NON-AVAILABILITY OF CBP INTERDICTION ASSETS

UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 001727

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INL/LP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DR KCRM PHUM PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: NON-AVAILABILITY OF CBP INTERDICTION ASSETS


1. (SBU) Summary. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Blackhawk helicopters stationed in Puerto Rico that have been
assisting the Dominican Republic Directorate for National
Drug Control (DNCD) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) in the interdiction of suspected
narcotics laden flights and boats have discontinued support
for an indefinite period. The support provided by CBP was
under OPERATION BROKEN BRIDGE and was discontinued after
recent hostile fire incidents directed by ground based
narcotics traffickers against the CBP helicopters. This has
caused a shut-down of interdiction end game efforts and drug
laden aircraft are delivering loads at an increased rate.
CBP cited safety concerns and the need to protect their
crews, DEA Special Agents and DNCD Tactical Response Team
members and has advised that they would be willing to
re-deploy in support of OPERATION BROKEN BRIDGE providing
they be authorized to deploy with U.S. manned weapons mounted
on the Blackhawk helicopters. By way of this cable, post is
reporting the problems with interdiction efforts and requests
guidance and assistance to resolve this issue. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Since August 2007, DEA Santo Domingo (SDCO) and
CBP Air and Marine Branch have been providing support to the
DNCD with OPERATION BROKEN BRIDGE. OPERATION BROKEN BRIDGE
is a Dominican led operation targeting illicit aircraft from
South America which are airdropping multi-ton quantities of
narcotics in remote areas of the DR during nighttime hours.
This operation's success has been attributed to the
deployment of the CBP Blackhawk helicopter which is
responsible for transporting the DR Tactical Response Team
(TRT) to the airdrop location. (Note: The DR lacks the
resources needed to effectively combat this threat (i.e.
antiquated helicopters not capable of flying at night and
over water, lack of night vision trained and qualified
pilots, etc.) and are solely reliant on the support provided
from CBP for end game operations).


3. (SBU) Once a suspect aircraft has been detected by the
Joint Inter Agency Task Force-South (JIATFS) and confirmed to
be heading for the DR, CBP deploys a CBP Blackhawk helicopter
and a DEA Special Agent Advisor from Puerto Rico to San
Isidro Air Force Base, DR to pick-up members of the DR TRT.
CBP then transports the DEA Special Agent Advisor and TRT
members to the suspected airdrop location for end game
operations.


4. (SBU) In the past several weeks, the CBP Blackhawk,
DEA Special Agent Advisor and TRT members have encountered an
increase in resistance from drug traffickers recovering drugs
from the airdrop. The level of violence has increased to
include drug traffickers firing at the Blackhawk crew and
group aboard, resulting in the DEA Special Agent Advisor and
DR TRT members taking a defensive posture and returning fire
with small arms fire. No U.S. or Dominican Officials on the
Blackhawk helicopter have been injured to date however; an
alleged drug trafficker was recently shot and killed. The
most recent shooting event occurred on October 9, 2008, when
CBP encountered two (2) drug traffickers shooting at the CBP
helicopter in an attempt to elude law enforcement
detection/apprehension.


5. (SBU) Since this event, CBP has terminated all
deployments to the DR in support of OPERATION BROKEN BRIDGE.
CBP has cited safety concerns and the need to protect their
crews, DEA Special Agent Advisor, Host Nation Counterparts
(TRT) and the helicopter that are being placed in harms way
from drug traffickers shooting at the helicopter. CBP has
advised that they would be willing to re-deploy to the DR in
support of OPERATION BROKEN BRIDGE providing they be
authorized to deploy with weapons mounted on the CBP
Blackhawk helicopter. These weapons would be manned by CBP
personnel and would be strictly utilized in self-defense when
encountering drug traffickers shooting at the Blackhawk
helicopter and crew, DEA Special Agent Advisor and Host
Nation Counterparts (TRT).


6. (SBU) DEA Santo Domingo has been in contact with DR
officials from the DNCD concerning this problem and the
possibility of permitting armed CBP Blackhawk helicopters to
operate in the DR. The DNCD has also been in contact with
the DR Secretary of Armed Forces regarding the issue and are
awaiting a response. Post's CBP Attache has been in contact
with the CBP Deputy Director of Air and Marine and with the
CBP Chief Counsel.


7. (SBU) Since the 9 October shooting incident and the
discontinuance of Blackhawk support, there have been 14
flights tracked into the DR, a noticeable increase
(approximately 30 to 40 percent) when compared to previous
periods of the same length. It is estimated these flights
carry an average of 400 kilograms of cocaine per trip,
resulting in approximately 6 metric tons of illicit drugs
delivered during this down time. Even though the DNCD has a
fully functional 24/7 Operations Center, a dedicated and
trained TRT of approximately 50 individuals that respond via
CBP Blackhawk helicopters and SUVs provided to the DR under
NAS programs, during Opertion Broken Bridge missions they are
defenseless without the support of the CBP Blackhawk. Based
on the known fact the TRT will no longer have the support of
the CBP Blackhawk, there is reason to believe the narcotics
organizations will take advantage of the downtime as the DNCD
now must rely solely on ground based interdiction which is
very difficult when considering the poor conditions of roads
and vastness of the remote drop zones.


8. (SBU) Much of the training and equipment (e.g. SUVs,
body armour, etc.) for the DNCD TRT are provided through INL
funded programs. This, coupled with the complexity of the
above issues and the fact that the ability to interdict
suspected drug laden aircraft as they deliver their loads is
at a standstill, warrants reporting and post seeks assistance
and guidance. Request DHS work with INL and WHA to review
these facts and circumstances and provide advice and
assistance to ensure all end game interdiction operations can
resume and that these efforts are legal and in accordance
with U.S. policies and laws.
FANNIN