GPC JITTERS OVER APRIL 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 001830


FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL YM
SUBJECT: GPC JITTERS OVER APRIL 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: SANAA 1458

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Although the ruling party is expected to
win easily in the upcoming parliamentary elections, President
Saleh has recently expressed fears about how the opposition
will portray his actions during the campaign. Some speculate
that he is overstating these fears to avoid taking actions he
does not want to take. Others, however, believe that, while
he knows victory is within his grasp, he is more concerned
about the legitimacy provided by a wide margin of victory in
elections that are seen as free and fair. END SUMMARY.

WHAT'S SALEH AFRAID OF?
--------------


2. (C) On a number of recent occasions, Yemeni President Ali
Abdullah Saleh framed his actions, or refusals to act, in
terms of how the opposition would use his actions against him
in the April 2009 parliamentary elections. With the Supreme
Council for Elections and Referenda (SCER) firmly controlled
by the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and the
continued struggles of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties
(JMP) coalition, fears of a GPC loss in the elections seem
unreasonable. Post's interlocutors overwhelmingly concur that
the GPC will easily win the elections. Sarah Phillips of the
National Democratic Institute (NDI) believes that even with a
"perfect storm" of negative factors working against it, the
GPC can't lose in April. Hassan Ali Saif of the Political
Development Forum, a local NGO, when asked if there was any
chance the GPC would lose, snarled derisively. Some observers
think Saleh might not be as anxious as he claims to be.
According to Mohamed Naji al-Shaif, a Yemeni businessman and
the son of the paramount sheikh of the Bakil tribal
confederation, "Sometimes Saleh exploits the Brothers (Islah)
to avoid doing what he doesn't want to do." (NOTE: As an
example of this tactic, Saleh attributes his reluctance to
crack down on extremists in certain tribal areas to his fear,
alleged or actual, of opposition from Islah. END NOTE.)

THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
--------------


3. (C) Notwithstanding the possibility that Saleh may be
overplaying his fears to manipulate foreign partners, his
strong-arm tactics in forming the SCER (reftel) and other
actions indicate genuine concern about the elections. On
October 28, an energy company executive told the Ambassador
that his company had been given clear instructions to get
their gas stream online before mid-April or not at all, since
the ROYG needed some "good news" right before the elections.


4. (C) The GPC wants the April 2009 elections to be
perceived, both by its domestic population and the
influential donor community, as free and fair. Deputy Prime
Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi
stated in a November 10 security-focused meeting with foreign
ambassadors, "Although it is actually to the advantage of the
GPC to delay the elections because of its current
parliamentary majority, we are subject to the laws and the
constitution to keep the elections on time." The GPC fears
that without the elections, the legitimacy of the current
regime could be brought into question. Nabil Basha, a GPC
member of parliament, told PolOff on November 4, "The
elections must happen on time. It would be better if other
parties participated, but it's their fault if they don't.
What's important is that the elections happen, and that they
happen on time."


5. (C) JMP members say they do not want the elections to
proceed without reforms. According to Dr. Muhammad Abdulmalik
al-Mutawakkil, deputy chairman of the JMP's Union of Popular
Forces (UPF) party and a professor at Sana'a University, "a
flawed election is worse than no election." A British
diplomat told PolOff that, in a new development, both the
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and Islah plan to boycott the
elections. Islah has also begun a campaign in the provinces
to inform its supporters about the boycott and urge them to
stay home on election day. By casting doubt on the legitimacy
of the process, the JMP could benefit more from sitting out
than from participating.


6. (C) According to another British diplomat, Saleh believes
that the GPC must win by a percentage at least in the
mid-eighties. She added that during the 2006 presidential
election, Saleh groused that a margin of victory like that
garnered by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2005 (88.6%)
was not sufficient. Saleh wants to burnish his legacy, not
see it weakened by what he perceives as anemic electoral
turnout. According to Sarah Phillips at NDI, a GPC win
percentage in the fifties or sixties would be seen by the
ruling party as an abject failure.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Observers expect the GPC to win comfortably in the
upcoming parliamentary elections, but sometimes winning isn't
enough. Saleh wants his party to not only win the elections,
but win them by a substantial margin that will vindicate his
leadership. At the same time, he wants the elections to be
deemed free and fair both domestically and internationally.
Saleh believes his continued mandate depends on achieving a
significant win in a "real" election. END COMMENT.


SECHE