later that day, Vice-Admiral
Bayonet spoke of his bona fides as one of the founders of the
DNCD and stated directly that the Dominican Navy works
constantly to defend the nation from the scourge of drugs.
According to Bayonet, it is the Navy that is the principal
counternarcotics force in the Dominican Republic, as the
Dominican Air Force does not possess radars and is not
capable of night-flying. That said, the Naval response is
limited by the small number of go-fast boats the Navy
possesses, a lack of basic equipment, and poor interagency
cooperation (particularly with the DNCD and, more
specifically, with intelligence-sharing). In comparison,
Bayonet lauded the level of cooperation between the Dominican

Navy, the DEA, and the Embassy's Military Advisory and
Assistance Group.

In responding to Walters' question regarding the Navy's basic
needs, Bayonet noted radar systems, as well as both fixed and
rotary-wing aircraft, as priorities. Bayonet thought radar
to be particularly critical as, given the limitations
inherent in the radar data shared under CNIES, finding a
trafficker using only that data is "like finding a needle in
a haystack."

Leonhart committed to supporting Dominican Navy operations
through funding the purchase of fuel.

--------------
Working Lunch with Senior Officials
--------------


6. (C) The day's final event with government officials was a
working lunch, during which Customs Director Miguel Cocco,
Attorney General Radhames Jimenez Pena, and National Police
Chief Major General Rafael Guzman Fermin made presentations.

All agreed that the fight against drugs was the largest, most
difficult, and most critical issue facing the nation, and all
agreed that various factors impacted the fight.

-- Resources

Cocco noted that the Dominican Republic enters the fight
against narcotics traffickers at an obvious disadvantage, as
trafficking organizations have nearly unlimited resources and
access to high technology. The government, on the other
hand, lacks sufficient resources to even maintain aircraft on
patrol.

-- Legal Framework: RICO, Artificial Limitations, Asset
forfeiture, and Money Laundering

Guzman spoke of the increasing influence of organized
criminal groups in trafficking and his belief that current
Dominican law is inadequate to deal with the challenge. He
thinks tougher maximum sentences for trafficking are in order
and legislation similar to the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is necessary.

Guzman also told of a rash of drug-related killings of public
servants, including 25 police officers. Guzman thought a
1988 law that "took away" the authority of the National
Police to combat drug crimes "one of the greatest weaknesses"
in the Dominican legal framework. The National Police are
now involved in drug sweeps in an effort to confront
"microtrafficking" - the proliferation of street-corner
dealers. Guzman attributed the growth of microtrafficking to
impediments placed on money-laundering; these impediments
caused trafficking organizations to "pay in kind." Guzman
asserted, and Jimenez agreed, that funds raised by the local
sale of narcotics run into the millions and are used to "buy
judges, district attorneys, arms, and technology." (Jimenez:
"Narcotraffickers have penetrated the legal system.")

Cocco complained, as did Feliz earlier, that the Dominican
Republic cannot make use of assets seized in a criminal case
until the definitive end of that case (which is considered to
include an appeal to the Supreme Court). As cases can take
anywhere from 3 to 15 years to reach their conclusion, the
funds sit useless. Cocco favors a change in law to something
similar to the current Dominican Customs law, which allows
the immediate (administrative) seizure and forfeiture of
assets. Under the Customs law, seized moneys are immediately
sent to the Treasury, converted to pesos, and distributed
among various law enforcement entities. Under this formula,
individuals can still contest the seizure, but only the
Supreme Court can order the money refunded. (Note: a trial

court can order the refund, but that order can be appealed
upward to an appellate court, and finally the Supreme Court.
End note.)

Jimenez noted that his office is currently doing research
that will ultimately result in a revision of the Dominican
Republic's anti-money laundering statute, which should be a
principal weapon against traffickers, but is currently
loophole-ridden and "very weak." Like the aforementioned
criminal asset forfeiture provision, the money-laundering law
does not permit the timely distribution of seized assets.

-- Political Will

Cocco stated that there is a tendency in the Dominican
Republic to place inordinate focus on the lack of material
resources when thinking about counternarcotics, but Dominican
actors must ensure that there is also adequate political
will. Dominican actors are the ones that can and should go
after trafficking assets in the Dominican Republic.
Moreover, it is Dominican actors that must pay attention to
the impact of drugs on Dominican youth and society as a whole
(including its negative impact on modernization).

Part of this political will, as detailed by Jimenez, must be
the desire to professionalize the prosecutorial corps, as
well as improve prosecutors' pay. Without pay increases,
including pay increases for the DNCD and other law
enforcement agencies, the possibility of corruption within
the legal system will always remain.
FANNIN