Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SANAA1881
2008-11-23 10:46:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

DAILEY DELIVERS STRONG CT MESSAGE TO ROYG OFFICIALS

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV YM 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 231046Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0658
S E C R E T SANAA 001881 


FOR S/CT AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV YM
SUBJECT: DAILEY DELIVERS STRONG CT MESSAGE TO ROYG OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Ambassador Dailey did not have the opportunity to clear this
cable before its release.

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SANAA 001881


FOR S/CT AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV YM
SUBJECT: DAILEY DELIVERS STRONG CT MESSAGE TO ROYG OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Ambassador Dailey did not have the opportunity to clear this
cable before its release.

Summary
--------------


1. (U) Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dell L. Dailey met
on December 16 and 17 with ranking ROYG security officials.
Assuring them that counterterrorism (CT) will continue to be
a priority for the new U.S. Administration, he pressed his
interlocutors for progress on effective CT legislation and
action against terrorist groups. He also urged them to
reinvigorate CT cooperation with the US and take needed steps
to improve the operation of Yemen's CT forces. While
reaction from his interlocutors was mixed, Dailey's firm
intervention delivered an timely reminder of high-level USG
concern over ROYG CT performance. End Summary.


2. (U) Dailey was given access to the key decision makers on
CT issues in Yemen including: Deputy Prime Minister for
Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi, Minister of
Interior Mutaher al-Masri, Presidential Office Director and
National Security Bureau Head Dr. Ali al-Anisi, and Political
Security Organization Chief Ghalib Qamish. Additionally,
Alimi hosted a luncheon for him that included Yemen's entire
Supreme Security Committee.

You Are A Target
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Dell L. Dailey began each of his meetings
with ROYG interlocutors by assuring them that the coming
change of Administration in the United States would not mean
decreased USG interest in counterterrorism (CT) issues or
decreased CT cooperation. (Note. Post's ROYG interlocutors
have been broadly in favor of the President-elect but some
seem to believe that the new Administration will not hold the
ROYG to its CT commitments. End Note.)


4. (S) Using examples of counterterrorism success in other
countries, Dailey highlighted the comparative lack of
movement on key issues by the ROYG. He specifically
emphasized enacting effective CT and CT finance legislation
(two areas where the ROYG is noticeably deficient) and the
need for aggressive offensive action against terrorist
groups. Appealing to ROYG self-interest, he pointed out that
terrorists fleeing more successful CT regimes will be looking

for safe havens and Yemen's porous borders and mountainous
topography combined with a permissive legal environment make
it an inviting destination. He added that recent attacks
demonstrate that al-Qaeda in Yemen is targeting the ROYG and
ROYG interests.


5. (S) To varying degrees, ROYG officials conceded Dailey's
points. All concurred that Yemen is a terrorist target.
(Note. Post's ROYG contacts frequently assert that th ROYG
is the real victim of terrorists in Yemen. End Note.)
Al-Anisi complained that current law to combat money
laundering (or terrorist finance) do not "meet our goals."
Qamish noted that the ack of an effective CT law meant that
his troopsoften arrested terrorists only to discover that
hey could not be prosecuted. He, however, diverte blame
for this shortcoming, saying "we know that legislation is
important but the opposition oppoes it." Others also
offered excuses for ROYG shrtcomings. Al-Alimi complained
that "people do ot appreciate the danger of terrorism, and
partyconflicts impede CT efforts." Qamish complained that
unrest inYemen's southern governorates and inSa'ada absorb
limited ROYG resources that otherwse would go to fight
terrorists.

Help Us HelpYou
--------------


6. (S) Dailey noted tha ROYG cooperation in investigating
the September 7 attack on the US Embassy had waned recently.
He told his interlocutors that the USG remains ready to help
and urged them to treat the USG as a partner. Al-Masri
denied any knowledge of a decrease in cooperation saying "no
one told me ... if you feel cooperation has declined I wish
you had told me before." (Note. LEGATT reports that
al-Masri himself is one of the main barriers to cooperation.
End Note.) Al-Anisi was even more defensive, complaining "we
feel like we are always being tested by the U.S. When will
we pass?"


7. (C) Dailey also pressed his interlocutors on the
importance of creating a ROYG-wide CT strategy that would
integrate all ROYG CT elements, and creating a joint CT
training center. Al-Anisi disagreed on the need for a formal
plan, saying that his organization has "practical and
effective" arrangements that allow for the various units to
work together. Al-Anisi was equally skeptical about Dailey's
suggestions that a working level mechanism was needed to
ensure information sharing between that various Yemeni CT
players. The NSB director spent a substantial amount of time
over lunch asserting the NSB and Supreme Security Committee
are sufficient to the task.

Expanding Yemen's CT forces
--------------


8. (C) Al-Masri broached with Dailey the idea for
facilitating response to terrorist activities outside of the
capital by creating four new units belonging to the existing
Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) located in the following
governorates: Hadramout, Abyan, Shebwa and Al-Jawf. Each
unit would have 40-50 members. Al-Masri asked if the USG
could provide training for 200 soldiers to fill those units.
(Note. It is not clear whether these units would be strike
units or support units. Embassy will follow up with MOI on
this and other questions and provide S/CT with a more
detailed proposal for its consideration. End Note.)

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador Dailey firmly delivered to his
interlocutors the messages that they needed to hear.
Al-Alimi's invitation to dine with the Supreme Security
Committee certainly seemed intended to convey a message of
partnership with the USG on CT issues. While their reactions
to his messages were mixed, his intervention moved the ball
forward by reinforcing in their minds that concerns the
Embassy raises with them on a regular basis about ROYG CT
cooperation and capacity are shared at high levels in the
USG. End Comment.


SECHE