Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SANAA1900
2008-11-26 07:49:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

CREATING INCENTIVES FOR YEMEN'S CT ENGAGEMENT

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV YM 
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R 260749Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0684
NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SANAA 001900 


DEPARTMENT FOR PRM:MKIMMITT AND S/CT:DDAILEY.
NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JUAN ZARATE.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV YM
SUBJECT: CREATING INCENTIVES FOR YEMEN'S CT ENGAGEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d).

S E C R E T SANAA 001900


DEPARTMENT FOR PRM:MKIMMITT AND S/CT:DDAILEY.
NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JUAN ZARATE.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV YM
SUBJECT: CREATING INCENTIVES FOR YEMEN'S CT ENGAGEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d).


1. (S) Embassy Sana'a wishes to express its appreciation for
the collective efforts of the Washington inter-agency process
that have identified both supply and financing sources for
the M-113 armored personnel carriers requested by President
Saleh. The purpose of this message is to ensure that the
timing of the delivery of these vehicles, and any other
equipment under consideration, supports and encourages
counter-terrorism initiatives in Yemen.


2. (S) Post has seen informal exchanges suggesting delivery
of the initial tranche of 25 M-113's via U.S. military C-5
aircraft. We do not/not support this course of action. In the
first instance, a series of C-5 flights into the otherwise
somnolent Sana'a International Airport would invite
considerable public and media speculation that President
Saleh himself might find unwelcome. He already has expressed
concern that Yemen's political opposition is eager to portray
him as an agent of American interests in the region, and a
sudden influx of military equipment arriving in a very
high-profile manner would only exacerbate that anxiety.
Furthermore, in the absence of any evidence that the ROYG is
engaging in CT operations that might usefully employ 25
M-113's, speculation would turn to other possible uses,
principal among them, suppression of the Houthi rebellion in
the northern Saada governorate, another outbreak of which is
viewed as increasingly likely by a range of observers here.
We believe the USG should avoid even the perception that it
is supporting the ROYG's exclusively military approach to
what still appears to us to be a largely internal conflict in
the north, the solution to which must include humanitarian
relief, reconstruction, and economic development.


3. (S) We propose instead delivery of the initial tranche of
25 M-113's via ship to Yemen. The period of time this mode of
shipment requires will provide us with opportunities to
receive required end-use assurances, and remind senior ROYG
officials that our ability to provide the additional vehicles
the President has requested depends on evidence of the
government's commitment to conduct operations against
al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) terrorists. Subsequent deliveries
would occur as these operations materialize.


4. (S) Similarly, we have seen informal exchanges regarding
delivery of 50 106mm recoilless rifles to the ROYG. Since we
have no recollection of President Saleh raising the issue of
106mm rifles in conversation in the past 15 months, it is
unclear to us how they came to be included in equipment under
consideration for delivery. Given genuine end-use concerns,
we welcome any additional background that would enable us to
support delivery of this weapon to the ROYG at this time.


5. (S) COMMENT. The biggest deficit in President Saleh's
counter-terrorism arsenal is political will. We cannot, nor
should we try to, correct this deficit with the untimely
delivery of military equipment that would suggest an
endorsement of the ROYG's reluctance to confront directly
terrorist activity in Yemen. Rather, we should use the
incentive of such deliveries to encourage development of a
ROYG strategy that will put this equipment to effective use.
In the absence of such a strategy, and the political will
that underpins it, we believe USG efforts to supply Yemen
with military equipment should move at a cautious, purposeful
pace of our ) not President Saleh's ) choosing. END
COMMENT.


SECHE